--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Please unblock package tor
unblock tor/0.2.9.10-1
I would very much like to update tor in testing. I have not yet
uploaded my proposed change to unstable.
This new version fixes the underlying bug of the DoS issue tracked
upstream as TROVE-2017-001. Debian Bug #856786, upstream issue
https://bugs.torproject.org/21278
It also makes ipv6 exit relays actually exit. Debian Bug #856788,
upstream https://bugs.torproject.org/21357
This upload also fixes a few other, minor issues as it is an upstream
bugfix release -- the 0.2.9.x branch does not see new features, it only
sees bug fixes for issues where the bug-severity/change-complexity seem
appropriate (and it's a conservative cutoff).
Please find attached the diff of my proposed upload. Let me know if I can go
forward.
diffstat of attached file:
ChangeLog | 62 +++++
configure.ac | 7
debian/changelog | 11
src/or/dirserv.c | 16 +
src/or/dirvote.c | 30 +-
src/or/policies.c | 153 +++++++++----
src/or/policies.h | 5
src/or/routerlist.c | 2
src/or/routerparse.c | 126 +++++++----
src/or/routerparse.h | 3
src/test/test_policy.c | 542 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/test/test_tortls.c | 43 ++-
src/tools/tor-resolve.c | 4
src/win32/orconfig.h | 2
14 files changed, 874 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-)
additionally, I have cut the following from my diff (db update and a duplicate
of the changelog and more windows only stuff):
contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2
ReleaseNotes | 62
src/config/geoip |10832 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
src/config/geoip6 | 1651 ++++-
Cheers,
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 512c245..203a213 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,65 @@
+Changes in version 0.2.9.10 - 2017-03-01
+ Tor 0.2.9.10 backports a security fix for users who build Tor with
+ the --enable-expensive-hardening option. It also includes fixes for
+ some major issues affecting directory authorities, LibreSSL
+ compatibility, and IPv6 correctness.
+
+ The Tor 0.2.9.x release series is now marked as a long-term-support
+ series. We intend to backport security fixes to 0.2.9.x until at
+ least January of 2020.
+
+ o Major bugfixes (directory authority, 0.3.0.3-alpha):
+ - During voting, when marking a relay as a probable sybil, do not
+ clear its BadExit flag: sybils can still be bad in other ways
+ too. (We still clear the other flags.) Fixes bug 21108; bugfix
+ on 0.2.0.13-alpha.
+
+ o Major bugfixes (IPv6 Exits, backport from 0.3.0.3-alpha):
+ - Stop rejecting all IPv6 traffic on Exits whose exit policy rejects
+ any IPv6 addresses. Instead, only reject a port over IPv6 if the
+ exit policy rejects that port on more than an IPv6 /16 of
+ addresses. This bug was made worse by 17027 in 0.2.8.1-alpha,
+ which rejected a relay's own IPv6 address by default. Fixes bug
+ 21357; bugfix on commit 004f3f4e53 in 0.2.4.7-alpha.
+
+ o Major bugfixes (parsing, also in 0.3.0.4-rc):
+ - Fix an integer underflow bug when comparing malformed Tor
+ versions. This bug could crash Tor when built with
+ --enable-expensive-hardening, or on Tor 0.2.9.1-alpha through Tor
+ 0.2.9.8, which were built with -ftrapv by default. In other cases
+ it was harmless. Part of TROVE-2017-001. Fixes bug 21278; bugfix
+ on 0.0.8pre1. Found by OSS-Fuzz.
+
+ o Minor features (directory authorities, also in 0.3.0.4-rc):
+ - Directory authorities now reject descriptors that claim to be
+ malformed versions of Tor. Helps prevent exploitation of
+ bug 21278.
+ - Reject version numbers with components that exceed INT32_MAX.
+ Otherwise 32-bit and 64-bit platforms would behave inconsistently.
+ Fixes bug 21450; bugfix on 0.0.8pre1.
+
+ o Minor features (geoip):
+ - Update geoip and geoip6 to the February 8 2017 Maxmind GeoLite2
+ Country database.
+
+ o Minor features (portability, compilation, backport from 0.3.0.3-alpha):
+ - Autoconf now checks to determine if OpenSSL structures are opaque,
+ instead of explicitly checking for OpenSSL version numbers. Part
+ of ticket 21359.
+ - Support building with recent LibreSSL code that uses opaque
+ structures. Closes ticket 21359.
+
+ o Minor bugfixes (code correctness, also in 0.3.0.4-rc):
+ - Repair a couple of (unreachable or harmless) cases of the risky
+ comparison-by-subtraction pattern that caused bug 21278.
+
+ o Minor bugfixes (tor-resolve, backport from 0.3.0.3-alpha):
+ - The tor-resolve command line tool now rejects hostnames over 255
+ characters in length. Previously, it would silently truncate them,
+ which could lead to bugs. Fixes bug 21280; bugfix on 0.0.9pre5.
+ Patch by "junglefowl".
+
+
Changes in version 0.2.9.9 - 2017-01-23
Tor 0.2.9.9 fixes a denial-of-service bug where an attacker could
cause relays and clients to crash, even if they were not built with
diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes
[cut]
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 1506373..095f374 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2015, The Tor Project, Inc.
dnl See LICENSE for licensing information
AC_PREREQ([2.63])
-AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.9.9])
+AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.9.10])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
@@ -677,6 +677,11 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
dnl Check if OpenSSL has scrypt implementation.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ EVP_PBE_scrypt ])
+dnl Check if OpenSSL structures are opaque
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([SSL.state], , ,
+[#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+])
+
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$save_CPPFLAGS"
diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in
[cut]
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 2d7c4b7..29cbbf0 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+tor (0.2.9.10-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * New upstream version.
+ - Stop rejecting all IPv6 traffic on Exits whose exit policy rejects
+ any IPv6 addresses.
+ - Fix an integer underflow bug when comparing malformed Tor
+ versions. Underlying issue of TROVE-2017-001, mitigated in the
+ previous release.
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org> Sat, 04 Mar 2017 16:28:58 +0100
+
tor (0.2.9.9-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* New upstream version.
diff --git a/src/config/geoip b/src/config/geoip
[cut]
diff --git a/src/config/geoip6 b/src/config/geoip6
[cut]
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 34db063..fa3938b 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -365,6 +365,16 @@ dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *id_digest, const char *nickname,
strmap_size(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name),
digestmap_size(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest));
+ if (platform) {
+ tor_version_t ver_tmp;
+ if (tor_version_parse_platform(platform, &ver_tmp, 1) < 0) {
+ if (msg) {
+ *msg = "Malformed platform string.";
+ }
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Versions before Tor 0.2.4.18-rc are too old to support, and are
* missing some important security fixes too. Disable them. */
if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.2.4.18-rc")) {
@@ -2233,13 +2243,17 @@ dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs)
/** Routerstatus <b>rs</b> is part of a group of routers that are on
* too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags: we don't want people
* using it.
+ *
+ * Leave its BadExit flag alone though, since if we think it's a bad exit,
+ * we want to vote that way in case all the other authorities are voting
+ * Running and Exit.
*/
static void
clear_status_flags_on_sybil(routerstatus_t *rs)
{
rs->is_authority = rs->is_exit = rs->is_stable = rs->is_fast =
rs->is_flagged_running = rs->is_named = rs->is_valid =
- rs->is_hs_dir = rs->is_possible_guard = rs->is_bad_exit = 0;
+ rs->is_hs_dir = rs->is_v2_dir = rs->is_possible_guard = 0;
/* FFFF we might want some mechanism to check later on if we
* missed zeroing any flags: it's easy to add a new flag but
* forget to add it to this clause. */
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 2c10e78..738ab35 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -421,16 +421,30 @@ compare_vote_rs(const vote_routerstatus_t *a, const vote_routerstatus_t *b)
b->status.descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN)))
return r;
- if ((r = (int)(b->status.published_on - a->status.published_on)))
- return r;
+ /* If we actually reached this point, then the identities and
+ * the descriptor digests matched, so somebody is making SHA1 collisions.
+ */
+#define CMP_FIELD(utype, itype, field) do { \
+ utype aval = (utype) (itype) a->status.field; \
+ utype bval = (utype) (itype) b->status.field; \
+ utype u = bval - aval; \
+ itype r2 = (itype) u; \
+ if (r2 < 0) { \
+ return -1; \
+ } else if (r2 > 0) { \
+ return 1; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+ CMP_FIELD(uint64_t, int64_t, published_on);
+
if ((r = strcmp(b->status.nickname, a->status.nickname)))
return r;
- if ((r = (((int)b->status.addr) - ((int)a->status.addr))))
- return r;
- if ((r = (((int)b->status.or_port) - ((int)a->status.or_port))))
- return r;
- if ((r = (((int)b->status.dir_port) - ((int)a->status.dir_port))))
- return r;
+
+ CMP_FIELD(unsigned, int, addr);
+ CMP_FIELD(unsigned, int, or_port);
+ CMP_FIELD(unsigned, int, dir_port);
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c
index 227e168..28770bb 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.c
+++ b/src/or/policies.c
@@ -1198,48 +1198,48 @@ policies_parse_from_options(const or_options_t *options)
return ret;
}
-/** Compare two provided address policy items, and return -1, 0, or 1
+/** Compare two provided address policy items, and renturn -1, 0, or 1
* if the first is less than, equal to, or greater than the second. */
static int
-cmp_single_addr_policy(addr_policy_t *a, addr_policy_t *b)
+single_addr_policy_eq(const addr_policy_t *a, const addr_policy_t *b)
{
int r;
- if ((r=((int)a->policy_type - (int)b->policy_type)))
- return r;
- if ((r=((int)a->is_private - (int)b->is_private)))
- return r;
+#define CMP_FIELD(field) do { \
+ if (a->field != b->field) { \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+ CMP_FIELD(policy_type);
+ CMP_FIELD(is_private);
/* refcnt and is_canonical are irrelevant to equality,
* they are hash table implementation details */
if ((r=tor_addr_compare(&a->addr, &b->addr, CMP_EXACT)))
- return r;
- if ((r=((int)a->maskbits - (int)b->maskbits)))
- return r;
- if ((r=((int)a->prt_min - (int)b->prt_min)))
- return r;
- if ((r=((int)a->prt_max - (int)b->prt_max)))
- return r;
- return 0;
+ return 0;
+ CMP_FIELD(maskbits);
+ CMP_FIELD(prt_min);
+ CMP_FIELD(prt_max);
+#undef CMP_FIELD
+ return 1;
}
-/** Like cmp_single_addr_policy() above, but looks at the
- * whole set of policies in each case. */
+/** As single_addr_policy_eq, but compare every element of two policies.
