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[Question] Is there security module/mechanism which can prevent such an attack?

Hi everyone,
     Recently I saw a vulnerability - Android KeyStore Stack Buffer Overflow  CVE-2014-3100. It's about Android keystore daemon.
/* KeyStore is a secured storage for key-value pairs. In this implementation,
* each file stores one key-value pair. Keys are encoded in file names, and
* values are encrypted with checksums. The encryption key is protected by a
* user-defined password. To keep things simple, buffers are always larger than
* the maximum space we needed, so boundary checks on buffers are omitted. */
The threat model: One vulnerability exists in keystore and attackers can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary codes after bypassing the DEP, ASLR and stack cookie protection. Let's see this legitimate app (uid:10053), which sends a request to keystore for generating a key pair (alias: a). The keys are stored in the path "/data/misc/keystore/user_0/10053_USRCERT_a" and "/data/misc/keystore/user_0/10053_USRPKEY_a" (the permission are "-rw------- keystore keystore" ).  Now, attackers can easily write a malicious app, which can send a malformed or overflowed request message to keystore to trigger that vulnerability and execute malicious codes. Then, the malicious app can read the 10053_USRCERT_a key file. In fact, this malicious app is not allowed to read this key file according to the current data isolation mechanism in keystore daemon. But, this mechanism will be nothing once attackers can trigger keystore's  vulnerabilities. 

      Even though SEAndroid is applied into Android after version 4.4, the above attack can still not be prevented by SEAndroid. In SEAndroid,  each file and process are labeled, and the file operation is restricted by policies. Obviously, the keystore process is allowed to create/read/write all key files in the "/data/misc/keystore/" directory for each app in SEAndroid policies, even when keystore process has been compromised. The SEAndroid cannot dynamically adjust policies to restrict file operations on different files according to different requested apps. So, this attack can bypass the defense of SEAndroid. 

KeyStore daemon can access all the keys which applications store in its folder. So If there is vulnerability in this daemon, malicious app can trigger this vulnerability to compromise this daemon and let the daemon to work for it. Malicious app can get all the keys on behalf of Keystore daemon.

I have a doubt about Daemon in Linux is vulnerable to this kind of attack. There are many daemon in Linux, such as init,sshd,httpd,ftpd,syslogd...... 
First, what's the difference between with Linux daemon and Android daemon?
Second, is there a possibility to attack daemon in Linux by this kind of attack? If there is, as shown in the paragraph with underline, this kind of attack is not prevented by SEAndroid. Can SELinux prevent this kind of attack?

    P.S.CC me because I don't subscribe debian-security mailing list.
    Thanks in advance.

My best regards to you.

     No System Is Safe!

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