--- Begin Message ---
- To: Debian Bug Tracking System <submit@bugs.debian.org>
- Subject: jessie-pu: package policykit-1/0.105-15~deb8u1
- From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
- Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 13:06:07 +0200
- Message-id: <146434716741.11180.10946500393994499870.reportbug@pluto.milchstrasse.xx>
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: jessie
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
Hi stable release team,
we'd like to make a stable upload for policykit-1 in the upcoming jessie
point release.
The policykit-1 package didn't have a new upstream release in sid, but
we backported a lot of fixes from newer upstream versions, including
quite a few CVEs and important memory leak fixes [1].
The policykit-1 package in sid is in a much better shape then what we
have in jessie.
We therefor think it's best to simply upload the current package from
sid, which has been cooking for a very long time, as is to stable.
I know the debdiff is large but I think the vast majority of the changes
are stable material and it's simply unfeasible to create and test yet
another stack of patches. I would therefor urge you to consider to
accept the attached debdiff.
If there is a certain change you absolutely don't want to have in
stable, please let use know. Reverting individual changes on top of
0.105-15 is simpler than building a new package based on 0.105-8.
Individual commits can be found at [2].
Regarding the versioning, I decided to keep the changelog as is and
version it 0.105-15~deb8u1. That seemed more logical to me and merging
the changelog into a single revision and using 0.105-8+deb8u1.
I'm open to change that though if you prefer.
Regards,
Michael
[1] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=775158
[2] http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-utopia/policykit.git/
-- System Information:
Debian Release: stretch/sid
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (200, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Foreign Architectures: i386
Kernel: Linux 4.5.0-2-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=de_DE.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=de_DE.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index c6b9065..bcee1a2 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,127 @@
+policykit-1 (0.105-15~deb8u1) stable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Upload to stable.
+
+ -- Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> Fri, 27 May 2016 12:46:17 +0200
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-15) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Generate tight inter-package dependencies.
+ This ensures that everything from the same source package is upgraded in
+ lockstep. (Closes: #817998)
+
+ -- Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> Thu, 14 Apr 2016 13:57:13 +0200
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-14.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Fix FTBFS on non-linux/non-systemd. (Closes: #798769)
+
+ -- Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> Thu, 14 Jan 2016 06:28:38 +0100
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-14) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * debian/policykit-1.preinst: Use systemctl unmask instead of direct symlink
+ removal for consistency.
+ * Fix handling of multi-line helper output. Thanks Dariusz Gadomski! Patch
+ backported from upstream master. (LP: #1510824)
+
+ -- Martin Pitt <mpitt@debian.org> Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:38:00 +0100
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-13) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * debian/policykit-1.{pre,pos}inst: Temporarily mask polkitd.service while
+ policykit-1 is unpackaged but not yet configured. During that time we
+ don't yet have our D-Bus policy in /etc so that polkitd cannot work yet.
+ This can be dropped once the D-Bus policy moves to /usr.
+ (Closes: #794723, LP: #1447654)
+
+ -- Martin Pitt <mpitt@debian.org> Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:11:22 +0200
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-12) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Team upload
+ * Replace 03_complete_session.patch with a change from upstream
+ which seems like a more correct solution for LP#445303, LP#649939
+ * 05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch: remove confusing
+ staff -> desktop_admin_r change in a man page (desktop_admin_r looks
+ vaguely like a SELinux role but is actually being used as a group);
+ keep only the actual functional change. This matches the syntactically
+ different but functionally similar change in experimental.
+ * 09_pam_environment.patch: replace with the version that went upstream.
+ * Annotate remaining patches with a bit more information.
+ They are:
+ - 00git_fix_memleak.patch, 00git_invalid_object_paths.patch,
+ 00git_type_registration.patch, 04_get_cwd.patch,
+ 07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch,
+ 08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch, 09_pam_environment.patch,
+ cve-2013-4288.patch: either backports from upstream, or already
+ applied upstream, and not discussed further here.
+ - 01_pam_polkit.patch: use Debian's common-* infrastructure,
+ plus pam_env to get the global environment and locale.
+ Debian-specific.
+ - 02_gettext.patch: Use gettext to translate .policy files at
+ runtime, allowing for Ubuntu-style language packs.
+ Debian-specific (mainly for Ubuntu's benefit, really).
+ - 05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch: Debian does
+ not use the "wheel" group like Red Hat derivatives do;
+ treat uid 0 as the administrative identity instead.
+ Debian-specific.
+ - 06_systemd-service.patch: hook up the systemd service in
+ debian/polkitd.service.
+ Not forwarded: obsoleted by an upstream change in 0.106,
+ commit 2995085.
+ * Re-order patch series to put upstream changes first, sorted by version
+ in which they went upstream, and put them in subdirectories by version
+ * Add patches from 0.113 to fix heap corruption CVE-2015-3255
+ (Closes: #766860) and local authenticated denial of service
+ CVE-2015-4625 (Closes: #796134)
+ * Add numerous other bug-fix patches from 0.113
+ - work around bugs in older versions of libpam-systemd when using
+ su or similar (Closes: #772125)
+ - treat background processes as part of the same uid's active GUI
+ session if they have one (Closes: #779988)
+ - fix some memory leaks (Closes: #775158, LP: #1417637)
+ * Add backported public API polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync() to
+ symbols file
+ * Fix FTBFS with dpkg-buildpackage -A by only installing files into
+ policykit-1 in per-arch builds
+ * Run tests with a session bus pretending to be the system bus,
+ so they can pass in a buildd environment
+
+ -- Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org> Fri, 11 Sep 2015 09:48:00 +0100
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-11) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Add 00git_invalid_object_paths.patch: backend: Handle invalid object paths
+ in RegisterAuthenticationAgent (CVE-2015-3218, Closes: #787932)
+ * policykit-1.postinst: Reload systemd before restarting polkitd.service, to
+ avoid "Warning: polkitd.service changed on disk". (Closes: #791397)
+
+ -- Martin Pitt <mpitt@debian.org> Fri, 10 Jul 2015 13:03:33 +0200
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-10) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Add 00git_type_registration.patch: Use GOnce for interface type
+ registration. Fixes frequent udisks segfault (LP: #1236510).
