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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)



On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
> pairwise preferences:
> 
> 	A dominates B, 60 to 40
> 	A dominates F, 100 to 10
> 	B dominates F, 100 to 10

What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this?  [It's other
parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]

> which are then scaled with supermajority requirements to be:
> 
> 	B dominates A, 40 to 20
> 	A dominates F, 33.3 to 10
> 	B dominates F, 100 to 10
> 
> and B wins by dominating all other options.

Supermajority doesn't apply on votes which are not final votes,
since they won't be ammending the constitution.

-- 
Raul



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