Re: List of bugs that *must* be fixed before releasing Slink
- To: Brian White <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Cc: Wichert Akkerman <email@example.com>, Brian White <firstname.lastname@example.org>, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com
- Subject: Re: List of bugs that *must* be fixed before releasing Slink
- From: Ben Collins <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Sun, 31 Jan 1999 21:43:45 -0500
- Message-id: <19990131214345.G14190@visi.net>
- Mail-followup-to: Brian White <email@example.com>, Wichert Akkerman <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Brian White <email@example.com>, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org
- In-reply-to: <36B4ACE0.B6B006D8@pobox.com>; from Brian White on Sun, Jan 31, 1999 at 02:20:00PM -0500
- References: <E1068wgemail@example.com> <19990131140100.B2824@cs.leidenuniv.nl> <36B4ACE0.B6B006D8@pobox.com>
On Sun, Jan 31, 1999 at 02:20:00PM -0500, Brian White wrote:
> > Previously Brian White wrote:
> > > apache 32204 user directories allow symlinks to other files  (Johnie Ingram <firstname.lastname@example.org>)
> > We should just force SymLinksIfOwnerMatch for /home to solve this.
> You know, I don't see this as "grave". It means that a user can
> effectively "export to the world" any file readable by www-data. In
> general, this means only things that can be read by public. So,
> the user can't intentionally export anything that he/she couldn't already
> do by other means.
> The problem comes with unintentional exports... Well, it's a bug. I
> don't see it as being a security hole. Thoughts?
Did you ever think that exporting vital databases that are under cgi
control would be a serious security bug? And what about apache using
the mod_roaming module, which saves netscape preferences, _security_
certificates, bookmarks, and preferences.
This doesn't even count directories protected by .htpasswd auth whose
files can easily be compromised, and even the .htpasswd file itself can
be exported by linking it as a .html file, exposing all the excrypted
password information, which may be the same passwords as the system.
This is a serious security hole, we need to close before release.
----- -- - -------- --------- ---- ------- ----- - - --- --------
Ben Collins <email@example.com> Debian GNU/Linux
UnixGroup Admin - Jordan Systems Inc. firstname.lastname@example.org
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