+ * Add 00git_fix_memleak.patch: Fix memory leak in EnumerateActions call
+ results handler. (LP: #1417637)
+
+ -- Martin Pitt <mpitt@debian.org> Wed, 08 Jul 2015 12:15:41 +0200
+
+policykit-1 (0.105-9) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ [ Martin Pitt ]
+ * policykit-1.postinst: Don't kill polkitd under systemd, but properly
+ restart it. This avoids killing it shortly after systemd tries to
+ bus-activate it on installation. (LP: #1447654)
+
+ [ Michael Biebl ]
+ * Build against libsystemd instead of the old libsystemd-login compat
+ library. (Closes: #779756)
+
+ -- Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> Wed, 08 Jul 2015 02:10:58 +0200
+
policykit-1 (0.105-8) unstable; urgency=medium
* Rebuild against libsystemd0. This drops the last remaining dependency to
diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
index 128b305..d72c9ec 100644
--- a/debian/control
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ Section: admin
Priority: optional
Maintainer: Utopia Maintenance Team <pkg-utopia-maintainers@lists.alioth.debian.org>
Uploaders: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>, Martin Pitt <mpitt@debian.org>
-Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 9),
+Build-Depends:
+ dbus,
+ debhelper (>= 9),
dh-autoreconf,
pkg-config,
libglib2.0-dev (>= 2.28.0),
@@ -17,7 +19,7 @@ Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 9),
gir1.2-glib-2.0,
libglib2.0-doc,
libgtk-3-doc,
- libsystemd-login-dev [linux-any]
+ libsystemd-dev [linux-any]
Standards-Version: 3.9.6
Vcs-Git: git://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-utopia/policykit.git
Vcs-Browser: http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=pkg-utopia/policykit.git;a=summary
diff --git a/debian/gbp.conf b/debian/gbp.conf
index c31be83..790495e 100644
--- a/debian/gbp.conf
+++ b/debian/gbp.conf
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[DEFAULT]
pristine-tar = True
-debian-branch = master
+debian-branch = jessie
diff --git a/debian/libpolkit-gobject-1-0.symbols b/debian/libpolkit-gobject-1-0.symbols
index 9531612..c9286c7 100644
--- a/debian/libpolkit-gobject-1-0.symbols
+++ b/debian/libpolkit-gobject-1-0.symbols
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ libpolkit-gobject-1.so.0 libpolkit-gobject-1-0 #MINVER#
polkit_system_bus_name_get_name@Base 0.94
polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync@Base 0.95
polkit_system_bus_name_get_type@Base 0.94
+ polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync@Base 0.105-12~
polkit_system_bus_name_new@Base 0.94
polkit_system_bus_name_set_name@Base 0.94
polkit_temporary_authorization_get_action_id@Base 0.94
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.110/04_get_cwd.patch b/debian/patches/0.110/04_get_cwd.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acaa68d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.110/04_get_cwd.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Emilio Pozuelo Monfort <pochu27@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2011 07:28:14 +0000
+Subject: Fix build on GNU Hurd
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=35685
+Applied-upstream: 0.110, commit:d6de13e12379826af8ca9355a32da48707b9831f
+---
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 7fafa14..682fe95 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
+ #include <polkitagent/polkitagent.h>
+
+ static gchar *original_user_name = NULL;
+-static gchar original_cwd[PATH_MAX];
++static gchar *original_cwd;
+ static gchar *command_line = NULL;
+ static struct passwd *pw;
+
+@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- if (getcwd (original_cwd, sizeof (original_cwd)) == NULL)
++ if ((original_cwd = g_get_current_dir ()) == NULL)
+ {
+ g_printerr ("Error getting cwd: %s\n",
+ g_strerror (errno));
+@@ -953,6 +953,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ g_ptr_array_free (saved_env, TRUE);
+ }
+
++ g_free (original_cwd);
+ g_free (path);
+ g_free (command_line);
+ g_free (opt_user);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.110/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch b/debian/patches/0.110/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ddf78c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.110/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2012 14:28:29 -0500
+Subject: Set XAUTHORITY environment variable if is unset
+
+The way it works is that if XAUTHORITY is unset, then its default
+value is $HOME/.Xauthority. But since we're changing user identity
+this will not work since $HOME will now change. Therefore, if
+XAUTHORITY is unset, just set its default value before changing
+identity. This bug only affected login managers using X Window
+Authorization but not explicitly setting the XAUTHORITY variable.
+
+You can argue that XAUTHORITY is broken since it forces uid-changing
+apps like pkexec(1) to do more work - and get involved in intimate
+details of how X works and so on - but that doesn't change how things
+work.
+
+Based on a patch from Peter Wu <lekensteyn@gmail.com>.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51623
+Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
+Origin: upstream, 0.110, commit:d6acecdd0ebb42e28ff28e04e0207cb01fa20910
+---
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 373977b..7fafa14 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -597,6 +597,28 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (value));
+ }
+
++ /* $XAUTHORITY is "special" - if unset, we need to set it to ~/.Xauthority. Yes,
++ * this is broken but it's unfortunately how things work (see fdo #51623 for
++ * details)
++ */
++ if (g_getenv ("XAUTHORITY") == NULL)
++ {
++ const gchar *home;
++
++ /* pre-2.36 GLib does not examine $HOME (it always looks in /etc/passwd) and
++ * this is not what we want
++ */
++ home = g_getenv ("HOME");
++ if (home == NULL)
++ home = g_get_home_dir ();
++
++ if (home != NULL)
++ {
++ g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("XAUTHORITY"));
++ g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_build_filename (home, ".Xauthority", NULL));
++ }
++ }
++
+ /* Nuke the environment to get a well-known and sanitized environment to avoid attacks
+ * via e.g. the DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS environment variable and similar.
+ */
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.111/09_pam_environment.patch b/debian/patches/0.111/09_pam_environment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..793efee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.111/09_pam_environment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 12:00:00 +0100
+Subject: pkexec: Set process environment from pam_getenvlist()
+
+Various pam modules provide environment variables that are intended to be set
+in the environment of the pam session. pkexec needs to process the output of
+pam_getenvlist() to get these.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62016
+Applied-upstream: 0.111, commit:5aef9722c15a350fbf8b20a3b58419f156cc7c98
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/982684
+---
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 682fe95..9a0570a 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth)
+ gboolean ret;
+ gint rc;
+ pam_handle_t *pam_h;
++ char **envlist;
+ struct pam_conv conversation;
+
+ ret = FALSE;
+@@ -176,6 +177,15 @@ open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth)
+
+ ret = TRUE;
+
++ envlist = pam_getenvlist (pam_h);
++ if (envlist != NULL)
++ {
++ guint n;
++ for (n = 0; envlist[n]; n++)
++ putenv (envlist[n]);
++ free (envlist);
++ }
++
+ out:
+ if (pam_h != NULL)
+ pam_end (pam_h, rc);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.112/00git_type_registration.patch b/debian/patches/0.112/00git_type_registration.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3936801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.112/00git_type_registration.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+From: Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 13:45:31 +0000
+Subject: Use GOnce for interface type registration
+
+Static local variable may not be enough since it doesn't provide locking.
+
+Related to these udisksd warnings:
+ GLib-GObject-WARNING **: cannot register existing type `PolkitSubject'
+
+Thanks to Hans de Goede for spotting this!
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=65130
+Origin: upstream, 0.112, commit:20ad116a6582e57d20f9d8197758947918753a4c
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitidentity.c | 10 ++++++----
+ src/polkit/polkitsubject.c | 10 ++++++----
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionlookup.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitidentity.c b/src/polkit/polkitidentity.c
+index dd15b2f..7813c2c 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitidentity.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitidentity.c
+@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ base_init (gpointer g_iface)
+ GType
+ polkit_identity_get_type (void)
+ {
+- static GType iface_type = 0;
++ static volatile gsize g_define_type_id__volatile = 0;
+
+- if (iface_type == 0)
++ if (g_once_init_enter (&g_define_type_id__volatile))
+ {
+ static const GTypeInfo info =
+ {
+@@ -67,12 +67,14 @@ polkit_identity_get_type (void)
+ NULL /* value_table */
+ };
+
+- iface_type = g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitIdentity", &info, 0);
++ GType iface_type =
++ g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitIdentity", &info, 0);
+
+ g_type_interface_add_prerequisite (iface_type, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
++ g_once_init_leave (&g_define_type_id__volatile, iface_type);
+ }
+
+- return iface_type;
++ return g_define_type_id__volatile;
+ }
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
+index d2c4c20..aed5795 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
+@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ base_init (gpointer g_iface)
+ GType
+ polkit_subject_get_type (void)
+ {
+- static GType iface_type = 0;
++ static volatile gsize g_define_type_id__volatile = 0;
+
+- if (iface_type == 0)
++ if (g_once_init_enter (&g_define_type_id__volatile))
+ {
+ static const GTypeInfo info =
+ {
+@@ -68,12 +68,14 @@ polkit_subject_get_type (void)
+ NULL /* value_table */
+ };
+
+- iface_type = g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitSubject", &info, 0);
++ GType iface_type =
++ g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitSubject", &info, 0);
+
+ g_type_interface_add_prerequisite (iface_type, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
++ g_once_init_leave (&g_define_type_id__volatile, iface_type);
+ }
+
+- return iface_type;
++ return g_define_type_id__volatile;
+ }
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionlookup.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionlookup.c
+index 5a1a228..20747e7 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionlookup.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionlookup.c
+@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ base_init (gpointer g_iface)
+ GType
+ polkit_backend_action_lookup_get_type (void)
+ {
+- static GType iface_type = 0;
++ static volatile gsize g_define_type_id__volatile = 0;
+
+- if (iface_type == 0)
++ if (g_once_init_enter (&g_define_type_id__volatile))
+ {
+ static const GTypeInfo info =
+ {
+@@ -92,12 +92,14 @@ polkit_backend_action_lookup_get_type (void)
+ NULL /* value_table */
+ };
+
+- iface_type = g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitBackendActionLookup", &info, 0);
++ GType iface_type =
++ g_type_register_static (G_TYPE_INTERFACE, "PolkitBackendActionLookup", &info, 0);
+
+ g_type_interface_add_prerequisite (iface_type, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
++ g_once_init_leave (&g_define_type_id__volatile, iface_type);
+ }
+
+- return iface_type;
++ return g_define_type_id__volatile;
+ }
+
+ /**
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.112/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch b/debian/patches/0.112/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..725a44a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.112/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 15:15:31 -0400
+Subject: polkitunixprocess: Deprecate racy APIs
+
+It's only safe for processes to be created with their owning uid,
+(without kernel support, which we don't have). Anything else is
+subject to clients exec()ing setuid binaries after the fact.
