[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Bug#804818: Improved interplay between StrictHostKeyChecking and VerifyHostKeyDNS



On Thu, 2015-11-12 at 19:21 +1300, martin f krafft wrote:
> also sprach Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.net> [2015-
> 11-12 17:41 +1300]:
> > > Hopeful, I was looking at VerifyHostKeyDNS for relief
> > The default StrictHostKeyChecking isn't secure enough for you, but
> > you'd trust DNSSEC here? ;-P
> Why should I not trust DNSSEC for hosts where I control the zone?
Well depends on what you mean by "control the zone":
If your resolver that verifies the DNSSEC has its starting trust anchor
for DNSSEC above your zone (i.e. at the root zone), every higher level
could in principle make forgeries.

But if you have your own keys configured as trust anchors in your
resolvers, than you're of course safe - but then I wouldn't see the big
advantage of using DNSSEC.

:-)

Cheers,
Chris.

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


Reply to: