I have some questions: 1) If none of the proposed courses of actions meets the 3:1 majority requirement, it is the same as "FURTHER DISCUSSION", right? Constitution A.6.3[1] seems to imply "yes". 1a) If so, what do we do? Is Anthony Towns's interpretation of the Social Contract and its bindingness upon the sarge release *uncontroversially* the status qup? 1b) If not, what do we do? 2) Are we seeking only one "winner" in this pending GR? The Condorcet Method (with Cloneproof/SSD) is easily capable of showing us the most favored M of N choices. The last round of SPI Board elections worked this way; there were three vacancies and several candidates; the 3 most preferred candidates under the Condorcet method filled the seats. 2a) Constitution A.6.8[1] strongly implies that the answer to 2) is "yes". Is it wise to have our SRP bind us to only one of several possible outcomes? Should we amend the Constitution to allow running an election with multiple winners, or is it felt this is not necessary, since approving M of N choices is thought to only be applicable to electing personnel, and we have no election process for anything apart from the solitary office of Project Leader? 2b) If the answer to 2) is "no", whose responsibility is it to reconcile any conflicts between multiple "winners"? [1] http://www.debian.org/devel/constitution -- G. Branden Robinson | I'm a firm believer in not drawing Debian GNU/Linux | trend lines before you have data branden@debian.org | points. http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | -- Tim Ottinger
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature