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Bug#1059694: marked as done (bookworm-pu: package filezilla/filezilla_3.63.0-1+deb12u3)

Your message dated Sat, 10 Feb 2024 13:11:20 +0000
with message-id <E1rYn8a-002yaC-Hf@coccia.debian.org>
and subject line Released with 12.5
has caused the Debian Bug report #1059694,
regarding bookworm-pu: package filezilla/filezilla_3.63.0-1+deb12u3
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this
message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system
misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact owner@bugs.debian.org
immediately.)


-- 
1059694: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1059694
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message --- 
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: bookworm
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
X-Debbugs-Cc: filezilla@packages.debian.org
Control: affects -1 + src:filezilla

[ Reason ]
This will address the no-DSA CVE-2023-48795. The vulnerability has been
fixed in sid and trixie.

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-48795

[ Impact ]
The impact of putty itself and by proxy also for the SFTP support in filezilla is
fortunately very limited : At most an attacker could use abuse terrapin to force
the use of SHA1 as negotiated during the server-sig-algs exchange:
https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/vuln-terrapin.html

[ Tests ]
The fix has been extensively tested by upstream.

I have built affected filezilla versions with and without patching and performed a variety of
connection, transfer and general use tests to be sure this update will work as users expect.

[ Risks ]
The updating of the embedded putty within filezilla from upstream commits was very straightforward
and is minimal risk.

[ Checklist ]
 [X] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog
 [X] I reviewed all changes and I approve them
 [X] attach debdiff against the package in (old)stable
 [X] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable

[ Other info ]
None.

Regards

Phil

-- 
Playing the game for the games sake.

Web:

* Debian Wiki: https://wiki.debian.org/PhilWyett
* Website: https://kathenas.org
* Social Debian: https://pleroma.debian.social/kathenas/
* Social Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/kathenasorg/


diff -Nru filezilla-3.63.0/debian/changelog filezilla-3.63.0/debian/changelog
--- filezilla-3.63.0/debian/changelog	2023-08-14 11:48:50.000000000 +0100
+++ filezilla-3.63.0/debian/changelog	2023-12-22 11:35:10.000000000 +0000
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+filezilla (3.63.0-1+deb12u3) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * [CVE-2023-48795] - Add patch: CVE-2023-48795.patch.
+    - Ref: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-48795
+
+ -- Phil Wyett <philip.wyett@kathenas.org>  Fri, 22 Dec 2023 11:35:10 +0000
+
 filezilla (3.63.0-1+deb12u2) bookworm; urgency=medium
 