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.112, commit:08291789a1f99d4ab29c74c39344304bcca43023
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
+index 531a57d..f5ed1a7 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
+@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ typedef struct _PolkitUnixProcess PolkitUnixProcess;
+ typedef struct _PolkitUnixProcessClass PolkitUnixProcessClass;
+
+ GType polkit_unix_process_get_type (void) G_GNUC_CONST;
++G_GNUC_DEPRECATED_FOR(polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner)
+ PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new (gint pid);
++G_GNUC_DEPRECATED_FOR(polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner)
+ PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new_full (gint pid,
+ guint64 start_time);
+ PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (gint pid,
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.112/cve-2013-4288.patch b/debian/patches/0.112/cve-2013-4288.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..207bcf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.112/cve-2013-4288.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:16:11 -0400
+Subject: pkcheck: Support --process=pid,start-time,uid syntax too
+
+The uid is a new addition; this allows callers such as libvirt to
+close a race condition in reading the uid of the process talking to
+them. They can read it via getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) or equivalent,
+rather than having pkcheck look at /proc later after the fact.
+
+Programs which invoke pkcheck but need to know beforehand (i.e. at
+compile time) whether or not it supports passing the uid can
+use:
+
+pkcheck_supports_uid=$($PKG_CONFIG --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1)
+test x$pkcheck_supports_uid = xyes
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.112, commit:3968411b0c7ba193f9b9276ec911692aec248608
+---
+ data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in | 3 +++
+ docs/man/pkcheck.xml | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/programs/pkcheck.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in b/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in
+index c39677d..5c4c620 100644
+--- a/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in
++++ b/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in
+@@ -11,3 +11,6 @@ Version: @VERSION@
+ Libs: -L${libdir} -lpolkit-gobject-1
+ Cflags: -I${includedir}/polkit-1
+ Requires: gio-2.0 >= 2.18 glib-2.0 >= 2.18
++# Programs using pkcheck can use this to determine
++# whether or not it can be passed a uid.
++pkcheck_supports_uid=true
+diff --git a/docs/man/pkcheck.xml b/docs/man/pkcheck.xml
+index 6b8a874..508447e 100644
+--- a/docs/man/pkcheck.xml
++++ b/docs/man/pkcheck.xml
+@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
+ <arg choice="plain">
+ <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time</replaceable>
+ </arg>
++ <arg choice="plain">
++ <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time,uid</replaceable>
++ </arg>
+ </group>
+ </arg>
+ <arg choice="plain">
+@@ -90,7 +93,7 @@
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+ <para>
+ <command>pkcheck</command> is used to check whether a process, specified by
+- either <option>--process</option> or <option>--system-bus-name</option>,
++ either <option>--process</option> (see below) or <option>--system-bus-name</option>,
+ is authorized for <replaceable>action</replaceable>. The <option>--detail</option>
+ option can be used zero or more times to pass details about <replaceable>action</replaceable>.
+ If <option>--allow-user-interaction</option> is passed, <command>pkcheck</command> blocks
+@@ -160,17 +163,25 @@ KEY3=VALUE3
+ <refsect1 id="pkcheck-notes">
+ <title>NOTES</title>
+ <para>
+- Since process identifiers can be recycled, the caller should always use
+- <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time</replaceable> to specify the process
+- to check for authorization when using the <option>--process</option> option.
+- The value of <replaceable>pid-start-time</replaceable>
+- can be determined by consulting e.g. the
++ Do not use either the bare <replaceable>pid</replaceable> or
++ <replaceable>pid,start-time</replaceable> syntax forms for
++ <option>--process</option>. There are race conditions in both.
++ New code should always use
++ <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time,uid</replaceable>. The value of
++ <replaceable>start-time</replaceable> can be determined by
++ consulting e.g. the
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>proc</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+- file system depending on the operating system. If only <replaceable>pid</replaceable>
+- is passed to the <option>--process</option> option, then <command>pkcheck</command>
+- will look up the start time itself but note that this may be racy.
++ file system depending on the operating system. If fewer than 3
++ arguments are passed, <command>pkcheck</command> will attempt to
++ look up them up internally, but note that this may be racy.
++ </para>
++ <para>
++ If your program is a daemon with e.g. a custom Unix domain
++ socket, you should determine the <replaceable>uid</replaceable>
++ parameter via operating system mechanisms such as
++ <literal>PEERCRED</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkcheck.c b/src/programs/pkcheck.c
+index 719a36c..057e926 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkcheck.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkcheck.c
+@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ else if (g_strcmp0 (argv[n], "--process") == 0 || g_strcmp0 (argv[n], "-p") == 0)
+ {
+ gint pid;
++ guint uid;
+ guint64 pid_start_time;
+
+ n++;
+@@ -381,7 +382,11 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT, &pid, &pid_start_time) == 2)
++ if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ",%u", &pid, &pid_start_time, &uid) == 3)
++ {
++ subject = polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (pid, pid_start_time, uid);
++ }
++ else if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT, &pid, &pid_start_time) == 2)
+ {
+ subject = polkit_unix_process_new_full (pid, pid_start_time);
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/00git_fix_memleak.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/00git_fix_memleak.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4283345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/00git_fix_memleak.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: "Max A. Dednev" <dednev@rambler.ru>
+Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2015 20:00:44 -0500
+Subject: authority: Fix memory leak in EnumerateActions call results handler
+
+Policykit-1 doesn't release reference counters of GVariant data for
+org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.EnumerateActions dbus call. This
+patch fixed reference counting and following memory leak.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88288
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:f4d71e0de885010494b8b0b8d62ca910011d7544
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitauthority.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+index 9947cf3..84dab72 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+@@ -715,7 +715,6 @@ polkit_authority_enumerate_actions_finish (PolkitAuthority *authority,
+ while ((child = g_variant_iter_next_value (&iter)) != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = g_list_prepend (ret, polkit_action_description_new_for_gvariant (child));
+- g_variant_ref_sink (child);
+ g_variant_unref (child);
+ }
+ ret = g_list_reverse (ret);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/00git_invalid_object_paths.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/00git_invalid_object_paths.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..088d170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/00git_invalid_object_paths.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat, 30 May 2015 09:06:23 -0400
+Subject: CVE-2015-3218: backend: Handle invalid object paths in
+ RegisterAuthenticationAgent
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Properly propagate the error, otherwise we dereference a `NULL`
+pointer. This is a local, authenticated DoS.
+
+`RegisterAuthenticationAgentWithOptions` and
+`UnregisterAuthentication` have been validated to not need changes for
+this.
+
+http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/polkit-devel/2015-May/000420.html
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90829
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/787932
+Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <philip@tecnocode.co.uk>
+Reviewed-by: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:48e646918efb2bf0b3b505747655726d7869f31c
+---
+ .../polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c | 53 ++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+index b237e9d..25e13fb 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+@@ -1558,36 +1558,42 @@ authentication_agent_new (PolkitSubject *scope,
+ const gchar *unique_system_bus_name,
+ const gchar *locale,
+ const gchar *object_path,
+- GVariant *registration_options)
++ GVariant *registration_options,
++ GError **error)
+ {
+ AuthenticationAgent *agent;
+- GError *error;
++ GDBusProxy *proxy;
+
+- agent = g_new0 (AuthenticationAgent, 1);
++ if (!g_variant_is_object_path (object_path))
++ {
++ g_set_error (error, POLKIT_ERROR, POLKIT_ERROR_FAILED,
++ "Invalid object path '%s'", object_path);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ proxy = g_dbus_proxy_new_for_bus_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
++ G_DBUS_PROXY_FLAGS_DO_NOT_LOAD_PROPERTIES |
++ G_DBUS_PROXY_FLAGS_DO_NOT_CONNECT_SIGNALS,
++ NULL, /* GDBusInterfaceInfo* */
++ unique_system_bus_name,
++ object_path,
++ "org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent",
++ NULL, /* GCancellable* */
++ error);
++ if (proxy == NULL)
++ {
++ g_prefix_error (error, "Failed to construct proxy for agent: " );
++ return NULL;
++ }
+
++ agent = g_new0 (AuthenticationAgent, 1);
+ agent->ref_count = 1;
+ agent->scope = g_object_ref (scope);
+ agent->object_path = g_strdup (object_path);
+ agent->unique_system_bus_name = g_strdup (unique_system_bus_name);
+ agent->locale = g_strdup (locale);
+ agent->registration_options = registration_options != NULL ? g_variant_ref (registration_options) : NULL;
+-
+- error = NULL;
+- agent->proxy = g_dbus_proxy_new_for_bus_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
+- G_DBUS_PROXY_FLAGS_DO_NOT_LOAD_PROPERTIES |
+- G_DBUS_PROXY_FLAGS_DO_NOT_CONNECT_SIGNALS,
+- NULL, /* GDBusInterfaceInfo* */
+- agent->unique_system_bus_name,
+- agent->object_path,
+- "org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent",
+- NULL, /* GCancellable* */
+- &error);
+- if (agent->proxy == NULL)
+- {
+- g_warning ("Error constructing proxy for agent: %s", error->message);
+- g_error_free (error);
+- /* TODO: Make authentication_agent_new() return NULL and set a GError */
+- }
++ agent->proxy = proxy;
+
+ return agent;
+ }
+@@ -2234,8 +2240,6 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_register_authentication_agent (PolkitBacken
+ caller_cmdline = NULL;
+ agent = NULL;
+
+- /* TODO: validate that object path is well-formed */
+-
+ interactive_authority = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY (authority);
+ priv = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY_GET_PRIVATE (interactive_authority);
+
+@@ -2322,7 +2326,10 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_register_authentication_agent (PolkitBacken
+ polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (caller)),
+ locale,
+ object_path,
+- options);
++ options,
++ error);
++ if (!agent)
++ goto out;
+
+ g_hash_table_insert (priv->hash_scope_to_authentication_agent,
+ g_object_ref (subject),
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/03_PolkitAgentSession-fix-race-between-child-and-io-wat.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/03_PolkitAgentSession-fix-race-between-child-and-io-wat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..956099b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/03_PolkitAgentSession-fix-race-between-child-and-io-wat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From: Rui Matos <tiagomatos@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 18:41:18 +0100
+Subject: PolkitAgentSession: fix race between child and io watches
+
+The helper flushes and fdatasyncs stdout and stderr before terminating
+but this doesn't guarantee that our io watch is called before our
+child watch. This means that we can end up with a successful return
+from the helper which we still report as a failure.
+
+If we add G_IO_HUP and G_IO_ERR to the conditions we look for in the
+io watch and the child terminates we still run the io watch handler
+which will complete the session.
