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Bug#919712: marked as done (stretch-pu: package samba/2:4.5.16+dfsg-1)



Your message dated Sat, 16 Feb 2019 11:36:33 +0000
with message-id <1550316993.21192.50.camel@adam-barratt.org.uk>
and subject line Closing bugs for updates included in 9.8
has caused the Debian Bug report #919712,
regarding stretch-pu: package samba/2:4.5.16+dfsg-1
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this
message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system
misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact owner@bugs.debian.org
immediately.)


-- 
919712: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=919712
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
Tags: stretch
Severity: normal

Hello stable release team,

I want to upload a new version of samba on top of current stretch-security
(2:4.5.12+dfsg-2+deb9u4). The changelog is:

samba (2:4.5.16+dfsg-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * New upstream release (latest 4.5.x)
    - Drop merged patches
  * Fix CVE-2018-14629 regression when there're more than 20 records on a non
    CNAME record.
  * Fix rmdir on non-empty samba directory (Closes: #915248)
  * Ignore nmbd start errors when there is no non-loopback interface
    (Closes: #893762)
  * Ignore nmbd start errors when there is  no local IPv4 non-loopback interface
    (Closes: #859526)
  * s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leak in manage_gensec_request() (Closes: #919611)

 -- Mathieu Parent <sathieu@debian.org>  Fri, 18 Jan 2019 07:35:15 +0100

The upstream changes are summarized in:
https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.5.13.html

The complete diff is too big, but can be obtained from the git repo:

  git diff 9014cb5484b9fe550ce6547e05135626fbd5d179..faa8dd2a11501e75fee2aeeae4e943b0b17aa38c

See the attached diff of the debian directory.

I will 'dch --release' before upload. Is the version numbering correct? Should I
use stretch or stretch-security as dist?

Regards

Mathieu Parent
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index bbd5b90d9a3..a2f86eff095 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+samba (2:4.5.16+dfsg-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * New upstream release (latest 4.5.x)
+    - Drop merged patches
+  * Fix CVE-2018-14629 regression when there're more than 20 records on a non
+    CNAME record.
+  * Fix rmdir on non-empty samba directory (Closes: #915248)
+  * Ignore nmbd start errors when there is no non-loopback interface
+    (Closes: #893762)
+  * Ignore nmbd start errors when there is  no local IPv4 non-loopback interface
+    (Closes: #859526)
+  * s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leak in manage_gensec_request() (Closes: #919611)
+
+ -- Mathieu Parent <sathieu@debian.org>  Fri, 18 Jan 2019 07:35:15 +0100
+
 samba (2:4.5.12+dfsg-2+deb9u4) stretch-security; urgency=high
 
   * New upstream security release
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2018-14629-v4-5.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2018-14629-v4-5.patch
index 5b1c52b30cc..79d8cf76666 100644
--- a/debian/patches/CVE-2018-14629-v4-5.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2018-14629-v4-5.patch
@@ -191,3 +191,284 @@ index bef21f6bdaf..51a86198b54 100644
 -- 
 2.11.0
 
+From 6c73a2b3d77115d69f99baa2452d6539c697fc3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 15:21:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2018-14629 dns: fix CNAME loop prevention using
+ counter regression
+
+The loop prevention should only be done for CNAME records!
+
+Otherwise we truncate the answer records for A, AAAA or
+SRV queries, which is a bad idea if you have more than 20 DCs.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13600
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source4/dns_server/dns_query.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source4/dns_server/dns_query.c b/source4/dns_server/dns_query.c
+index 0c26f9f8fb5..19c4dc32faa 100644
+--- a/source4/dns_server/dns_query.c
++++ b/source4/dns_server/dns_query.c
+@@ -439,7 +439,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_authoritative_send(
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct tevent_context *ev,
+ 	struct dns_server *dns, const char *forwarder,
+ 	struct dns_name_question *question,
+-	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs);
++	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs,
++	size_t cname_depth);
+ static WERROR handle_authoritative_recv(struct tevent_req *req);
+ 
+ struct handle_dnsrpcrec_state {
+@@ -455,7 +456,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_dnsrpcrec_send(
+ 	struct dns_server *dns, const char *forwarder,
+ 	const struct dns_name_question *question,
+ 	struct dnsp_DnssrvRpcRecord *rec,
+-	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs)
++	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs,
++	size_t cname_depth)
+ {
+ 	struct tevent_req *req, *subreq;
+ 	struct handle_dnsrpcrec_state *state;
+@@ -471,7 +473,7 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_dnsrpcrec_send(
+ 	state->answers = answers;
+ 	state->nsrecs = nsrecs;
+ 
+-	if (talloc_array_length(*answers) >= MAX_Q_RECURSION_DEPTH) {
++	if (cname_depth >= MAX_Q_RECURSION_DEPTH) {
+ 		tevent_req_done(req);
+ 		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+ 	}
+@@ -516,7 +518,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_dnsrpcrec_send(
+ 	if (dns_authoritative_for_zone(dns, new_q->name)) {
+ 		subreq = handle_authoritative_send(
+ 			state, ev, dns, forwarder, new_q,
+-			state->answers, state->nsrecs);
++			state->answers, state->nsrecs,
++			cname_depth + 1);
+ 		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+ 			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+ 		}
+@@ -600,6 +603,8 @@ struct handle_authoritative_state {
+ 
+ 	struct dns_res_rec **answers;
+ 	struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs;
++
++	size_t cname_depth;
+ };
+ 
+ static void handle_authoritative_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+@@ -608,7 +613,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_authoritative_send(
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct tevent_context *ev,
+ 	struct dns_server *dns, const char *forwarder,
+ 	struct dns_name_question *question,
+-	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs)
++	struct dns_res_rec **answers, struct dns_res_rec **nsrecs,
++	size_t cname_depth)
+ {
+ 	struct tevent_req *req, *subreq;
+ 	struct handle_authoritative_state *state;
+@@ -626,6 +632,7 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_authoritative_send(
+ 	state->forwarder = forwarder;
+ 	state->answers = answers;
+ 	state->nsrecs = nsrecs;
++	state->cname_depth = cname_depth;
+ 
+ 	werr = dns_name2dn(dns, state, question->name, &dn);
+ 	if (tevent_req_werror(req, werr)) {
+@@ -647,7 +654,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *handle_authoritative_send(
+ 	subreq = handle_dnsrpcrec_send(
+ 		state, state->ev, state->dns, state->forwarder,
+ 		state->question, &state->recs[state->recs_done],
+-		state->answers, state->nsrecs);
++		state->answers, state->nsrecs,
++		state->cname_depth);
+ 	if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+ 		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+ 	}
+@@ -679,7 +687,8 @@ static void handle_authoritative_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ 	subreq = handle_dnsrpcrec_send(
+ 		state, state->ev, state->dns, state->forwarder,
+ 		state->question, &state->recs[state->recs_done],
+-		state->answers, state->nsrecs);
++		state->answers, state->nsrecs,
++		state->cname_depth);
+ 	if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+@@ -1010,7 +1019,8 @@ struct tevent_req *dns_server_process_query_send(
+ 
+ 		subreq = handle_authoritative_send(
+ 			state, ev, dns, (forwarders == NULL ? NULL : forwarders[0]),
+-			&in->questions[0], &state->answers, &state->nsrecs);
++			&in->questions[0], &state->answers, &state->nsrecs,
++			0); /* cname_depth */
+ 		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+ 			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+ 		}
+@@ -1112,7 +1122,8 @@ static void dns_server_process_query_got_auth(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ 		subreq = handle_authoritative_send(state, state->ev, state->dns,
+ 						   state->forwarders->forwarder,
+ 						   state->question, &state->answers,
+-						   &state->nsrecs);
++						   &state->nsrecs,
++						   0); /* cname_depth */
+ 
+ 		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+ 			return;
+-- 
+2.19.2
+
+
+From 77fac10d0171b731bce38e5596928b6d618ed4d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aaron Haslett <aaronhaslett@catalyst.net.nz>
+Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 18:37:27 +1300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2018-14629: Tests to expose regression from dns cname
+ loop fix
+
+These tests expose the regression described by Stefan Metzmacher in
+discussion on the bugzilla paged linked below.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13600
+Signed-off-by: Aaron Haslett <aaronhaslett@catalyst.net.nz>
+---
+ python/samba/tests/dns.py | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ selftest/knownfail.d/dns  | 14 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/python/samba/tests/dns.py b/python/samba/tests/dns.py
+index 102269c7156..65e4a3b0b3f 100644
+--- a/python/samba/tests/dns.py
++++ b/python/samba/tests/dns.py
+@@ -918,6 +918,103 @@ class TestComplexQueries(DNSTest):
+         max_recursion_depth = 20
+         self.assertEquals(len(response.answers), max_recursion_depth)
+ 
++    # Make sure cname limit doesn't count other records.  This is a generic
++    # test called in tests below
++    def max_rec_test(self, rtype, rec_gen):
++        name = "limittestrec{0}.{1}".format(rtype, self.get_dns_domain())
++        limit = 20
++        num_recs_to_enter = limit + 5
++
++        for i in range(1, num_recs_to_enter+1):
++            ip = rec_gen(i)
++            self.make_dns_update(name, ip, rtype)
++
++        p = self.make_name_packet(dns.DNS_OPCODE_QUERY)
++        questions = []
++
++        q = self.make_name_question(name,
++                                    rtype,
++                                    dns.DNS_QCLASS_IN)
++        questions.append(q)
++        self.finish_name_packet(p, questions)
++
++        response = self.dns_transaction_udp(p, host=self.server_ip)
++
++        self.assertEqual(len(response.answers), num_recs_to_enter)
++
++    def test_record_limit_A(self):
++        def ip4_gen(i):
++            return "127.0.0." + str(i)
++        self.max_rec_test(rtype=dns.DNS_QTYPE_A, rec_gen=ip4_gen)
++
++    def test_record_limit_AAAA(self):
++        def ip6_gen(i):
++            return "AAAA:0:0:0:0:0:0:" + str(i)
++        self.max_rec_test(rtype=dns.DNS_QTYPE_AAAA, rec_gen=ip6_gen)
++
++    def test_record_limit_SRV(self):
++        def srv_gen(i):
++            rec = dns.srv_record()
++            rec.priority = 1
++            rec.weight = 1
++            rec.port = 92
++            rec.target = "srvtestrec" + str(i)
++            return rec
++        self.max_rec_test(rtype=dns.DNS_QTYPE_SRV, rec_gen=srv_gen)
++
++    # Same as test_record_limit_A but with a preceding CNAME follow
++    def test_cname_limit(self):
++        cname1 = "cnamelimittestrec." + self.get_dns_domain()
++        cname2 = "cnamelimittestrec2." + self.get_dns_domain()
++        cname3 = "cnamelimittestrec3." + self.get_dns_domain()
++        ip_prefix = '127.0.0.'
++        limit = 20
++        num_recs_to_enter = limit + 5
++
++        self.make_dns_update(cname1, cname2, dnsp.DNS_TYPE_CNAME)
++        self.make_dns_update(cname2, cname3, dnsp.DNS_TYPE_CNAME)
++        num_arecs_to_enter = num_recs_to_enter - 2
++        for i in range(1, num_arecs_to_enter+1):
++            ip = ip_prefix + str(i)
++            self.make_dns_update(cname3, ip, dns.DNS_QTYPE_A)
++
++        p = self.make_name_packet(dns.DNS_OPCODE_QUERY)
++        questions = []
++
++        q = self.make_name_question(cname1,
++                                    dns.DNS_QTYPE_A,
++                                    dns.DNS_QCLASS_IN)
++        questions.append(q)
++        self.finish_name_packet(p, questions)
++
++        response = self.dns_transaction_udp(p, host=self.server_ip)
++
++        self.assertEqual(len(response.answers), num_recs_to_enter)
++
++    # ANY query on cname record shouldn't follow the link
++    def test_cname_any_query(self):
++        cname1 = "cnameanytestrec." + self.get_dns_domain()
++        cname2 = "cnameanytestrec2." + self.get_dns_domain()
++        cname3 = "cnameanytestrec3." + self.get_dns_domain()
++
++        self.make_dns_update(cname1, cname2, dnsp.DNS_TYPE_CNAME)
++        self.make_dns_update(cname2, cname3, dnsp.DNS_TYPE_CNAME)
++
++        p = self.make_name_packet(dns.DNS_OPCODE_QUERY)
++        questions = []
++
++        q = self.make_name_question(cname1,
++                                    dns.DNS_QTYPE_ALL,
++                                    dns.DNS_QCLASS_IN)
++        questions.append(q)
++        self.finish_name_packet(p, questions)
++
++        response = self.dns_transaction_udp(p, host=self.server_ip)
++
++        self.assertEqual(len(response.answers), 1)
++        self.assertEqual(response.answers[0].name, cname1)
++        self.assertEqual(response.answers[0].rdata, cname2)
++
+ 
+ class TestInvalidQueries(DNSTest):
+ 
+diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/dns b/selftest/knownfail.d/dns
