Re: analysis of a per-option quorum

[Raul Miller <moth@debian.org>]

On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 12:32:39AM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
>     Let N(a,b) be the number of votes which prefer options a
>     over options b.  Let Q be some positive number (the quorum).
> 
>     step 1: remove each option x, where N(x,default) < Q
>             (per-option quorum)
> 
>     step 2: Use Condorcet voting with Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential
>             Dropping on the remaining options.
...
>   Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion (SDSC),
>   Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion (WDSC):
>     These do hold.  If a majority prefers A over B then it can vote
>     ADB to ensure that B cannot win.  Either B fails at the quota
>     criterion or the SDSC condition of the Condorcet method ensures
>     that B looses.

Are you considering the default option to be a candidate?  [You don't
say one way or the other.] If you do then these criterion do not hold.

For example: quorum is 45 and three people vote, all three prefer option
A over option D.  These three people have no way of voting which prevents
the election from defaulting.

I've not taken the time to study the rest of your analysis.

Thanks,

-- 
Raul