--- Begin Message ---
- To: Debian Bug Tracking System <submit@bugs.debian.org>
- Subject: stretch-pu: package samba/2:4.5.12+dfsg-2
- From: Mathieu Parent <sathieu@debian.org>
- Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 21:33:19 +0200
- Message-id: <150645439944.26046.6773952502543196066.reportbug@ultrathieu.sathieu.net>
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: stretch
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
This upload will bring the same security changes than 2:4.5.8+dfsg-2+deb9u2.
samba (2:4.5.12+dfsg-2) stretch; urgency=high
* This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
- CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing, when they should
- CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs redirects
- CVE-2017-12163: Server memory information leak over SMB1
See attached debdiff.
Regards
Mathieu Parent
-- System Information:
Debian Release: buster/sid
APT prefers testing
APT policy: (500, 'testing')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Kernel: Linux 4.12.0-1-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=fr_FR.utf8, LC_CTYPE=fr_FR.utf8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE=fr_FR.utf8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /usr/bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
diff -Nru samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/changelog samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/changelog
--- samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/changelog 2017-08-26 17:35:49.000000000 +0200
+++ samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/changelog 2017-09-25 15:19:34.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+samba (2:4.5.12+dfsg-2) stretch; urgency=high
+
+ * This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+ - CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing, when they should
+ - CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs redirects
+ - CVE-2017-12163: Server memory information leak over SMB1
+
+ -- Mathieu Parent <sathieu@debian.org> Mon, 25 Sep 2017 15:19:34 +0200
+
samba (2:4.5.12+dfsg-1) stretch; urgency=medium
* gbp.conf: change debian-branch to stretch
diff -Nru samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
--- samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt 2017-09-25 15:15:46.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+From f14a94b5cd3e9977e8483e8a6ba06f48045edc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:16:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib:
+ get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+
+This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296.
+
+It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+index 80c3ecd..539fa55 100644
+--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+
+ int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+ {
++ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
++ return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
++ }
+ return auth_info->signing_state;
+ }
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From f82c235484d03e22ad78a79e9cf2f14c8455df56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 09:26:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of
+ SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+index 0c5d7e9..97aa39e 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args,
+ cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds),
+ cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds),
+ cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds),
+- 0, 0);
++ 0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
+ if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 5d296e6ea32ca2df035dd35e6f21b82390f87f86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 05:49:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+ in gpo_connect_server()
+
+It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs!
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644
+--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
++++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
+ ads->auth.password,
+ CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
+ CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
+- Undefined);
++ SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
+ DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
+ "failed to connect: %s\n",
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From dc24ef0fc4292a365900270d6b9b66c9cfc0609e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:24:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
+ cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
+ NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+index bfa397c..194b5c2 100644
+--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
++++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
++#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+ #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+ #include "tevent.h"
+ #include "param/param.h"
+@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre
+
+ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+ {
++ uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
++
+ if (cred->bind_dn) {
+ return true;
+ }
+@@ -374,6 +377,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
+ return true;
+ }
+
++ gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
+ return false;
+ }
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From f30ea84489e9ee6ab65279bc3ea62ce4f954f965 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:35:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add
+ smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++++
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+index 43294be..9d801c9 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+ return false;
+ }
+
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
++{
++ return conn->mandatory_signing;
++}
++
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
+ {
+ set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+index 55d3f78..f320500 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+
+ enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
+ const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 609e6b09feb4b00ee52db4a9df258cb9061f4ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 06:07:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if
+ authentication was not requested
+
+With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 16b21bd..0b7c281 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ /* If a password was not supplied then
+ * try again with a null username. */
+ if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
++ force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
+ get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
++ get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) ||
+ !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "",
+ "", 0,
+ "", 0,
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff -Nru samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
--- samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt 2017-09-25 15:19:34.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 282a1d122f9861b0521fa5a389ad467f8da93bd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:13:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function
+
+This allows to check if the current cli_state uses encryption
+(either via unix extentions or via SMB3).
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+index 2b53a93..e675f95 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+@@ -334,6 +334,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
+ return cli->smb1.pid;
+ }
+
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
++{
++ if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
++ return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
++ }
++
++ if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
++}
++
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
+ {
+ uint32_t tid;
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+index 340cd22..f276b74 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
++++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid);
+ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 157f2a703bcaca9495d50cbd4d48c24b1ceed80d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 10:36:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on()
+
+This will keep enforced encryption across dfs referrals.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 4 ++--
+ source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 0b7c281..d9c9e27 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ "IPC$",
+ dfs_auth_info,
+ false,
+- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 0,
+ 0x20,
+@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ dfs_refs[count].share,
+ dfs_auth_info,
+ false,
+- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 0,
+ 0x20,
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+index a956058..74adade 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
+
+ for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
+ num_servers++;
+- if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
++ if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
+ return (void *)false;
+ }
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff -Nru samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
--- samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt 2017-09-25 15:15:46.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+From 364275d1ae8c55242497e7c8804fb28aa3b73465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:13:14 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+ writing server memory to file.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+index 317143f..7b07078 100644
+--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
++++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ error_to_writebrawerr(req);
+@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
++ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
++ * bytes available - we just read from the client.
++ */
+ nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
+ if (nwritten == -1) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(buf);
+@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ off_t startpos;
+ const char *data;
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ off_t startpos;
+ const char *data;
+@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (!fsp->print_file) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
+ smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ off_t startpos;
+@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
+
+ numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
+
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff -Nru samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/series samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/series
--- samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/series 2017-08-26 17:32:47.000000000 +0200
+++ samba-4.5.12+dfsg/debian/patches/series 2017-09-25 15:17:46.000000000 +0200
@@ -16,3 +16,6 @@
fix_kill_path_in_units.patch
nmbd-requires-a-working-network.patch
provision-Update-root-DNS-servers-list.patch
+CVE-2017-12150-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12151-v4-5.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
--- End Message ---