RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote:
> I agree with you that supermajority requirements don't make much sense when
> using the 'Concorde' (Condorcet's) method. Usually, a supermajority
> requirement is used to prevent drastic flip-flops in the basic policies of
> an organisation. [...]
> Therefore, provided a good compromise is proposed by someone, there should
> never be any radical changes in policy, merely gradual evolution. In this
> case, supermajority requirements simply undermine the democratic character
> of an organisation, by giving the supporters of the status quo much more
> political power than those who prefer change.
I agree that the supermajority policies can be overused, and thus I think
they should be used sparingly, but some issues are indeed binary issues
that don't lend themselves to compromise. There are many more issues that
seem binary that it takes a lot of time and thought to come up with a
clever compromise, for which no one thinks of the compromise in time for
the election.
There are some matters for which the conservative nature of requiring a
supermajority are entirely appropriate. The founding principles of an
organization should be defended with more than a majority, since at
represents the cumulative wisdom of the organization, including past
members (especially the founding members). Depending on the age/luck of
an organization, past members need that voice because any other expression
may involve coming back from the grave. Those that really want to alter
the character of an organization can often "vote with their feet" (which
is almost certainly true with Debian).
Rob
----
Rob Lanphier
robla@eskimo.com
http://www.eskimo.com/~robla
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