Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of
> opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible.
> Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be
> called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV" on most of the voting method
> websites) because it "biases selection in favor of first preferences
> at the expense of other preferences". Obviously, you think this is a
> good thing.
Sure -- but logically, if I'm a voter, and I indicate a second and third
preference on a ballot, that shouldn't weaken the strength of my first
preference.
> Others may prefer other methods because they reverse the preferences of
> the fewest number of voters. This is a different criteria. Is it
> better? I think so, and so do others. You may not. Most of the
> "traditional" Condorcet resolution methods favor this criteria.
Sure -- mediocracy tends to be easy to agree on.
> I think the best we can do is list a bunch of alternatives, with
> explanations and descriptions of their advantages and disadvantages,
> and discuss from there.
I'm willing (see above :).
> > I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to
> > Single Transferrable Vote. [So it's not comprehensive.] I don't think
> > "my favorite web site doesn't mention this system" somehow makes the
> > systems it proposes to be somehow superior.
>
> The URL I'm looking at does not discuss IRV under Condorcet resolution
> methods, but it does discuss IRV as a technique for general elections
> (i.e., an alternative to Condorcet). I'm looking at http://
> www.electionmethods.org/, which does have some faults (it has an
> -extreme- bias towards Condorcet and against plurality and IRV, for
> instance).
Turns out I'd missed the cite.
> > The nice thing about Single Transferrable Vote is that it
> > automatically makes first preference votes more important than
> > second preference votes (and so on). There are few systems at the
> > URL you cited which even attempt this.
>
> Most of the Condorcet resolution methods I've seen don't attempt that
> because they don't see it as a valid criteria. They see overruling the
> fewest number of votes to be a valid criteria.
Right, but that's method, and not a reason why.
> Actually, I did find one description of a voting concern that does
> severely impact IRV. IRV requires the multiple examination of every
> ballot, which can be prohibitive if the number of ballots is huge,
> or fragile, etc. Since most voting reform sites are concerned with
> reform of real-world elections, where there may be millions of voters,
> this is a bigger concern for them than it is for us. And this is a
> valid criteria for them to consider. The Condorcet resolution methods
> normally discussed can all be computed solely from the aggregate
> voting data, not needing to further examine individual ballots.
In other words: it requires computerization of the voting process.
And: rankings actually indicate preference, as they represent more than
the ability to cast multiple votes.
> > > This sort of situation happens no matter how you resolve a cyclic
> > > tie, though. You pretty much have to be "unfair" in some sense to
> > > choose a winner. As I said, I'm inclined to suspect that there
> > > other means are likely to be more optimal, although I'm not clear
> > > exactly how.
> >
> > It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the
> > constitution than you've thought this through and have a better
> > alternative to propose.
>
> No voting system is going to be 100% "fair" to all voters. The
> question remains, however: How do we determine "fairness" to evaluate
> different methods?
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
--
Raul
Reply to: