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Bug#1025647: marked as done (buster-pu: package libapache2-mod-auth-mellon/0.14.2-1+deb10u1)



Your message dated Tue, 06 Dec 2022 21:02:28 +0000
with message-id <243cfae99206bdbb6754fec69fac161eaa3171af.camel@adam-barratt.org.uk>
and subject line Re: Bug#1025647: buster-pu: package libapache2-mod-auth-mellon/0.14.2-1+deb10u1
has caused the Debian Bug report #1025647,
regarding buster-pu: package libapache2-mod-auth-mellon/0.14.2-1+deb10u1
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this
message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system
misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact owner@bugs.debian.org
immediately.)


-- 
1025647: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1025647
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: buster
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu

Hi,

I propose this upload to buster to fix a relatively minor security issue
(open redirect) in libapache2-mod-auth-mellon.

The changes are already in sid and bookworm for a longer time, and in
bullseye for the first part.


Cheers,
Thijs
diff -Nru libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/changelog libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/changelog
--- libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/changelog	2019-03-22 12:10:11.000000000 +0000
+++ libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/changelog	2022-12-06 15:39:13.000000000 +0000
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+libapache2-mod-auth-mellon (0.14.2-1+deb10u1) buster; urgency=high
+
+  * Upload to fix security issues:
+    - Open redirect in logout endpoint (CVE-2019-13038 CVE-2021-3639)
+
+ -- Thijs Kinkhorst <thijs@debian.org>  Tue, 06 Dec 2022 15:39:13 +0000
+
 libapache2-mod-auth-mellon (0.14.2-1) unstable; urgency=high
 
   * New upstream security release. (closes: #925197)
diff -Nru libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2019-13038.patch libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2019-13038.patch
--- libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2019-13038.patch	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2019-13038.patch	2022-12-06 15:36:36.000000000 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From a52645391d08739a6a96df21e2506d3e57b888dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Valentin <awakenine@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 13:30:36 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix open redirect CVE-2019-13038
+
+Resolves:
+    https://github.com/latchset/mod_auth_mellon/issues/2
+
+The original reported redirect attack was:
+    https://application.com/mellon/login?ReturnTo=http:www.malicious.com
+---
+ auth_mellon_util.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth_mellon_util.c b/auth_mellon_util.c
+index fd442f9..e53a98f 100644
+--- a/auth_mellon_util.c
++++ b/auth_mellon_util.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ int am_validate_redirect_url(request_rec *r, const char *url)
+ 
+     /* Sanity check of the scheme of the domain. We only allow http and https. */
+     if (uri.scheme) {
++        /* http and https schemes without hostname are invalid. */
++        if (!uri.hostname) {
++            return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++        }
+         if (strcasecmp(uri.scheme, "http")
+             && strcasecmp(uri.scheme, "https")) {
+             AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
diff -Nru libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2021-3639.patch libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2021-3639.patch
--- libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2021-3639.patch	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/CVE-2021-3639.patch	2022-12-06 15:38:26.000000000 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 42a11261b9dad2e48d70bdff7c53dd57a12db6f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: AIMOTO Norihito <aimoto@osstech.co.jp>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 22:57:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent redirect to URLs that begin with '///'
+
+Visiting a logout URL like this:
+    https://rp.example.co.jp/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=///fishing-site.example.com/logout.html
+would have redirected the user to fishing-site.example.com
+
+With the patch, this URL would be rejected.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3639
+---
+ auth_mellon_util.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth_mellon_util.c b/auth_mellon_util.c
+index 2f8c9c3..6a686db 100644
+--- a/auth_mellon_util.c
++++ b/auth_mellon_util.c
+@@ -927,6 +927,10 @@ int am_check_url(request_rec *r, const char *url)
+ {
+     const char *i;
+ 
++    if (url == NULL) {
++        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
+     for (i = url; *i; i++) {
+         if (*i >= 0 && *i < ' ') {
+             /* Deny all control-characters. */
+@@ -943,6 +947,12 @@ int am_check_url(request_rec *r, const char *url)
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (strstr(url, "///") == url) {
++        AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST, r,
++                          "URL starts with '///'");
++        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
+     return OK;
+ }
+ 
diff -Nru libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/series libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/series
--- libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/series	2018-01-06 12:58:18.000000000 +0000
+++ libapache2-mod-auth-mellon-0.14.2/debian/patches/series	2022-12-06 15:39:01.000000000 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+CVE-2019-13038.patch
+CVE-2021-3639.patch

--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Hi,

On Tue, 2022-12-06 at 21:10 +0100, Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
> I propose this upload to buster to fix a relatively minor security
> issue
> (open redirect) in libapache2-mod-auth-mellon.
> 
> The changes are already in sid and bookworm for a longer time, and in
> bullseye for the first part.

SRM no longer handle updates to buster, as it moved to LTS support at
the end of June. Please co-ordinate any updates there with the LTS
team.

Regards,

Adam

--- End Message ---

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