+
+This means that the child watch is in fact needless and we can remove
+it.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:7650ad1e08ab13bdb461783c4995d186d9392840
+Bug: http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30515
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/649939
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/445303
+---
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c | 47 +++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+index 8129cd9..a658a22 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ struct _PolkitAgentSession
+ int child_stdout;
+ GPid child_pid;
+
+- GSource *child_watch_source;
+ GSource *child_stdout_watch_source;
+ GIOChannel *child_stdout_channel;
+
+@@ -377,13 +376,6 @@ kill_helper (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ session->child_pid = 0;
+ }
+
+- if (session->child_watch_source != NULL)
+- {
+- g_source_destroy (session->child_watch_source);
+- g_source_unref (session->child_watch_source);
+- session->child_watch_source = NULL;
+- }
+-
+ if (session->child_stdout_watch_source != NULL)
+ {
+ g_source_destroy (session->child_stdout_watch_source);
+@@ -429,26 +421,6 @@ complete_session (PolkitAgentSession *session,
+ }
+ }
+
+-static void
+-child_watch_func (GPid pid,
+- gint status,
+- gpointer user_data)
+-{
+- PolkitAgentSession *session = POLKIT_AGENT_SESSION (user_data);
+-
+- if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
+- {
+- g_print ("PolkitAgentSession: in child_watch_func for pid %d (WIFEXITED=%d WEXITSTATUS=%d)\n",
+- (gint) pid,
+- WIFEXITED(status),
+- WEXITSTATUS(status));
+- }
+-
+- /* kill all the watches we have set up, except for the child since it has exited already */
+- session->child_pid = 0;
+- complete_session (session, FALSE);
+-}
+-
+ static gboolean
+ io_watch_have_data (GIOChannel *channel,
+ GIOCondition condition,
+@@ -475,10 +447,13 @@ io_watch_have_data (GIOChannel *channel,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ &error);
+- if (error != NULL)
++ if (error != NULL || line == NULL)
+ {
+- g_warning ("Error reading line from helper: %s", error->message);
+- g_error_free (error);
++ /* In case we get just G_IO_HUP, line is NULL but error is
++ unset.*/
++ g_warning ("Error reading line from helper: %s",
++ error ? error->message : "nothing to read");
++ g_clear_error (&error);
+
+ complete_session (session, FALSE);
+ goto out;
+@@ -540,6 +515,9 @@ io_watch_have_data (GIOChannel *channel,
+ g_free (line);
+ g_free (unescaped);
+
++ if (condition & (G_IO_ERR | G_IO_HUP))
++ complete_session (session, FALSE);
++
+ /* keep the IOChannel around */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -650,12 +628,9 @@ polkit_agent_session_initiate (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
+ g_print ("PolkitAgentSession: spawned helper with pid %d\n", (gint) session->child_pid);
+
+- session->child_watch_source = g_child_watch_source_new (session->child_pid);
+- g_source_set_callback (session->child_watch_source, (GSourceFunc) child_watch_func, session, NULL);
+- g_source_attach (session->child_watch_source, g_main_context_get_thread_default ());
+-
+ session->child_stdout_channel = g_io_channel_unix_new (session->child_stdout);
+- session->child_stdout_watch_source = g_io_create_watch (session->child_stdout_channel, G_IO_IN);
++ session->child_stdout_watch_source = g_io_create_watch (session->child_stdout_channel,
++ G_IO_IN | G_IO_ERR | G_IO_HUP);
+ g_source_set_callback (session->child_stdout_watch_source, (GSourceFunc) io_watch_have_data, session, NULL);
+ g_source_attach (session->child_stdout_watch_source, g_main_context_get_thread_default ());
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-3255-Fix-GHashTable-usage.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-3255-Fix-GHashTable-usage.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f20fab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-3255-Fix-GHashTable-usage.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2015 05:22:37 +0200
+Subject: CVE-2015-3255 Fix GHashTable usage.
+
+Don't assume that the hash table with free both the key and the value
+at the same time, supply proper deallocation functions for the key
+and value separately.
+
+Then drop ParsedAction::action_id which is no longer used for anything.
+
+https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69501
+and
+https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83590
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-3255
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:9f5e0c731784003bd4d6fc75ab739ff8b2ea269f
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/796134
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c | 8 +++-----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
+index e3ed38d..4270d4e 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
+
+ typedef struct
+ {
+- gchar *action_id;
+ gchar *vendor_name;
+ gchar *vendor_url;
+ gchar *icon_name;
+@@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ typedef struct
+ static void
+ parsed_action_free (ParsedAction *action)
+ {
+- g_free (action->action_id);
+ g_free (action->vendor_name);
+ g_free (action->vendor_url);
+ g_free (action->icon_name);
+@@ -134,7 +132,7 @@ polkit_backend_action_pool_init (PolkitBackendActionPool *pool)
+
+ priv->parsed_actions = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash,
+ g_str_equal,
+- NULL,
++ g_free,
+ (GDestroyNotify) parsed_action_free);
+
+ priv->parsed_files = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash,
+@@ -988,7 +986,6 @@ _end (void *data, const char *el)
+ icon_name = pd->global_icon_name;
+
+ action = g_new0 (ParsedAction, 1);
+- action->action_id = g_strdup (pd->action_id);
+ action->vendor_name = g_strdup (vendor);
+ action->vendor_url = g_strdup (vendor_url);
+ action->icon_name = g_strdup (icon_name);
+@@ -1003,7 +1000,8 @@ _end (void *data, const char *el)
+ action->implicit_authorization_inactive = pd->implicit_authorization_inactive;
+ action->implicit_authorization_active = pd->implicit_authorization_active;
+
+- g_hash_table_insert (priv->parsed_actions, action->action_id, action);
++ g_hash_table_insert (priv->parsed_actions, g_strdup (pd->action_id),
++ action);
+
+ /* we steal these hash tables */
+ pd->annotations = NULL;
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Bind-use-of-cookies-to-specific-uids.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Bind-use-of-cookies-to-specific-uids.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0516d5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Bind-use-of-cookies-to-specific-uids.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 13:07:02 -0400
+Subject: CVE-2015-4625: Bind use of cookies to specific uids
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/polkit-devel/2015-June/000425.html
+
+The "cookie" value that Polkit hands out is global to all polkit
+users. And when `AuthenticationAgentResponse` is invoked, we
+previously only received the cookie and *target* identity, and
+attempted to find an agent from that.