+ */
int
-cmp_addr_policies(smartlist_t *a, smartlist_t *b)
+addr_policies_eq(const smartlist_t *a, const smartlist_t *b)
{
- int r, i;
+ int i;
int len_a = a ? smartlist_len(a) : 0;
int len_b = b ? smartlist_len(b) : 0;
- for (i = 0; i < len_a && i < len_b; ++i) {
- if ((r = cmp_single_addr_policy(smartlist_get(a, i), smartlist_get(b, i))))
- return r;
- }
- if (i == len_a && i == len_b)
+ if (len_a != len_b)
return 0;
- if (i < len_a)
- return -1;
- else
- return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len_a; ++i) {
+ if (! single_addr_policy_eq(smartlist_get(a, i), smartlist_get(b, i)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
/** Node in hashtable used to store address policy entries. */
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ static HT_HEAD(policy_map, policy_map_ent_t) policy_root = HT_INITIALIZER();
static inline int
policy_eq(policy_map_ent_t *a, policy_map_ent_t *b)
{
- return cmp_single_addr_policy(a->policy, b->policy) == 0;
+ return single_addr_policy_eq(a->policy, b->policy);
}
/** Return a hashcode for <b>ent</b> */
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(addr_policy_t *e)
HT_INSERT(policy_map, &policy_root, found);
}
- tor_assert(!cmp_single_addr_policy(found->policy, e));
+ tor_assert(single_addr_policy_eq(found->policy, e));
++found->policy->refcnt;
return found->policy;
}
@@ -2299,7 +2299,26 @@ policy_summary_item_split(policy_summary_item_t* old, uint16_t new_starts)
* my immortal soul, he can clean it up himself. */
#define AT(x) ((policy_summary_item_t*)smartlist_get(summary, x))
-#define REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT (1<<25)
+#define IPV4_BITS (32)
+/* Every IPv4 address is counted as one rejection */
+#define REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV4 (0)
+/* Ports are rejected in an IPv4 summary if they are rejected in more than two
+ * IPv4 /8 address blocks */
+#define REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV4 (U64_LITERAL(1) << \
+ (IPV4_BITS - REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV4 - 7))
+
+#define IPV6_BITS (128)
+/* IPv6 /64s are counted as one rejection, anything smaller is ignored */
+#define REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV6 (64)
+/* Ports are rejected in an IPv6 summary if they are rejected in more than one
+ * IPv6 /16 address block.
+ * This is rougly equivalent to the IPv4 cutoff, as only five IPv6 /12s (and
+ * some scattered smaller blocks) have been allocated to the RIRs.
+ * Network providers are typically allocated one or more IPv6 /32s.
+ */
+#define REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV6 (U64_LITERAL(1) << \
+ (IPV6_BITS - REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV6 - 16))
+
/** Split an exit policy summary so that prt_min and prt_max
* fall at exactly the start and end of an item respectively.
*/
@@ -2332,35 +2351,82 @@ policy_summary_split(smartlist_t *summary,
return start_at_index;
}
-/** Mark port ranges as accepted if they are below the reject_count */
+/** Mark port ranges as accepted if they are below the reject_count for family
+ */
static void
policy_summary_accept(smartlist_t *summary,
- uint16_t prt_min, uint16_t prt_max)
+ uint16_t prt_min, uint16_t prt_max,
+ sa_family_t family)
{
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(family == AF_INET || family == AF_INET6);
+ uint64_t family_reject_count = ((family == AF_INET) ?
+ REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV4 :
+ REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV6);
+
int i = policy_summary_split(summary, prt_min, prt_max);
while (i < smartlist_len(summary) &&
AT(i)->prt_max <= prt_max) {
if (!AT(i)->accepted &&
- AT(i)->reject_count <= REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT)
+ AT(i)->reject_count <= family_reject_count)
AT(i)->accepted = 1;
i++;
}
tor_assert(i < smartlist_len(summary) || prt_max==65535);
}
-/** Count the number of addresses in a network with prefixlen maskbits
- * against the given portrange. */
+/** Count the number of addresses in a network in family with prefixlen
+ * maskbits against the given portrange. */
static void
policy_summary_reject(smartlist_t *summary,
maskbits_t maskbits,
- uint16_t prt_min, uint16_t prt_max)
+ uint16_t prt_min, uint16_t prt_max,
+ sa_family_t family)
{
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(family == AF_INET || family == AF_INET6);
+
int i = policy_summary_split(summary, prt_min, prt_max);
- /* XXX: ipv4 specific */
- uint64_t count = (U64_LITERAL(1) << (32-maskbits));
+
+ /* The length of a single address mask */
+ int addrbits = (family == AF_INET) ? IPV4_BITS : IPV6_BITS;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(addrbits >= maskbits);
+
+ /* We divide IPv6 address counts by (1 << scale) to keep them in a uint64_t
+ */
+ int scale = ((family == AF_INET) ?
+ REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV4 :
+ REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV6);
+
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(addrbits >= scale);
+ if (maskbits > (addrbits - scale)) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(family == AF_INET6);
+ /* The address range is so small, we'd need billions of them to reach the
+ * rejection limit. So we ignore this range in the reject count. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ uint64_t count = 0;
+ if (addrbits - scale - maskbits >= 64) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(family == AF_INET6);
+ /* The address range is so large, it's an automatic rejection for all ports
+ * in the range. */
+ count = UINT64_MAX;
+ } else {
+ count = (U64_LITERAL(1) << (addrbits - scale - maskbits));
+ }
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(count > 0);
while (i < smartlist_len(summary) &&
AT(i)->prt_max <= prt_max) {
- AT(i)->reject_count += count;
+ if (AT(i)->reject_count <= UINT64_MAX - count) {
+ AT(i)->reject_count += count;
+ } else {
+ /* IPv4 would require a 4-billion address redundant policy to get here,
+ * but IPv6 just needs to have ::/0 */
+ if (family == AF_INET) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
+ }
+ /* If we do get here, use saturating arithmetic */
+ AT(i)->reject_count = UINT64_MAX;
+ }
i++;
}
tor_assert(i < smartlist_len(summary) || prt_max==65535);
@@ -2380,7 +2446,7 @@ policy_summary_add_item(smartlist_t *summary, addr_policy_t *p)
{
if (p->policy_type == ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT) {
if (p->maskbits == 0) {
- policy_summary_accept(summary, p->prt_min, p->prt_max);
+ policy_summary_accept(summary, p->prt_min, p->prt_max, p->addr.family);
}
} else if (p->policy_type == ADDR_POLICY_REJECT) {
@@ -2401,7 +2467,8 @@ policy_summary_add_item(smartlist_t *summary, addr_policy_t *p)
}
if (!is_private) {
- policy_summary_reject(summary, p->maskbits, p->prt_min, p->prt_max);
+ policy_summary_reject(summary, p->maskbits, p->prt_min, p->prt_max,
+ p->addr.family);
}
} else
tor_assert(0);
@@ -2435,7 +2502,6 @@ policy_summarize(smartlist_t *policy, sa_family_t family)
}
if (f != family)
continue;
- /* XXXX-ipv6 More family work is needed */
policy_summary_add_item(summary, p);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
@@ -2624,8 +2690,7 @@ parse_short_policy(const char *summary)
return result;
}
-/** Write <b>policy</b> back out into a string. Used only for unit tests
- * currently. */
+/** Write <b>policy</b> back out into a string. */
char *
write_short_policy(const short_policy_t *policy)
{
diff --git a/src/or/policies.h b/src/or/policies.h
index 20f58f2..f73f850 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.h
+++ b/src/or/policies.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
#define EXIT_POLICY_REJECT_PRIVATE (1 << 1)
#define EXIT_POLICY_ADD_DEFAULT (1 << 2)
#define EXIT_POLICY_REJECT_LOCAL_INTERFACES (1 << 3)
+#define EXIT_POLICY_OPTION_MAX EXIT_POLICY_REJECT_LOCAL_INTERFACES
+/* All options set: used for unit testing */
+#define EXIT_POLICY_OPTION_ALL ((EXIT_POLICY_OPTION_MAX << 1) - 1)
typedef enum firewall_connection_t {
FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION = 0,
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ void policy_expand_unspec(smartlist_t **policy);
int policies_parse_from_options(const or_options_t *options);
addr_policy_t *addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(addr_policy_t *ent);
-int cmp_addr_policies(smartlist_t *a, smartlist_t *b);
+int addr_policies_eq(const smartlist_t *a, const smartlist_t *b);
MOCK_DECL(addr_policy_result_t, compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy,
(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const smartlist_t *policy));
addr_policy_result_t compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr,
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index b876795..2365f28 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -5445,7 +5445,7 @@ router_differences_are_cosmetic(const routerinfo_t *r1, const routerinfo_t *r2)
(r1->contact_info && r2->contact_info &&
strcasecmp(r1->contact_info, r2->contact_info)) ||
r1->is_hibernating != r2->is_hibernating ||
- cmp_addr_policies(r1->exit_policy, r2->exit_policy) ||
+ ! addr_policies_eq(r1->exit_policy, r2->exit_policy) ||
(r1->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests !=
r2->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests))
return 0;
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
index d7e4252..2ee0d27 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
@@ -5512,40 +5512,78 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos,
return result;
}
-/** Parse the Tor version of the platform string <b>platform</b>,
- * and compare it to the version in <b>cutoff</b>. Return 1 if
- * the router is at least as new as the cutoff, else return 0.
+/** Extract a Tor version from a <b>platform</b> line from a router
+ * descriptor, and place the result in <b>router_version</b>.
+ *
+ * Return 1 on success, -1 on parsing failure, and 0 if the
+ * platform line does not indicate some version of Tor.
+ *
+ * If <b>strict</b> is non-zero, finding any weird version components
+ * (like negative numbers) counts as a parsing failure.
*/
int
-tor_version_as_new_as(const char *platform, const char *cutoff)
+tor_version_parse_platform(const char *platform,
+ tor_version_t *router_version,
+ int strict)
{
- tor_version_t cutoff_version, router_version;
- char *s, *s2, *start;
char tmp[128];
+ char *s, *s2, *start;
- tor_assert(platform);
-
- if (tor_version_parse(cutoff, &cutoff_version)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"cutoff version '%s' unparseable.",cutoff);
+ if (strcmpstart(platform,"Tor ")) /* nonstandard Tor; say 0. */
return 0;
- }
- if (strcmpstart(platform,"Tor ")) /* nonstandard Tor; be safe and say yes */
- return 1;
start = (char *)eat_whitespace(platform+3);
- if (!*start) return 0;
+ if (!*start) return -1;
s = (char *)find_whitespace(start); /* also finds '\0', which is fine */
s2 = (char*)eat_whitespace(s);
if (!strcmpstart(s2, "(r") || !strcmpstart(s2, "(git-"))
s = (char*)find_whitespace(s2);
if ((size_t)(s-start+1) >= sizeof(tmp)) /* too big, no */
- return 0;
+ return -1;
strlcpy(tmp, start, s-start+1);
- if (tor_version_parse(tmp, &router_version)<0) {
+ if (tor_version_parse(tmp, router_version)<0) {
log_info(LD_DIR,"Router version '%s' unparseable.",tmp);
- return 1; /* be safe and say yes */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (strict) {
+ if (router_version->major < 0 ||
+ router_version->minor < 0 ||
+ router_version->micro < 0 ||
+ router_version->patchlevel < 0 ||
+ router_version->svn_revision < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Parse the Tor version of the platform string <b>platform</b>,
+ * and compare it to the version in <b>cutoff</b>. Return 1 if
+ * the router is at least as new as the cutoff, else return 0.
+ */
+int
+tor_version_as_new_as(const char *platform, const char *cutoff)
+{
+ tor_version_t cutoff_version, router_version;
+ int r;
+ tor_assert(platform);
+
+ if (tor_version_parse(cutoff, &cutoff_version)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"cutoff version '%s' unparseable.",cutoff);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ r = tor_version_parse_platform(platform, &router_version, 0);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* nonstandard Tor; be safe and say yes */
+ return 1;
+ } else if (r < 0) {
+ /* unparseable version; be safe and say yes. */
+ return 1;
}
/* Here's why we don't need to do any special handling for svn revisions:
@@ -5567,6 +5605,7 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out)
{
char *eos=NULL;
const char *cp=NULL;
+ int ok = 1;
/* Format is:
* "Tor " ? NUM dot NUM [ dot NUM [ ( pre | rc | dot ) NUM ] ] [ - tag ]
*/
@@ -5582,7 +5621,9 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out)
#define NUMBER(m) \
do { \
- out->m = (int)strtol(cp, &eos, 10); \
+ out->m = (int)tor_parse_uint64(cp, 10, 0, INT32_MAX, &ok, &eos); \
+ if (!ok) \
+ return -1; \
if (!eos || eos == cp) \
return -1; \
cp = eos; \
@@ -5672,26 +5713,37 @@ tor_version_compare(tor_version_t *a, tor_version_t *b)
int i;
tor_assert(a);
tor_assert(b);
- if ((i = a->major - b->major))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->minor - b->minor))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->micro - b->micro))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->status - b->status))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->patchlevel - b->patchlevel))
- return i;
- else if ((i = strcmp(a->status_tag, b->status_tag)))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->svn_revision - b->svn_revision))
- return i;
- else if ((i = a->git_tag_len - b->git_tag_len))
- return i;
- else if (a->git_tag_len)
- return fast_memcmp(a->git_tag, b->git_tag, a->git_tag_len);
+
+ /* We take this approach to comparison to ensure the same (bogus!) behavior
+ * on all inputs as we would have seen before bug #21278 was fixed. The
+ * only important difference here is that this method doesn't cause
+ * a signed integer underflow.
+ */
+#define CMP(field) do { \
+ unsigned aval = (unsigned) a->field; \
+ unsigned bval = (unsigned) b->field; \
+ int result = (int) (aval - bval); \
+ if (result < 0) \
+ return -1; \
+ else if (result > 0) \
+ return 1; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ CMP(major);
+ CMP(minor);
+ CMP(micro);
+ CMP(status);
+ CMP(patchlevel);
+ if ((i = strcmp(a->status_tag, b->status_tag)))
+ return i;
+ CMP(svn_revision);
+ CMP(git_tag_len);
+ if (a->git_tag_len)
+ return fast_memcmp(a->git_tag, b->git_tag, a->git_tag_len);
else
- return 0;
+ return 0;
+
+#undef CMP
}
/** Return true iff versions <b>a</b> and <b>b</b> belong to the same series.
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.h b/src/or/routerparse.h
index 9a3fadc..01a5de8 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.h
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.h
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ MOCK_DECL(addr_policy_t *, router_parse_addr_policy_item_from_string,
(const char *s, int assume_action, int *malformed_list));
version_status_t tor_version_is_obsolete(const char *myversion,
const char *versionlist);
+int tor_version_parse_platform(const char *platform,
+ tor_version_t *version_out,
+ int strict);
int tor_version_as_new_as(const char *platform, const char *cutoff);
int tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out);
int tor_version_compare(tor_version_t *a, tor_version_t *b);
diff --git a/src/test/test_policy.c b/src/test/test_policy.c
index 22f473f..1ffdc2c 100644
--- a/src/test/test_policy.c
+++ b/src/test/test_policy.c
@@ -32,12 +32,14 @@ test_short_policy_parse(const char *input,
short_policy_free(short_policy);
}
-/** Helper: Parse the exit policy string in <b>policy_str</b>, and make sure
- * that policies_summarize() produces the string <b>expected_summary</b> from
- * it. */
+/** Helper: Parse the exit policy string in <b>policy_str</b> with
+ * <b>options</b>, and make sure that policies_summarize() produces the string
+ * <b>expected_summary</b> from it when called with family. */
static void
-test_policy_summary_helper(const char *policy_str,
- const char *expected_summary)
+test_policy_summary_helper_family_flags(const char *policy_str,
+ const char *expected_summary,
+ sa_family_t family,
+ exit_policy_parser_cfg_t options)
{
config_line_t line;
smartlist_t *policy = smartlist_new();
@@ -45,17 +47,17 @@ test_policy_summary_helper(const char *policy_str,
char *summary_after = NULL;
int r;
short_policy_t *short_policy = NULL;
+ int success = 0;
line.key = (char*)"foo";
line.value = (char *)policy_str;
line.next = NULL;
r = policies_parse_exit_policy(&line, &policy,
- EXIT_POLICY_IPV6_ENABLED |
- EXIT_POLICY_ADD_DEFAULT, NULL);
+ options, NULL);
tt_int_op(r,OP_EQ, 0);
- summary = policy_summarize(policy, AF_INET);
+ summary = policy_summarize(policy, family);
tt_assert(summary != NULL);
tt_str_op(summary,OP_EQ, expected_summary);
@@ -65,7 +67,12 @@ test_policy_summary_helper(const char *policy_str,
summary_after = write_short_policy(short_policy);
tt_str_op(summary,OP_EQ, summary_after);
+ success = 1;
done:
+ /* If we don't print the flags on failure, it's very hard to diagnose bugs */
+ if (!success)
+ TT_DECLARE("CTXT", ("\n IPv%d\n Options: %x\n Policy: %s",
+ family == AF_INET ? 4 : 6, options, policy_str));
tor_free(summary_after);
tor_free(summary);
if (policy)
@@ -73,6 +80,50 @@ test_policy_summary_helper(const char *policy_str,
short_policy_free(short_policy);
}
+/** Like test_policy_summary_helper_family_flags, but tries all the different
+ * flag combinations */
+static void
+test_policy_summary_helper_family(const char *policy_str,
+ const char *expected_summary,
+ sa_family_t family)
+{
+ for (exit_policy_parser_cfg_t opt = 0;
+ opt <= EXIT_POLICY_OPTION_ALL;
+ opt++) {
+ if (family == AF_INET6 && !(opt & EXIT_POLICY_IPV6_ENABLED))
+ /* Skip the test: IPv6 addresses need IPv6 enabled */
+ continue;
+
+ if (opt & EXIT_POLICY_REJECT_LOCAL_INTERFACES)
+ /* Skip the test: local interfaces are machine-specific */
+ continue;
+
+ test_policy_summary_helper_family_flags(policy_str, expected_summary,
+ family, opt);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Like test_policy_summary_helper_family, but uses expected_summary for
+ * both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+static void
+test_policy_summary_helper(const char *policy_str,
+ const char *expected_summary)
+{
+ test_policy_summary_helper_family(policy_str, expected_summary, AF_INET);
+ test_policy_summary_helper_family(policy_str, expected_summary, AF_INET6);
+}
+
+/** Like test_policy_summary_helper_family, but uses expected_summary4 for
+ * IPv4 and expected_summary6 for IPv6. */
+static void
+test_policy_summary_helper6(const char *policy_str,
+ const char *expected_summary4,
+ const char *expected_summary6)
+{
+ test_policy_summary_helper_family(policy_str, expected_summary4, AF_INET);
