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# Re: Nov 19 draft of voting amendment

```For concreteness, here's what I think we should be doing:

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A.6 Vote Counting

1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on.  Not
all options need be ranked.  Ranked options are considered
preferred to all unranked options.  Unranked options are not
considered preferred to other unranked options.  The details
of how ballots may be filled out will be included in the Call

2. If fewer ballots are received than the required quorum for
the vote, the default option is declared the winner.

3. If a majority of N:1 is required for an option A, and V(A,D)
is less than or equal to N * V(D,A), then A is dropped from
consideration. If a simple majority is required for an option A,
and V(A,D) is less than or equal to V(D,A), then A is dropped
from consideration.

4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and defeats:

a. An undropped option A is in the Schwartz set if for all
undropped options B, either A transitively defeats B,
or B does not transitively defeat A.

b. An option, A, transitively defeats an option, C, if A defeats
C or if there is some other option, B, where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.

c. An option, A, defeats an option, B, if V(A,B) is larger than
V(B,A), and the (A,B) defeat has not been dropped.

d. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.

5. If there are defeats within the Schwartz set, we drop the weakest
such defeats, and return to step 4.

a. A defeat is in the Schwartz set if both of its options are
in the Schwartz set.

b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X) is
less than V(B,Y).  Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).

c. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
than it. There may be more than one such defeat.

6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the
winner is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there
is only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote may choose which of
those option wins.

"RATIONALE": Voters should rank the options they prefer in the
order that they prefer them, ranking the default option higher
than any options they believe are unacceptable. If they believe
the current situation is superior to any of the proposed changes,
they should propose or second an amendment that simply preserves
the status-quo, and only rank options they find unacceptable below
the default option.

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Following the "rationale" seems perfectly reasonable, to me: for the non-free
vote if you *like* non-free, you're better off voting:

[ 2 ] DROP non-free
[ 1 ] KEEP non-free
...

than

[ 2 ] DROP non-free
[ 1 ] FURTHER discussion

After all, you probably don't want further discussion - you want to keep
non-free. I don't believe there are any signficant stability problems if
things are done this way, either. There can occassionally be cases where
insincere voting might benefit you more than sincere voting, but I don't
believe there are signficantly more than in straight Condorcet voting.

Cheers,
aj

--
Anthony Towns <aj@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``If you don't do it now, you'll be one year older when you do.''
```

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