--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Hi,
please consider unblocking systemd.
The changes include two fixes for selinux, a fix for a dist-upgrade
failure and an important performance regression.
None of those should affect the udev/libudev1 udeb, i.e. the installer.
That said, I've CCed debian-boot for a d-i/KiBi ack.
Here's an annotated changelog
systemd (232-25) unstable; urgency=medium
* hwdb: Use path_join() to generate the hwdb_bin path.
This ensures /lib/udev/hwdb.bin gets the correct SELinux context. Having
double slashes in the path makes selabel_lookup_raw() return the wrong
context. (Closes: #851933)
https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-systemd/systemd.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=16508bf
I was asked by the SELinux maintainers to fix this for stretch. In the
end, it turned out to be a bug in libselinux (#863854). But the fix for
libselinux is rather invasive so will likely not make it into stretch
and it's easy to avoid triggering the bug, so I've decided to fix/work
around this in systemd.
* selinux: Enable labeling and access checks for unprivileged users.
Revert commit that inadvertently broke a lot of SELinux related
functionality for both unprivileged users and systemd instances running
as MANAGER_USER and instead deal with the auditd issue by checking for
the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability before opening an audit netlink socket.
(Closes: #863800)
https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-systemd/systemd.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=5088d0
Laurent Bigonville, one of the SELinux maintainers, asked me to pull
those fixes for stretch. He tested the patches and confirmed that they
work. The patches are from upstream.
* Revert "systemd-sysv: Add Conflicts: systemd-shim"
Under certain conditions this confuses Jessies's apt which then tries to
remove systemd while being the active init system, resulting in a failed
dist-upgrade. While this turned out to be a bug in apt, avoid this
situation by dropping the Conflicts. (Closes: #854041)
https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-systemd/systemd.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=a99075
This is bug which imho is the most important one to get fixed for r0.
It was (sometimes) causing dist-upgrade failures, if prior to the upgrade
systemd-shim was installed. David Kalnischkies identified this as a bug
in apt, but since we can't retroactively fix apt in jessie, I decided to
drop this Conflicts again to avoid this situation.
* link: Fix offload features initialization.
This fixes a regression introduced in v232 which caused TCP
segmentation offloads being disabled by default, resulting in
significant performance issues under certain conditions. (Closes: #864073)
https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-systemd/systemd.git/commit/?h=stretch&id=551b79
This seemed like a rather straightforward fix which was unfortuantely
only reported the other day. Otherwise I would have pulled it earlier.
The patch is from upstream.
Full debdiff is attached as well.
Regards,
Michael
unblock systemd/232-25
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 9.0
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (200, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Foreign Architectures: i386
Kernel: Linux 4.9.0-3-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=de_DE.utf8, LC_CTYPE=de_DE.utf8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE=de_DE.utf8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 68276b7..d3789db 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,27 @@
+systemd (232-25) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * hwdb: Use path_join() to generate the hwdb_bin path.
+ This ensures /lib/udev/hwdb.bin gets the correct SELinux context. Having
+ double slashes in the path makes selabel_lookup_raw() return the wrong
+ context. (Closes: #851933)
+ * selinux: Enable labeling and access checks for unprivileged users.
+ Revert commit that inadvertently broke a lot of SELinux related
+ functionality for both unprivileged users and systemd instances running
+ as MANAGER_USER and instead deal with the auditd issue by checking for
+ the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability before opening an audit netlink socket.
+ (Closes: #863800)
+ * Revert "systemd-sysv: Add Conflicts: systemd-shim"
+ Under certain conditions this confuses Jessies's apt which then tries to
+ remove systemd while being the active init system, resulting in a failed
+ dist-upgrade. While this turned out to be a bug in apt, avoid this
+ situation by dropping the Conflicts. (Closes: #854041)
+ * link: Fix offload features initialization.
+ This fixes a regression introduced in v232 which caused TCP
+ segmentation offloads being disabled by default, resulting in
+ significant performance issues under certain conditions. (Closes: #864073)
+
+ -- Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> Sun, 04 Jun 2017 22:58:32 +0200
+
systemd (232-24) unstable; urgency=medium
[ Felipe Sateler ]
diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
index c4e7db1..15df6f7 100644
--- a/debian/control
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ Conflicts: sysvinit-core,
upstart-sysv,
openrc (<< 0.20.4-2.1),
file-rc,
- systemd-shim,
Replaces: sysvinit (<< 2.88dsf-44~),
sysvinit-core,
upstart (<< 1.13.2-0ubuntu10~),
diff --git a/debian/patches/Revert-selinux-split-up-mac_selinux_have-from-mac_selinux.patch b/debian/patches/Revert-selinux-split-up-mac_selinux_have-from-mac_selinux.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ceb643
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/Revert-selinux-split-up-mac_selinux_have-from-mac_selinux.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+From: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 17:42:19 +0100
+Subject: Revert "selinux: split up mac_selinux_have() from mac_selinux_use()"
+
+This reverts commit 6355e75610a8d47fc3ba5ab8bd442172a2cfe574.
+
+The previously mentioned commit inadvertently broke a lot of SELinux related
+functionality for both unprivileged users and systemd instances running as
+MANAGER_USER. In particular, setting the correct SELinux context after a User=
+directive is used would fail to work since we attempt to set the security
+context after changing UID. Additionally, it causes activated socket units to
+be mislabeled for systemd --user processes since setsockcreatecon() would never
+be called.
+
+Reverting this fixes the issues with labeling outlined above, and reinstates
+SELinux access checks on unprivileged user services.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6d395665e5ce7b64f3de4c9550c0779843e6cc44)
+---
+ src/basic/selinux-util.c | 20 +++++---------------
+ src/basic/selinux-util.h | 1 -
+ src/journal/journald-native.c | 2 +-
+ src/journal/journald-server.c | 2 +-
+ src/journal/journald-stream.c | 2 +-
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 2 +-
+ src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c | 2 +-
+ src/shared/condition.c | 2 +-
+ src/test/test-condition.c | 2 +-
+ src/test/test-selinux.c | 8 ++++----
+ 10 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/selinux-util.c b/src/basic/selinux-util.c
+index bc07654..380285d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/selinux-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/selinux-util.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd = NULL;
+ #define log_enforcing(...) log_full(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG, __VA_ARGS__)
+ #endif
+
+-bool mac_selinux_have(void) {
++bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (cached_use < 0)
+ cached_use = is_selinux_enabled() > 0;
+@@ -64,16 +64,6 @@ bool mac_selinux_have(void) {
+ #endif
+ }
+
+-bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
+- if (!mac_selinux_have())
+- return false;
+-
+- /* Never try to configure SELinux features if we aren't
+- * root */
+-
+- return getuid() == 0;
+-}
+-
+ void mac_selinux_retest(void) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ cached_use = -1;
+@@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
+ assert(exe);
+ assert(label);
+
+- if (!mac_selinux_have())
++ if (!mac_selinux_use())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
+@@ -231,7 +221,7 @@ int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **label) {
+ assert(label);
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+- if (!mac_selinux_have())
++ if (!mac_selinux_use())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ r = getcon_raw(label);
+@@ -255,7 +245,7 @@ int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *
+ assert(exe);
+ assert(label);
+
+- if (!mac_selinux_have())
++ if (!mac_selinux_use())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
+@@ -310,7 +300,7 @@ char* mac_selinux_free(char *label) {
+ if (!label)
+ return NULL;
+
+- if (!mac_selinux_have())
++ if (!mac_selinux_use())
+ return NULL;
+
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/selinux-util.h b/src/basic/selinux-util.h
+index ce6bc8e..5bf7236 100644
+--- a/src/basic/selinux-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/selinux-util.h
+@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
+ #include "macro.h"
+
+ bool mac_selinux_use(void);
+-bool mac_selinux_have(void);
+ void mac_selinux_retest(void);
+
+ int mac_selinux_init(void);
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+index bba75b6..128e951 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ int server_open_native_socket(Server*s) {
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "SO_PASSCRED failed: %m");
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+- if (mac_selinux_have()) {
++ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ r = setsockopt(s->native_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &one, sizeof(one));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "SO_PASSSEC failed: %m");
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-server.c b/src/journal/journald-server.c
+index 2e8954a..239b099 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c
+@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
+ }
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+- if (mac_selinux_have()) {
++ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ if (label) {
+ x = alloca(strlen("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=") + label_len + 1);
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-stream.c b/src/journal/journald-stream.c
+index bc092f3..77551dc 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-stream.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-stream.c
+@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int stdout_stream_install(Server *s, int fd, StdoutStream **ret) {
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine peer credentials: %m");
+
+- if (mac_selinux_have()) {
++ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ r = getpeersec(fd, &stream->label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ (void) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to determine peer security context: %m");
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 0609b4b..8856cc8 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ int server_open_syslog_socket(Server *s) {
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "SO_PASSCRED failed: %m");
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+- if (mac_selinux_have()) {
++ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ r = setsockopt(s->syslog_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &one, sizeof(one));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "SO_PASSSEC failed: %m");
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
+index cfd7753..83f82be 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
+@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static void bus_get_peercred(sd_bus *b) {
+ b->ucred_valid = getpeercred(b->input_fd, &b->ucred) >= 0;
+
+ /* Get the SELinux context of the peer */
+- if (mac_selinux_have()) {
++ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ r = getpeersec(b->input_fd, &b->label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine peer security context: %m");
+diff --git a/src/shared/condition.c b/src/shared/condition.c
+index 8bd6a51..b22f7f6 100644
+--- a/src/shared/condition.c
++++ b/src/shared/condition.c
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int condition_test_security(Condition *c) {
+ assert(c->type == CONDITION_SECURITY);
+
+ if (streq(c->parameter, "selinux"))
+- return mac_selinux_have();
++ return mac_selinux_use();
+ if (streq(c->parameter, "smack"))
+ return mac_smack_use();
+ if (streq(c->parameter, "apparmor"))
+diff --git a/src/test/test-condition.c b/src/test/test-condition.c
+index dd985f5..3bb7f92 100644
+--- a/src/test/test-condition.c
++++ b/src/test/test-condition.c
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static void test_condition_test_security(void) {
+
+ condition = condition_new(CONDITION_SECURITY, "selinux", false, true);
+ assert_se(condition);
+- assert_se(condition_test(condition) != mac_selinux_have());
++ assert_se(condition_test(condition) != mac_selinux_use());
+ condition_free(condition);
+
+ condition = condition_new(CONDITION_SECURITY, "ima", false, false);
+diff --git a/src/test/test-selinux.c b/src/test/test-selinux.c
+index 7545ad3..d60b984 100644
+--- a/src/test/test-selinux.c
++++ b/src/test/test-selinux.c
+@@ -35,16 +35,16 @@ static void test_testing(void) {
+ b = mac_selinux_use();
+ log_info("mac_selinux_use → %s", yes_no(b));
+
+- b = mac_selinux_have();
+- log_info("mac_selinux_have → %s", yes_no(b));
++ b = mac_selinux_use();
++ log_info("mac_selinux_use → %s", yes_no(b));
+
+ mac_selinux_retest();
+
+ b = mac_selinux_use();
+ log_info("mac_selinux_use → %s", yes_no(b));
+
+- b = mac_selinux_have();
+- log_info("mac_selinux_have → %s", yes_no(b));
++ b = mac_selinux_use();
++ log_info("mac_selinux_use → %s", yes_no(b));
+ }
+
+ static void test_loading(void) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/audit-fd-check-for-CAP_AUDIT_WRITE-before-opening-an-audi.patch b/debian/patches/audit-fd-check-for-CAP_AUDIT_WRITE-before-opening-an-audi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdbf491
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/audit-fd-check-for-CAP_AUDIT_WRITE-before-opening-an-audi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 21:05:32 +0100
+Subject: audit-fd: check for CAP_AUDIT_WRITE before opening an audit socket
+
+Adds a check to audit-fd.c to ensure that CAP_AUDIT_WRITE is present in
+the set of effective capabilities before opening an audit netlink
+socket. This ensures that unprivileged systemd instances (MANAGER_USER)
+don't try to log AVC permission checks with the audit subsystem when
+CAP_AUDIT_WRITE is not present.