+ test_policy_summary_helper_family(policy_str, expected_summary6, AF_INET6);
+}
+
/** Run unit tests for generating summary lines of exit policies */
static void
test_policies_general(void *arg)
@@ -253,10 +304,10 @@ test_policies_general(void *arg)
tt_assert(!exit_policy_is_general_exit(policy10));
tt_assert(!exit_policy_is_general_exit(policy11));
- tt_assert(cmp_addr_policies(policy, policy2));
- tt_assert(cmp_addr_policies(policy, NULL));
- tt_assert(!cmp_addr_policies(policy2, policy2));
- tt_assert(!cmp_addr_policies(NULL, NULL));
+ tt_assert(!addr_policies_eq(policy, policy2));
+ tt_assert(!addr_policies_eq(policy, NULL));
+ tt_assert(addr_policies_eq(policy2, policy2));
+ tt_assert(addr_policies_eq(NULL, NULL));
tt_assert(!policy_is_reject_star(policy2, AF_INET, 1));
tt_assert(policy_is_reject_star(policy, AF_INET, 1));
@@ -394,13 +445,14 @@ test_policies_general(void *arg)
"reject 14.0.0.0/9:80,"
"reject 15.0.0.0:81,"
"accept *:*", "accept 1-65535");
- test_policy_summary_helper("reject 11.0.0.0/9:80,"
- "reject 12.0.0.0/9:80,"
- "reject 13.0.0.0/9:80,"
- "reject 14.0.0.0/9:80,"
- "reject 15.0.0.0:80,"
- "accept *:*",
- "reject 80");
+ test_policy_summary_helper6("reject 11.0.0.0/9:80,"
+ "reject 12.0.0.0/9:80,"
+ "reject 13.0.0.0/9:80,"
+ "reject 14.0.0.0/9:80,"
+ "reject 15.0.0.0:80,"
+ "accept *:*",
+ "reject 80",
+ "accept 1-65535");
/* no exits */
test_policy_summary_helper("accept 11.0.0.0/9:80,"
"reject *:*",
@@ -431,6 +483,458 @@ test_policies_general(void *arg)
"reject *:7,"
"accept *:*",
"reject 1,3,5,7");
+ /* long policies */
+ /* standard long policy on many exits */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("accept *:20-23,"
+ "accept *:43,"
+ "accept *:53,"
+ "accept *:79-81,"
+ "accept *:88,"
+ "accept *:110,"
+ "accept *:143,"
+ "accept *:194,"
+ "accept *:220,"
+ "accept *:389,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "accept *:464,"
+ "accept *:531,"
+ "accept *:543-544,"
+ "accept *:554,"
+ "accept *:563,"
+ "accept *:636,"
+ "accept *:706,"
+ "accept *:749,"
+ "accept *:873,"
+ "accept *:902-904,"
+ "accept *:981,"
+ "accept *:989-995,"
+ "accept *:1194,"
+ "accept *:1220,"
+ "accept *:1293,"
+ "accept *:1500,"
+ "accept *:1533,"
+ "accept *:1677,"
+ "accept *:1723,"
+ "accept *:1755,"
+ "accept *:1863,"
+ "accept *:2082,"
+ "accept *:2083,"
+ "accept *:2086-2087,"
+ "accept *:2095-2096,"
+ "accept *:2102-2104,"
+ "accept *:3128,"
+ "accept *:3389,"
+ "accept *:3690,"
+ "accept *:4321,"
+ "accept *:4643,"
+ "accept *:5050,"
+ "accept *:5190,"
+ "accept *:5222-5223,"
+ "accept *:5228,"
+ "accept *:5900,"
+ "accept *:6660-6669,"
+ "accept *:6679,"
+ "accept *:6697,"
+ "accept *:8000,"
+ "accept *:8008,"
+ "accept *:8074,"
+ "accept *:8080,"
+ "accept *:8087-8088,"
+ "accept *:8332-8333,"
+ "accept *:8443,"
+ "accept *:8888,"
+ "accept *:9418,"
+ "accept *:9999,"
+ "accept *:10000,"
+ "accept *:11371,"
+ "accept *:12350,"
+ "accept *:19294,"
+ "accept *:19638,"
+ "accept *:23456,"
+ "accept *:33033,"
+ "accept *:64738,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 20-23,43,53,79-81,88,110,143,194,220,389,"
+ "443,464,531,543-544,554,563,636,706,749,873,"
+ "902-904,981,989-995,1194,1220,1293,1500,1533,"
+ "1677,1723,1755,1863,2082-2083,2086-2087,"
+ "2095-2096,2102-2104,3128,3389,3690,4321,4643,"
+ "5050,5190,5222-5223,5228,5900,6660-6669,6679,"
+ "6697,8000,8008,8074,8080,8087-8088,8332-8333,"
+ "8443,8888,9418,9999-10000,11371,12350,19294,"
+ "19638,23456,33033,64738");
+ /* short policy with configured addresses */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 149.56.1.1:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::1:0]:*,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 80,443");
+ /* short policy with configured and local interface addresses */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 149.56.1.0:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.1:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.2:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.3:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.4:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.5:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.6:*,"
+ "reject 149.56.1.7:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::1:0]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::1:1]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::1:2]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::1:3]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::2:0]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::2:1]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::2:2]:*,"
+ "reject [2607:5300:1:1::2:3]:*,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 80,443");
+ /* short policy with configured netblocks */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 149.56.0.0/16,"
+ "reject6 2607:5300::/32,"
+ "reject6 2608:5300::/64,"
+ "reject6 2609:5300::/96,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 80,443");
