On Mon, 2015-02-09 at 19:18 -0800, Russ Allbery wrote: > It does make sense to me that it should be possible to both enable GSS-API > key exchange and otherwise restrict the key exchange methods that the > server will use in the absence of GSS-API. (Ideally, you could restrict > which specific GSS-API key exchange algorithms would be used, but I think > there aren't many to choose from anyway.) Well at least it should be absolutely obvious and controllable for an admin, which methods are used and which are forbidden. I think automatic/hidden fallbacks are generally a security problem (unless of course one they are simply part of default options, which one can override. > This whole thing is unnecessarily irritating due to the OpenSSH project's > unwillingness to take the key exchange patches, forcing every distribution > to apply them separately and meaning that they aren't considered when > upstream works on things like the configuration parameter for key exchange > methods. Well... unfortunately upstream blocks (or at least shows no interest in) many things that might be nice or security relevant :( Cheers, Chris.
Attachment:
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature