Re: Accepted openssh 1:4.7p1-9 (source all i386)
On Wed, May 14, 2008 at 01:10:20AM -0400, Joey Hess wrote:
> openssh-server checks for weak keys and offers to replace them. But what
> if you have a strong DSA host key, and have been using the broken libssl
> for years? My understanding (from irc, possibly very flawed) is that
> this effecively exposed the DSA host key to brute-forcing. So that key
> should also probably be replaced. Having ssh handle one case but not the
> other on upgrade could lead to a false sense of security..
This is technically true. However I believe that the DSA host key is
only actually used if the RSA host key is missing (or the client doesn't
want it for some reason), so I think it's academic and am not worrying
about it too much right now. At some point I think it makes sense to
stop generating a DSA host key by default; I doubt anyone would notice
the difference.
The above premise could use some verification, though; it's not obvious
from debug output and I haven't had time to check the source or the
protocol RFCs.
--
Colin Watson [cjwatson@debian.org]
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