Re: supermajority options
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 07:56:16AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Raul Miller:
> > [3] (current draft) Only consider supermajority in terms of defeating
> > the default option. This gets a bit confusing to think about in the
> > context of transitive defeats.
> >
> See my earlier email -- this method favors the default option
> unreasonably.
It is not that simple: Suggestion [5] also gives a lot of weight to
the default option, as per the example in my last message. My last
message also contains a tweak to [3] that favors the default option
less. But you might argue it favors the supermajority option
unreasonable (by letting it win even when it doesn't have a
supermajority).
> > [4] (my old hobby horse) Consider supermajority in every comparison
> > involving an option with a supermajority requirement. This gets a bit
> > confusing to think about in the context of transitive defeats.
>
> This method invites insincere voting. If the voter would like to vote ABD,
> but thinks that B would be strong enough to block any supermajority by A,
> they might vote ADB instead. Not good.
Huh? Swapping D and B doesn't directly affect B's strength compared
to A. This strategy is no more effective here than in straight
Condorcet voting. You might like [4] if you think [3] favors the
supermajority option too much.
Andrew
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