+index 916afc1af85..a9b16eaac2a 100644
+--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/dns
++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/dns
+@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
+ #
+-# rodc and vampire_dc require signed dns updates, so the test setup
+-# fails, but the test does run on fl2003dc
++# rodc and vampire_dc require signed dns updates, so these tests' setups
++# fail, but they pass on fl2003dc
+ ^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_loop\(rodc:local\)
+ ^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_loop\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_A\(rodc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_A\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_AAAA\(rodc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_AAAA\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_SRV\(rodc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_record_limit_SRV\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_limit\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_limit\(rodc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_any_query\(vampire_dc:local\)
++^samba.tests.dns.__main__.TestComplexQueries.test_cname_any_query\(rodc:local\)
+-- 
+2.19.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/fix-rmdir.patch b/debian/patches/fix-rmdir.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1db437695de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/fix-rmdir.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: Anoop C S <anoopcs@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2018 12:28:41 +0530
+Subject: s3/libsmb: Explicitly set delete_on_close token for rmdir
+
+The current implementation of `rmdir` hopes to get the directory deleted
+on closing last open handle when FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE is set on it. But
+for non-empty directories Windows doesn't error out during an open call.
+Following that we internally refuse to set initial delete_on_close while
+opening a non-empty directory. This prevents us from trying to delete
+the directory when last open handle is closed.
+
+Instead of relying on FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE during an open we explicitly
+set delete_on_close token on directory handle once it is available. This
+ensures that NT_STATUS_DIRECTORY_NOT_EMPTY is returned for `rmdir` on
+non-empty directories while closing open directory handle.
+
+Applied-Upstream: https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/6b68e3eca631c04d6d57c489daf60f64732fc86d
+Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13204
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/915248
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/samba/+bug/1795772
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+index 237e6bb2b..d4ff8bd28 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+@@ -682,13 +682,20 @@ NTSTATUS cli_smb2_rmdir(struct cli_state *cli, const char *dname)
+ 			FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY, /* file attributes */
+ 			FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE|FILE_SHARE_DELETE, /* share_access */
+ 			FILE_OPEN,		/* create_disposition */
+-			FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE|FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE,	/* create_options */
++			FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE,	/* create_options */
+ 			&fnum,
+ 			NULL);
+ 
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		return status;
+ 	}
++
++	status = cli_smb2_delete_on_close(cli, fnum, true);
++	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++		cli_smb2_close_fnum(cli, fnum);
++		return status;
++	}
++
+ 	return cli_smb2_close_fnum(cli, fnum);
+ }
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/s3-ntlm_auth-fix-memory-leak-in-manage_gensec_reques.patch b/debian/patches/s3-ntlm_auth-fix-memory-leak-in-manage_gensec_reques.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f5aa194d7c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/s3-ntlm_auth-fix-memory-leak-in-manage_gensec_reques.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+From 1606ab1baf02c8d3797fdc6f347af2c8552996a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 11:52:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leak in manage_gensec_request()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12736
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e999b798c6484de3cddad988406f97fc4cc7af79)
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/919611
+---
+ source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
+index 84269a139a3..d35e8f050b6 100644
+--- a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
++++ b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
+@@ -1290,6 +1290,8 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ 
++	mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "manage_gensec_request internal mem_ctx");
++
+ 	if (*private1) {
+ 		state = (struct gensec_ntlm_state *)*private1;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1307,6 +1309,7 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 	if (strlen(buf) < 2) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("query [%s] invalid", buf));