+
+(cherry picked from commit b3fb3c01eeedd1995c74dbe30fe33f189bc828e2)
+---
+ src/core/audit-fd.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/core/audit-fd.c b/src/core/audit-fd.c
+index 76afe3f..a91906b 100644
+--- a/src/core/audit-fd.c
++++ b/src/core/audit-fd.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <libaudit.h>
+ #include <stdbool.h>
+
++#include "capability-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "util.h"
+@@ -37,6 +38,13 @@ static int audit_fd;
+ int get_audit_fd(void) {
+
+ if (!initialized) {
++ if (have_effective_cap(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE) == 0) {
++ audit_fd = -EPERM;
++ initialized = true;
++
++ return audit_fd;
++ }
++
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian/Re-enable-journal-forwarding-to-syslog.patch b/debian/patches/debian/Re-enable-journal-forwarding-to-syslog.patch
index 9dcbce8..2178269 100644
--- a/debian/patches/debian/Re-enable-journal-forwarding-to-syslog.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/debian/Re-enable-journal-forwarding-to-syslog.patch
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ index 9daa964..e829d63 100644
<literal>systemd.journald.forward_to_syslog</literal>,
<literal>systemd.journald.forward_to_kmsg</literal>,
diff --git a/src/journal/journald-server.c b/src/journal/journald-server.c
-index 2e8954a..cfefe9d 100644
+index 239b099..29119a2 100644
--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c
+++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c
@@ -1885,6 +1885,7 @@ int server_init(Server *s) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/hwdb-use-path_join-to-generate-the-hwdb_bin-path-6063.patch b/debian/patches/hwdb-use-path_join-to-generate-the-hwdb_bin-path-6063.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00f5b1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/hwdb-use-path_join-to-generate-the-hwdb_bin-path-6063.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Michael Biebl <mbiebl@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 03:21:11 +0200
+Subject: hwdb: use path_join() to generate the hwdb_bin path (#6063)
+
+This avoids having double slashes which can confuse selinux.
+(cherry picked from commit 0aac506b64dd6102374635290ca979b080d1192f)
+---
+ src/hwdb/hwdb.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/hwdb/hwdb.c b/src/hwdb/hwdb.c
+index 1d16d9f..de2f403 100644
+--- a/src/hwdb/hwdb.c
++++ b/src/hwdb/hwdb.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include "hwdb-util.h"
+ #include "label.h"
+ #include "mkdir.h"
++#include "path-util.h"
+ #include "selinux-util.h"
+ #include "strbuf.h"
+ #include "string-util.h"
+@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ static int hwdb_update(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
+ log_debug("strings dedup'ed: %8zu bytes (%8zu)",
+ trie->strings->dedup_len, trie->strings->dedup_count);
+
+- hwdb_bin = strjoin(arg_root, "/", arg_hwdb_bin_dir, "/hwdb.bin");
++ hwdb_bin = path_join(arg_root, arg_hwdb_bin_dir, "hwdb.bin");
+ if (!hwdb_bin)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/link-fix-offload-features-initialization-4639.patch b/debian/patches/link-fix-offload-features-initialization-4639.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf98585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/link-fix-offload-features-initialization-4639.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+From: Maks Naumov <maksqwe1@ukr.net>
+Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2016 12:33:43 +0200
+Subject: link: fix offload features initialization (#4639)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 45d34fa7fb9f587f09e8cca882966050b4cbb5be)
+---
+ src/udev/net/link-config.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/udev/net/link-config.c b/src/udev/net/link-config.c
+index ece9248..fa8fe1f 100644
+--- a/src/udev/net/link-config.c
++++ b/src/udev/net/link-config.c
+@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int load_link(link_config_ctx *ctx, const char *filename) {
+ link->wol = _WOL_INVALID;
+ link->duplex = _DUP_INVALID;
+
+- memset(&link->features, -1, _NET_DEV_FEAT_MAX);
++ memset(&link->features, -1, sizeof(link->features));
+
+ r = config_parse(NULL, filename, file,
+ "Match\0Link\0Ethernet\0",
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index adc86a7..621b176 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ journal-fix-up-syslog-facility-when-forwarding-native-mes.patch
machinectl-make-sure-that-inability-to-get-OS-version-isn.patch
nspawn-support-ephemeral-boots-from-images.patch
resolved-bugfix-of-null-pointer-p-question-dereferencing-.patch
+hwdb-use-path_join-to-generate-the-hwdb_bin-path-6063.patch
+Revert-selinux-split-up-mac_selinux_have-from-mac_selinux.patch
+audit-fd-check-for-CAP_AUDIT_WRITE-before-opening-an-audi.patch
+link-fix-offload-features-initialization-4639.patch
debian/Use-Debian-specific-config-files.patch
debian/don-t-try-to-start-autovt-units-when-not-running-wit.patch
debian/Make-logind-hostnamed-localed-timedated-D-Bus-activa.patch
--- End Message ---