   * Add patch: 0003-crash-when-removing-filetypes-from-list.patch (Closes: #1043556)
diff -Nru filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch
--- filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch	2023-12-22 11:35:10.000000000 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+Description: Cherry pick and modify upstream fix for CVE-2023-48795.
+
+Picked from upstream commits:
+
+filezilla: https://svn.filezilla-project.org/filezilla?view=revision&revision=11047
+filezilla: https://svn.filezilla-project.org/filezilla?view=revision&revision=11048
+filezilla: https://svn.filezilla-project.org/filezilla?view=revision&revision=11049
+filezilla: https://svn.filezilla-project.org/filezilla?view=revision&revision=11051
+
+Author: Phil Wyett <philip.wyett@kathenas.org>
+
+================================================================================
+--- a/src/putty/ssh.h.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/ssh.h	2023-12-22 11:23:42.211363089 +0000
+@@ -1684,6 +1684,7 @@
+               alloc_channel_id_general(tree, offsetof(type, localid)))
+ 
+ void add_to_commasep(strbuf *buf, const char *data);
++void add_to_commasep_pl(strbuf *buf, ptrlen data);
+ bool get_commasep_word(ptrlen *list, ptrlen *word);
+ 
+ int verify_ssh_manual_host_key(Conf *conf, char **fingerprints, ssh_key *key);
+--- a/src/putty/ssh2bpp.c.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/ssh2bpp.c	2023-12-22 09:48:54.045561126 +0000
+@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@
+     BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
+     const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
+     const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
+-    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression)
++    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression,
++    bool reset_sequence_number)
+ {
+     struct ssh2_bpp_state *s;
+     assert(bpp->vt == &ssh2_bpp_vtable);
+@@ -155,6 +156,9 @@
+         s->out.mac = NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    if (reset_sequence_number)
++        s->out.sequence = 0;
++
+     if (delayed_compression && !s->seen_userauth_success) {
+         s->out.pending_compression = compression;
+         s->out_comp = NULL;
+@@ -179,7 +183,8 @@
+     BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
+     const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
+     const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
+-    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression)
++    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression,
++    bool reset_sequence_number)
+ {
+     struct ssh2_bpp_state *s;
+     assert(bpp->vt == &ssh2_bpp_vtable);
+@@ -237,6 +242,9 @@
+      * start consuming the input data again. */
+     s->pending_newkeys = false;
+ 
++    if (reset_sequence_number)
++        s->in.sequence = 0;
++
+     /* And schedule a run of handle_input, in case there's already
+      * input data in the queue. */
+     queue_idempotent_callback(&s->bpp.ic_in_raw);
+--- a/src/putty/ssh2transport.c.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/ssh2transport.c	2023-12-22 10:01:13.199216745 +0000
+@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@
+     &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
+ };
+ 
++const static ptrlen ext_info_c = PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("ext-info-c");
++const static ptrlen ext_info_s = PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("ext-info-s");
++const static ptrlen kex_strict_c =
++    PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++const static ptrlen kex_strict_s =
++    PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++
+ static ssh_compressor *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
+ {
+     return NULL;
+@@ -447,6 +454,31 @@
+ {
+     PktIn *pktin;
+ 
++    if (!s->enabled_incoming_crypto) {
++        /*
++         * Record the fact that we've seen any non-KEXINIT packet at
++         * the head of our queue.
++         *
++         * This enables us to check later that the initial incoming
++         * KEXINIT was the very first packet, if scanning the KEXINITs
++         * turns out to enable strict-kex mode.
++         */
++        PktIn *pktin = pq_peek(s->ppl.in_pq);
++        if (pktin && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
++            s->seen_non_kexinit = true;
++
++        if (s->strict_kex) {
++            /*
++             * Also, if we're already in strict-KEX mode and haven't
++             * turned on crypto yet, don't do any actual filtering.
++             * This ensures that extraneous packets _after_ the
++             * KEXINIT will go to the main coroutine, which will
++             * complain about them.
++             */
++            return false;
++        }
++    }
++
+     while (1) {
+         if (ssh2_common_filter_queue(&s->ppl))
+             return true;
+@@ -840,10 +872,14 @@
+             }
+         }
+         if (i == KEXLIST_KEX && first_time) {
+-            if (our_hostkeys)          /* we're the server */
+-                add_to_commasep(list, "ext-info-s");
+-            else                       /* we're the client */
+-                add_to_commasep(list, "ext-info-c");
++            if (our_hostkeys) {        /* we're the server */
++                add_to_commasep_pl(list, ext_info_s);
++                add_to_commasep_pl(list, kex_strict_s);
++
++            } else {                   /* we're the client */
++                add_to_commasep_pl(list, ext_info_c);
++                add_to_commasep_pl(list, kex_strict_c);
++            }
+         }
+         put_stringsb(pktout, list);
+     }
+@@ -853,15 +889,23 @@
+     put_stringz(pktout, "");
+ }
+ 
++static bool kexinit_keyword_found(ptrlen list, ptrlen keyword)
++{
++    for (ptrlen word; get_commasep_word(&list, &word) ;)
++        if (ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(word, keyword))
++            return true;
++    return false;
++}
++
+ static bool ssh2_scan_kexinits(
+-    ptrlen client_kexinit, ptrlen server_kexinit,
++    ptrlen client_kexinit, ptrlen server_kexinit, bool we_are_server,
+     struct kexinit_algorithm kexlists[NKEXLIST][MAXKEXLIST],
+     const ssh_kex **kex_alg, const ssh_keyalg **hostkey_alg,
+     transport_direction *cs, transport_direction *sc,
+     bool *warn_kex, bool *warn_hk, bool *warn_cscipher, bool *warn_sccipher,
