On 2014-05-30 13:43, Alfie John wrote:
On Fri, May 30, 2014, at 10:24 PM, Michael Stone wrote:On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 10:15:01PM +1000, Alfie John wrote: >The public Debian mirrors seem like an obvious target for governments to >MITM. I know that the MD5s are also published, but unless you're >verifying them with third parties, what's stopping the MD5s being >compromised too? The cryptographic signatures that are validated automatically by apt.What's stopping the attacker from serving a compromised apt?
How would you get the client's system to install it in the first place? (More specifically, how would you get the cryptographic signature to match your package, given a lack of access to any of the keys trusted by the client's system?)
There's something of a chicken and egg problem to your idea. Regards, Adam