+
+The problem is that the current cookie is just an integer
+counter, and if it overflowed, it would be possible for
+an successful authorization in one session to trigger a response
+in another session.
+
+The overflow and ability to guess the cookie were fixed by the
+previous patch.
+
+This patch is conceptually further hardening on top of that. Polkit
+currently treats uids as equivalent from a security domain
+perspective; there is no support for
+SELinux/AppArmor/etc. differentiation.
+
+We can retrieve the uid from `getuid()` in the setuid helper, which
+allows us to ensure the uid invoking `AuthenticationAgentResponse2`
+matches that of the agent.
+
+Then the authority only looks at authentication sessions matching the
+cookie that were created by a matching uid, thus removing the ability
+for different uids to interfere with each other entirely.
+
+Several fixes to this patch were contributed by:
+Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90837
+CVE: CVE-2015-4625
+Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:493aa5dc1d278ab9097110c1262f5229bbaf1766
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/796134
+---
+ ....freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml | 14 ++++-
+ data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml | 24 ++++++++-
+ ...erface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml | 46 +++++++++++++++-
+ docs/polkit/overview.xml | 18 ++++---
+ src/polkit/polkitauthority.c | 13 ++++-
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.h | 2 +
+ .../polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c | 39 ++++++++++++--
+ 8 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+index 3b519c2..5beef7d 100644
+--- a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
++++ b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+@@ -8,7 +8,19 @@
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="<para>This D-Bus interface is used for communication between the system-wide PolicyKit daemon and one or more authentication agents each running in a user session.</para><para>An authentication agent must implement this interface and register (passing the object path of the object implementing the interface) using the org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.RegisterAuthenticationAgent() and org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.UnregisterAuthenticationAgent() methods on the #org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface of the PolicyKit daemon.</para>"/>
+
+ <method name="BeginAuthentication">
+- <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="<para>Called by the PolicyKit daemon when the authentication agent needs the user to authenticate as one of the identities in @identities for the action with the identifier @action_id.</para><para>Upon succesful authentication, the authentication agent must invoke the org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse() method on the #org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface of the PolicyKit daemon before returning.</para><para>If the user dismisses the authentication dialog, the authentication agent should return an error.</para>"/>
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="<para>Called
++ by the PolicyKit daemon when the authentication agent needs the
++ user to authenticate as one of the identities in @identities for
++ the action with the identifier @action_id.</para><para>This
++ authentication is normally achieved via the
++ polkit_agent_session_response() API, which invokes a private
++ setuid helper process to verify the authentication. When
++ successful, it calls the
++ org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2()
++ method on the #org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface of
++ the PolicyKit daemon before returning. If the user dismisses the
++ authentication dialog, the authentication agent should call
++ polkit_agent_session_cancel().</para>"/>
+
+ <arg name="action_id" direction="in" type="s">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The identifier for the action that the user is authentication for."/>
+diff --git a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+index fbfb9cd..f9021ee 100644
+--- a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
++++ b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+@@ -313,7 +313,29 @@
+ </method>
+
+ <method name="AuthenticationAgentResponse">
+- <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful authentication. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged caller invokes it."/>
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
++authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
++internal to polkit."/>
++
++ <arg name="cookie" direction="in" type="s">
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The cookie identifying the authentication request that was passed to the authentication agent."/>
++ </arg>
++
++ <arg name="identity" direction="in" type="(sa{sv})">
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.Type" value="Identity"/>
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="A #Identity struct describing what identity was authenticated."/>
++ </arg>
++ </method>
++
++ <method name="AuthenticationAgentResponse2">
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
++authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
++internal to polkit. Note this method was added in 0.114, and should be preferred over AuthenticationAgentResponse
++as it fixes a security issue."/>
++
++ <arg name="uid" direction="in" type="u">
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The real uid of the agent. Normally set by the setuid helper program."/>
++ </arg>
+
+ <arg name="cookie" direction="in" type="s">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The cookie identifying the authentication request that was passed to the authentication agent."/>
+diff --git a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+index 6525e25..e66bf53 100644
+--- a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
++++ b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ Structure <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-TemporaryAuthorization">TemporaryAuth
+ IN String object_path)
+ <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse</link> (IN String cookie,
+ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
++<link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse2</link> (IN uint32 uid, IN String cookie,
++ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
+ <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations">EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations</link> (IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Subject">Subject</link> subject,
+ OUT Array<<link linkend="eggdbus-struct-TemporaryAuthorization">TemporaryAuthorization</link>> temporary_authorizations)
+ <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.RevokeTemporaryAuthorizations">RevokeTemporaryAuthorizations</link> (IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Subject">Subject</link> subject)
+@@ -777,10 +779,52 @@ AuthenticationAgentResponse (IN String cookie,
+ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+-Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful authentication. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged caller invokes it.
++Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
++authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
++internal to polkit. Deprecated in favor of AuthenticationAgentResponse2.
++ </para>
++<variablelist role="params">
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term><literal>IN String <parameter>cookie</parameter></literal>:</term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++The cookie identifying the authentication request that was passed to the authentication agent.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term><literal>IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> <parameter>identity</parameter></literal>:</term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++A <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> struct describing what identity was authenticated.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++</variablelist>
++ </refsect2>
++ <refsect2 role="function" id="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">
++ <title>AuthenticationAgentResponse2 ()</title>
++ <programlisting>
++AuthenticationAgentResponse2 (IN uint32 uid,
++ IN String cookie,
++ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
++ </programlisting>
++ <para>
++Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
++authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
++internal to polkit. Note this method was introduced in 0.114 to fix a security issue.