+ /* short policy with large netblocks that do not count as a rejection */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 148.0.0.0/7,"
+ "reject6 2600::/16,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 80,443");
+ /* short policy with large netblocks that count as a rejection */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 148.0.0.0/6,"
+ "reject6 2600::/15,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "reject 1-65535");
+ /* short policy with huge netblocks that count as a rejection */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 128.0.0.0/1,"
+ "reject6 8000::/1,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "reject 1-65535");
+ /* short policy which blocks everything using netblocks */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "reject 1-65535");
+ /* short policy which has repeated redundant netblocks */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject 0.0.0.0/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "reject6 ::/0,"
+ "accept *:80,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "reject 1-65535");
+
+ /* longest possible policy
+ * (1-2,4-5,... is longer, but gets reduced to 3,6,... )
+ * Going all the way to 65535 is incredibly slow, so we just go slightly
+ * more than the expected length */
+ test_policy_summary_helper("accept *:1,"
+ "accept *:3,"
+ "accept *:5,"
+ "accept *:7,"
+ "accept *:9,"
+ "accept *:11,"
+ "accept *:13,"
+ "accept *:15,"
+ "accept *:17,"
+ "accept *:19,"
+ "accept *:21,"
+ "accept *:23,"
+ "accept *:25,"
+ "accept *:27,"
+ "accept *:29,"
+ "accept *:31,"
+ "accept *:33,"
+ "accept *:35,"
+ "accept *:37,"
+ "accept *:39,"
+ "accept *:41,"
+ "accept *:43,"
+ "accept *:45,"
+ "accept *:47,"
+ "accept *:49,"
+ "accept *:51,"
+ "accept *:53,"
+ "accept *:55,"
+ "accept *:57,"
+ "accept *:59,"
+ "accept *:61,"
+ "accept *:63,"
+ "accept *:65,"
+ "accept *:67,"
+ "accept *:69,"
+ "accept *:71,"
+ "accept *:73,"
+ "accept *:75,"
+ "accept *:77,"
+ "accept *:79,"
+ "accept *:81,"
+ "accept *:83,"
+ "accept *:85,"
+ "accept *:87,"
+ "accept *:89,"
+ "accept *:91,"
+ "accept *:93,"
+ "accept *:95,"
+ "accept *:97,"
+ "accept *:99,"
+ "accept *:101,"
+ "accept *:103,"
+ "accept *:105,"
+ "accept *:107,"
+ "accept *:109,"
+ "accept *:111,"
+ "accept *:113,"
+ "accept *:115,"
+ "accept *:117,"
+ "accept *:119,"
+ "accept *:121,"
+ "accept *:123,"
+ "accept *:125,"
+ "accept *:127,"
+ "accept *:129,"
+ "accept *:131,"
+ "accept *:133,"
+ "accept *:135,"
+ "accept *:137,"
+ "accept *:139,"
+ "accept *:141,"
+ "accept *:143,"
+ "accept *:145,"
+ "accept *:147,"
+ "accept *:149,"
+ "accept *:151,"
+ "accept *:153,"
+ "accept *:155,"
+ "accept *:157,"
+ "accept *:159,"
+ "accept *:161,"
+ "accept *:163,"
+ "accept *:165,"
+ "accept *:167,"
+ "accept *:169,"
+ "accept *:171,"
+ "accept *:173,"
+ "accept *:175,"
+ "accept *:177,"
+ "accept *:179,"
+ "accept *:181,"
+ "accept *:183,"
+ "accept *:185,"
+ "accept *:187,"
+ "accept *:189,"
+ "accept *:191,"
+ "accept *:193,"
+ "accept *:195,"
+ "accept *:197,"
+ "accept *:199,"
+ "accept *:201,"
+ "accept *:203,"
+ "accept *:205,"
+ "accept *:207,"
+ "accept *:209,"
+ "accept *:211,"
+ "accept *:213,"
+ "accept *:215,"
+ "accept *:217,"
+ "accept *:219,"
+ "accept *:221,"
+ "accept *:223,"
+ "accept *:225,"
+ "accept *:227,"
+ "accept *:229,"
+ "accept *:231,"
+ "accept *:233,"
+ "accept *:235,"
+ "accept *:237,"
+ "accept *:239,"
+ "accept *:241,"
+ "accept *:243,"
+ "accept *:245,"
+ "accept *:247,"
+ "accept *:249,"
+ "accept *:251,"
+ "accept *:253,"
+ "accept *:255,"
+ "accept *:257,"
+ "accept *:259,"
+ "accept *:261,"
+ "accept *:263,"
+ "accept *:265,"
+ "accept *:267,"
+ "accept *:269,"
+ "accept *:271,"
+ "accept *:273,"
+ "accept *:275,"
+ "accept *:277,"
+ "accept *:279,"
+ "accept *:281,"
+ "accept *:283,"
+ "accept *:285,"
+ "accept *:287,"
+ "accept *:289,"
+ "accept *:291,"
+ "accept *:293,"
+ "accept *:295,"
+ "accept *:297,"
+ "accept *:299,"
+ "accept *:301,"
+ "accept *:303,"
+ "accept *:305,"
+ "accept *:307,"
+ "accept *:309,"
+ "accept *:311,"
+ "accept *:313,"
+ "accept *:315,"
+ "accept *:317,"
+ "accept *:319,"
+ "accept *:321,"
+ "accept *:323,"
+ "accept *:325,"
+ "accept *:327,"
+ "accept *:329,"
+ "accept *:331,"
+ "accept *:333,"
+ "accept *:335,"
+ "accept *:337,"
+ "accept *:339,"
+ "accept *:341,"
+ "accept *:343,"
+ "accept *:345,"
+ "accept *:347,"
+ "accept *:349,"
+ "accept *:351,"
+ "accept *:353,"
+ "accept *:355,"
+ "accept *:357,"
+ "accept *:359,"
+ "accept *:361,"
+ "accept *:363,"
+ "accept *:365,"
+ "accept *:367,"
+ "accept *:369,"
+ "accept *:371,"
+ "accept *:373,"
+ "accept *:375,"
+ "accept *:377,"
+ "accept *:379,"
+ "accept *:381,"
+ "accept *:383,"
+ "accept *:385,"
+ "accept *:387,"
+ "accept *:389,"
+ "accept *:391,"
+ "accept *:393,"
+ "accept *:395,"
+ "accept *:397,"
+ "accept *:399,"
+ "accept *:401,"
+ "accept *:403,"
+ "accept *:405,"