+     Ssh *ssh, bool *ignore_guess_cs_packet, bool *ignore_guess_sc_packet,
+     int *n_server_hostkeys, int server_hostkeys[MAXKEXLIST], unsigned *hkflags,
+-    bool *can_send_ext_info)
++    bool *can_send_ext_info, bool first_time, bool *strict_kex)
+ {
+     BinarySource client[1], server[1];
+     int i;
+@@ -1064,16 +1108,18 @@
+     /*
+      * Check whether the other side advertised support for EXT_INFO.
+      */
+-    {
+-        ptrlen extinfo_advert =
+-            (server_hostkeys ? PTRLEN_LITERAL("ext-info-c") :
+-             PTRLEN_LITERAL("ext-info-s"));
+-        ptrlen list = (server_hostkeys ? clists[KEXLIST_KEX] :
+-                       slists[KEXLIST_KEX]);
+-        for (ptrlen word; get_commasep_word(&list, &word) ;)
+-            if (ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(word, extinfo_advert))
+-                *can_send_ext_info = true;
+-    }
++    if (kexinit_keyword_found(
++            we_are_server ? clists[KEXLIST_KEX] : slists[KEXLIST_KEX],
++            we_are_server ? ext_info_c : ext_info_s))
++        *can_send_ext_info = true;
++
++    /*
++     * Check whether the other side advertised support for kex-strict.
++     */
++    if (first_time && kexinit_keyword_found(
++            we_are_server ? clists[KEXLIST_KEX] : slists[KEXLIST_KEX],
++            we_are_server ? kex_strict_c : kex_strict_s))
++        *strict_kex = true;
+ 
+     if (server_hostkeys) {
+         /*
+@@ -1242,14 +1288,28 @@
+ 
+         if (!ssh2_scan_kexinits(
+                 ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->client_kexinit),
+-                ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->server_kexinit),
++                ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->server_kexinit), s->ssc != NULL,
+                 s->kexlists, &s->kex_alg, &s->hostkey_alg, s->cstrans,
+                 s->sctrans, &s->warn_kex, &s->warn_hk, &s->warn_cscipher,
+                 &s->warn_sccipher, s->ppl.ssh, NULL, &s->ignorepkt, &nhk, hks,
+-                &s->hkflags, &s->can_send_ext_info))
++                &s->hkflags, &s->can_send_ext_info, !s->got_session_id,
++                &s->strict_kex))
+             return; /* false means a fatal error function was called */
+ 
+         /*
++         * If we've just turned on strict kex mode, say so, and
++         * retrospectively fault any pre-KEXINIT extraneous packets.
++         */
++        if (!s->got_session_id && s->strict_kex) {
++            ppl_logevent("Enabling strict key exchange semantics");
++            if (s->seen_non_kexinit) {
++                ssh_proto_error(s->ppl.ssh, "Received a packet before KEXINIT "
++                                "in strict-kex mode");
++                return;
++            }
++        }
++
++        /*
+          * In addition to deciding which host key we're actually going
+          * to use, we should make a list of the host keys offered by
+          * the server which we _don't_ have cached. These will be
+@@ -1438,7 +1498,9 @@
+             s->ppl.bpp,
+             s->out.cipher, cipher_key->u, cipher_iv->u,
+             s->out.mac, s->out.etm_mode, mac_key->u,
+-            s->out.comp, s->out.comp_delayed);
++            s->out.comp, s->out.comp_delayed,
++            s->strict_kex);
++        s->enabled_outgoing_crypto = true;
+ 
+         strbuf_free(cipher_key);
+         strbuf_free(cipher_iv);
+@@ -1529,7 +1591,9 @@
+             s->ppl.bpp,
+             s->in.cipher, cipher_key->u, cipher_iv->u,
+             s->in.mac, s->in.etm_mode, mac_key->u,
+-            s->in.comp, s->in.comp_delayed);
++            s->in.comp, s->in.comp_delayed,
++            s->strict_kex);
++        s->enabled_incoming_crypto = true;
+ 
+         strbuf_free(cipher_key);
+         strbuf_free(cipher_iv);
+--- a/src/putty/ssh2transport.h.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/ssh2transport.h	2023-12-22 09:57:12.374747626 +0000
+@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@
+     bool warned_about_no_gss_transient_hostkey;
+     bool got_session_id;
+     bool can_send_ext_info, post_newkeys_ext_info;
++    bool strict_kex, enabled_outgoing_crypto, enabled_incoming_crypto;
++    bool seen_non_kexinit;
+     int dlgret;
+     bool guessok;
+     bool ignorepkt;
+--- a/src/putty/sshbpp.h.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/sshbpp.h	2023-12-22 09:53:53.327065403 +0000
+@@ -138,12 +138,14 @@
+     BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
+     const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
+     const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
+-    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression);
++    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression,
++	bool reset_sequence_number);
+ void ssh2_bpp_new_incoming_crypto(
+     BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
+     const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
+     const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
+-    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression);
++    const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression,
++	bool reset_sequence_number);
+ 
+ /*
+  * A query method specific to the interface between ssh2transport and
+--- a/src/putty/sshcommon.c.orig	2021-06-29 09:59:07.000000000 +0100
++++ b/src/putty/sshcommon.c	2023-12-22 11:20:35.839502891 +0000
+@@ -606,6 +606,13 @@
+  * lists of protocol identifiers in SSH-2.
+  */
+ 
++void add_to_commasep_pl(strbuf *buf, ptrlen data)
++{
++    if (buf->len > 0)
++        put_byte(buf, ',');
++    put_datapl(buf, data);
++}
++
+ void add_to_commasep(strbuf *buf, const char *data)
+ {
+     if (buf->len > 0)
diff -Nru filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/series filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/series
--- filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/series	2023-08-14 11:47:29.000000000 +0100
+++ filezilla-3.63.0/debian/patches/series	2023-12-22 11:35:10.000000000 +0000
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 # 11_use-decimal-si-by-default.patch
 0002-Add-patch-to-not-build-fzshellext.patch
 0003-crash-when-removing-filetypes-from-list.patch
+CVE-2023-48795.patch

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--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message --- 
Version: 12.5

The upload requested in this bug has been released as part of 12.5.

--- End Message ---
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