Re: Constitutional voting, definition of cummulative prefererence
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:08:33AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
> The only ambiguity I see with the current constitution is that it cannot
> cope with circular ties. Fortunately, these are rare, so this has never
> been an issue for Debian (all previous elections have had a Condorcet
> winner). One thing I do as part of my involvement in the EM list is to
> carry out simulation studies of voting methods, and these suggest that
> circular ties will occur naturally about 5% of the time, so this isn't that
> big an issue. It's a minor bug which could result in some embarrassment and
> confusion at some point, but it is not likely to affect anything in the
> short run.
> A minimal fix for this problem is to replace A.6.3 with A.6.4, and then
> create a new A.6.4 which uses the Smith set to restrict the group of
> potential winners that are then subjected to the STV count rule (or for
> something even simpler, just leave it out entirely, in which case *all* the
> candidates would be selected from using STV, if there is no Condorcet
> winner). This doesn't address the issue of mixing options with different
> supermajority requirements, but I think Debian's existing rules can
> unambiguously cope with that -- they're sub-optimal, but serviceable. I
> don't see anything wrong with the quota requirements as they're written.
Wouldn't this change the results in some cases which are currently
> >> 3) It is not necessary to define 'cumulatively preferred' unless it is
> >> used as part of a voting method definition, and I'd need to see the
> >> whole method in order to judge the merits of your system.
> >As I indicated above, I'm considering the implications of explicitly
> >specifying that an option "Dominates" another only where the first
> >option is transitively preferred to the second, but the second is not
> >transitively preferred to the first.
> >[I'm aware that there are many alternate voting methods. But, I think
> >we need to at least consider options based on the "don't fix what
> >ain't broke" approach. If we completely rewrite large sections of the
> >constitution we may create future problems which we won't notice for a
> >year or two.]
> I disagree with this approach. If you redefine the underlying concepts
> used in pairwise voting, you may be able to make minimal wording
> changes yet create profound changes in voting results. On the other
> hand, major changes in wording can have little or no effect on
Can you show me an example where the current constitution is unambiguous,
and my change would alter the outcome (or make the outcome ambiguous)?
[Or, can you show me an example where my change wouldn't fix the
I don't want to shy away from what I see as the proper solution, to
avoid a problem which doesn't exist.