+ 		x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Query invalid\n");
++		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1316,9 +1319,10 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 			talloc_free(want_feature_list);
+ 			want_feature_list = talloc_strndup(state, buf+3, strlen(buf)-3);
+ 			x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
++			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+-		in = base64_decode_data_blob(buf + 3);
++		in = base64_decode_data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, buf + 3);
+ 	} else {
+ 		in = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+@@ -1331,7 +1335,7 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 	} else if ( (strncmp(buf, "OK", 2) == 0)) {
+ 		/* Just return BH, like ntlm_auth from Samba 3 does. */
+ 		x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH Command expected\n");
+-		data_blob_free(&in);
++		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	} else if ( (strncmp(buf, "TT ", 3) != 0) &&
+ 		    (strncmp(buf, "KK ", 3) != 0) &&
+@@ -1343,12 +1347,10 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 		    (strncmp(buf, "GF", 2) != 0)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("SPNEGO request [%s] invalid prefix\n", buf));
+ 		x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH SPNEGO request invalid prefix\n");
+-		data_blob_free(&in);
++		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "manage_gensec_request internal mem_ctx");
+-
+ 	/* setup gensec */
+ 	if (!(state->gensec_state)) {
+ 		switch (stdio_helper_mode) {
+@@ -1478,7 +1480,6 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 					     state->set_password,
+ 					     CRED_SPECIFIED);
+ 		x_fprintf(x_stdout, "OK\n");
+-		data_blob_free(&in);
+ 		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+@@ -1510,10 +1511,12 @@ static void manage_gensec_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mode,
+ 		neg_flags = gensec_ntlmssp_neg_flags(state->gensec_state);
+ 		if (neg_flags == 0) {
+ 			x_fprintf(x_stdout, "BH\n");
++			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		x_fprintf(x_stdout, "GF 0x%08x\n", neg_flags);
++		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.19.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index d83fa0494bb..acf3faae401 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -16,15 +16,10 @@ Add-documentation-to-systemd-Unit-files.patch
 fix_kill_path_in_units.patch
 nmbd-requires-a-working-network.patch
 provision-Update-root-DNS-servers-list.patch
-CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
-CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
-CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
-s3-smbd-Chain-code-can-return-uninitialized-memory-w.patch
-s3-smbd-Fix-SMB1-use-after-free-crash-bug.-CVE-2017-.patch
-CVE-2018-1050-11343-4.5.patch
-CVE-2018-1057-v4-5.metze01.patches.txt
 CVE-2018-10919.patch
 CVE-2018-10858-4.6.patch
 CVE-2018-14629-v4-5.patch
 CVE-2018-16841-master.patch
 CVE-2018-16851-master.patch
+fix-rmdir.patch
+s3-ntlm_auth-fix-memory-leak-in-manage_gensec_reques.patch
diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules
index 61271460f1b..fb4ad066066 100755
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ override_dh_installchangelogs:
 override_dh_installinit:
 ifneq (,$(filter samba, $(shell dh_listpackages)))
 	dh_installinit -psamba --name smbd
-	dh_installinit -psamba --name nmbd
+	dh_installinit -psamba --name nmbd --error-handler nmbd_error_handler
 	dh_installinit -psamba --name samba-ad-dc
 	dh_installinit -psamba --noscripts
 	dh_installinit -psamba --no-start --name reload-smbd
diff --git a/debian/samba.postinst b/debian/samba.postinst
index 787d8029986..e798f4fe19e 100644
--- a/debian/samba.postinst
+++ b/debian/samba.postinst
@@ -6,6 +6,23 @@
 
 set -e
 
+nmbd_error_handler() {
+    if [ -d /sys/class/net/lo ] && ls /sys/class/net | grep -qv ^lo$; then
+        # https://bugs.debian.org/893762
+        echo 'WARNING: nmbd failed to start as there is no non-loopback interfaces available.'
+        echo 'Either add an interface or set "disable netbios = yes" in smb.conf and run "systemctl mask nmbd"'
+        return 0
+    elif command -v ip > /dev/null && ip a show | grep '^[[:space:]]*inet ' | grep -vq ' lo$'; then
+        # https://bugs.debian.org/859526
+        echo 'WARNING: nmbd failed to start as there is no local IPv4 non-loopback interfaces available.'
+        echo 'Either add an IPv4 address or set "disable netbios = yes" in smb.conf and run "systemctl mask nmbd"'
+        return 0
+    else
+        echo 'ERROR: nmbd failed to start.'
+        return 1 # caught by set -e
+    fi
+}
+
 # We generate several files during the postinst, and we don't want
 #	them to be readable only by root.
 umask 022

--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Version: 9.8

Hi,

The update referenced by each of these bugs was included in this
morning's stretch point release.

Regards,

Adam

--- End Message ---

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