+ "accept *:407,"
+ "accept *:409,"
+ "accept *:411,"
+ "accept *:413,"
+ "accept *:415,"
+ "accept *:417,"
+ "accept *:419,"
+ "accept *:421,"
+ "accept *:423,"
+ "accept *:425,"
+ "accept *:427,"
+ "accept *:429,"
+ "accept *:431,"
+ "accept *:433,"
+ "accept *:435,"
+ "accept *:437,"
+ "accept *:439,"
+ "accept *:441,"
+ "accept *:443,"
+ "accept *:445,"
+ "accept *:447,"
+ "accept *:449,"
+ "accept *:451,"
+ "accept *:453,"
+ "accept *:455,"
+ "accept *:457,"
+ "accept *:459,"
+ "accept *:461,"
+ "accept *:463,"
+ "accept *:465,"
+ "accept *:467,"
+ "accept *:469,"
+ "accept *:471,"
+ "accept *:473,"
+ "accept *:475,"
+ "accept *:477,"
+ "accept *:479,"
+ "accept *:481,"
+ "accept *:483,"
+ "accept *:485,"
+ "accept *:487,"
+ "accept *:489,"
+ "accept *:491,"
+ "accept *:493,"
+ "accept *:495,"
+ "accept *:497,"
+ "accept *:499,"
+ "accept *:501,"
+ "accept *:503,"
+ "accept *:505,"
+ "accept *:507,"
+ "accept *:509,"
+ "accept *:511,"
+ "accept *:513,"
+ "accept *:515,"
+ "accept *:517,"
+ "accept *:519,"
+ "accept *:521,"
+ "accept *:523,"
+ "accept *:525,"
+ "accept *:527,"
+ "accept *:529,"
+ "reject *:*",
+ "accept 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15,17,19,21,23,25,27,29,"
+ "31,33,35,37,39,41,43,45,47,49,51,53,55,57,59,61,"
+ "63,65,67,69,71,73,75,77,79,81,83,85,87,89,91,93,"
+ "95,97,99,101,103,105,107,109,111,113,115,117,"
+ "119,121,123,125,127,129,131,133,135,137,139,141,"
+ "143,145,147,149,151,153,155,157,159,161,163,165,"
+ "167,169,171,173,175,177,179,181,183,185,187,189,"
+ "191,193,195,197,199,201,203,205,207,209,211,213,"
+ "215,217,219,221,223,225,227,229,231,233,235,237,"
+ "239,241,243,245,247,249,251,253,255,257,259,261,"
+ "263,265,267,269,271,273,275,277,279,281,283,285,"
+ "287,289,291,293,295,297,299,301,303,305,307,309,"
+ "311,313,315,317,319,321,323,325,327,329,331,333,"
+ "335,337,339,341,343,345,347,349,351,353,355,357,"
+ "359,361,363,365,367,369,371,373,375,377,379,381,"
+ "383,385,387,389,391,393,395,397,399,401,403,405,"
+ "407,409,411,413,415,417,419,421,423,425,427,429,"
+ "431,433,435,437,439,441,443,445,447,449,451,453,"
+ "455,457,459,461,463,465,467,469,471,473,475,477,"
+ "479,481,483,485,487,489,491,493,495,497,499,501,"
+ "503,505,507,509,511,513,515,517,519,521,523");
/* Short policies with unrecognized formats should get accepted. */
test_short_policy_parse("accept fred,2,3-5", "accept 2,3-5");
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c
index 1cba617..47455cf 100644
--- a/src/test/test_tortls.c
+++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c
@@ -38,9 +38,11 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
#include "log_test_helpers.h"
#define NS_MODULE tortls
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) \
- && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_STATE
#define OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
#define SSL_STATE_STR "before SSL initialization"
#else
#define SSL_STATE_STR "before/accept initialization"
@@ -723,6 +725,26 @@ test_tortls_get_my_certs(void *ignored)
(void)1;
}
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+static SSL_CIPHER *
+get_cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
+ int num = method->num_ciphers();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) {
+ return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
static void
test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored)
@@ -742,23 +764,6 @@ test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored)
}
static SSL_CIPHER *
-get_cipher_by_name(const char *name)
-{
- int i;
- const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
- int num = method->num_ciphers();
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
- const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
- if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) {
- return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
- }
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static SSL_CIPHER *
get_cipher_by_id(uint16_t id)
{
int i;
diff --git a/src/tools/tor-resolve.c b/src/tools/tor-resolve.c
index 29f85c4..6ac866d 100644
--- a/src/tools/tor-resolve.c
+++ b/src/tools/tor-resolve.c
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ build_socks_resolve_request(char **out,
}
ipv6 = reverse && tor_addr_family(&addr) == AF_INET6;
addrlen = reverse ? (ipv6 ? 16 : 4) : 1 + strlen(hostname);
+ if (addrlen > UINT8_MAX) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Hostname is too long!");
+ return -1;
+ }
len = 6 + addrlen;
*out = tor_malloc(len);
(*out)[0] = 5; /* SOCKS version 5 */
diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h
index 17e1e54..540cfab 100644
--- a/src/win32/orconfig.h
+++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
#define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT
/* Version number of package */
-#define VERSION "0.2.9.9"
+#define VERSION "0.2.9.10"
--- End Message ---