+ </para>
+ <variablelist role="params">
+ <varlistentry>
++ <term><literal>IN uint32 <parameter>uid</parameter></literal>:</term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++The user id of the agent; normally this is the owner of the parent pid
++of the process that invoked the internal setuid helper.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
+ <term><literal>IN String <parameter>cookie</parameter></literal>:</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+diff --git a/docs/polkit/overview.xml b/docs/polkit/overview.xml
+index 24440d2..c29d8da 100644
+--- a/docs/polkit/overview.xml
++++ b/docs/polkit/overview.xml
+@@ -66,16 +66,18 @@
+ <para>
+ Authentication agents are provided by desktop environments. When
+ an user session starts, the agent registers with the polkit
+- Authority using
+- the <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.RegisterAuthenticationAgent">RegisterAuthenticationAgent()</link>
++ Authority using the <link
++ linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.RegisterAuthenticationAgent">RegisterAuthenticationAgent()</link>
+ method. When services are needed, the authority will invoke
+- methods on
+- the <link linkend="eggdbus-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent">org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent</link>
++ methods on the <link
++ linkend="eggdbus-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent">org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent</link>
+ D-Bus interface. Once the user is authenticated, (a privileged
+- part of) the agent invokes
+- the <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse()</link>
+- method. Note that the polkit Authority itself does not care
+- how the agent authenticates the user.
++ part of) the agent invokes the <link
++ linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse()</link>
++ method. This method should be treated as an internal
++ implementation detail, and callers should use the public shared
++ library API to invoke it, which currently uses a setuid helper
++ program.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ The <link linkend="ref-authentication-agent-api">libpolkit-agent-1</link>
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+index 84dab72..f45abc4 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+@@ -1492,6 +1492,14 @@ polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitAuthority *authority,
+ gpointer user_data)
+ {
+ GVariant *identity_value;
++ /* Note that in reality, this API is only accessible to root, and
++ * only called from the setuid helper `polkit-agent-helper-1`.
++ *
++ * However, because this is currently public API, we avoid
++ * triggering warnings from ABI diff type programs by just grabbing
++ * the real uid of the caller here.
++ */
++ uid_t uid = getuid ();
+
+ g_return_if_fail (POLKIT_IS_AUTHORITY (authority));
+ g_return_if_fail (cookie != NULL);
+@@ -1501,8 +1509,9 @@ polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitAuthority *authority,
+ identity_value = polkit_identity_to_gvariant (identity);
+ g_variant_ref_sink (identity_value);
+ g_dbus_proxy_call (authority->proxy,
+- "AuthenticationAgentResponse",
+- g_variant_new ("(s@(sa{sv}))",
++ "AuthenticationAgentResponse2",
++ g_variant_new ("(us@(sa{sv}))",
++ (guint32)uid,
+ cookie,
+ identity_value),
+ G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+index fd4f161..d1b1a25 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ polkit_backend_authority_unregister_authentication_agent (PolkitBackendAuthority
+ gboolean
+ polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ uid_t uid,
+ const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitIdentity *identity,
+ GError **error)
+@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBackendAuthority
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- return klass->authentication_agent_response (authority, caller, cookie, identity, error);
++ return klass->authentication_agent_response (authority, caller, uid, cookie, identity, error);
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -587,6 +588,11 @@ static const gchar *server_introspection_data =
+ " <arg type='s' name='cookie' direction='in'/>"
+ " <arg type='(sa{sv})' name='identity' direction='in'/>"
+ " </method>"
++ " <method name='AuthenticationAgentResponse2'>"
++ " <arg type='u' name='uid' direction='in'/>"
++ " <arg type='s' name='cookie' direction='in'/>"
++ " <arg type='(sa{sv})' name='identity' direction='in'/>"
++ " </method>"
+ " <method name='EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations'>"
+ " <arg type='(sa{sv})' name='subject' direction='in'/>"
+ " <arg type='a(ss(sa{sv})tt)' name='temporary_authorizations' direction='out'/>"
+@@ -1035,6 +1041,57 @@ server_handle_authentication_agent_response (Server *server,
+ error = NULL;
+ if (!polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response (server->authority,
+ caller,
++ (uid_t)-1,
++ cookie,
++ identity,
++ &error))
++ {
++ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_gerror (invocation, error);
++ g_error_free (error);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (invocation, g_variant_new ("()"));
++
++ out:
++ if (identity != NULL)
++ g_object_unref (identity);
++}
++
++static void
++server_handle_authentication_agent_response2 (Server *server,
++ GVariant *parameters,
++ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation)
++{
++ const gchar *cookie;
++ GVariant *identity_gvariant;
++ PolkitIdentity *identity;
++ GError *error;
++ guint32 uid;
++
++ identity = NULL;
++
++ g_variant_get (parameters,
++ "(u&s@(sa{sv}))",
++ &uid,
++ &cookie,
++ &identity_gvariant);
++
++ error = NULL;
++ identity = polkit_identity_new_for_gvariant (identity_gvariant, &error);
++ if (identity == NULL)
++ {
++ g_prefix_error (&error, "Error getting identity: ");
++ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_gerror (invocation, error);
++ g_error_free (error);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ error = NULL;
++ if (!polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response (server->authority,
++ caller,
++ (uid_t)uid,
+ cookie,
+ identity,
+ &error))
+@@ -1222,6 +1279,8 @@ server_handle_method_call (GDBusConnection *connection,
+ server_handle_unregister_authentication_agent (server, parameters, caller, invocation);
+ else if (g_strcmp0 (method_name, "AuthenticationAgentResponse") == 0)
+ server_handle_authentication_agent_response (server, parameters, caller, invocation);
++ else if (g_strcmp0 (method_name, "AuthenticationAgentResponse2") == 0)
++ server_handle_authentication_agent_response2 (server, parameters, caller, invocation);
+ else if (g_strcmp0 (method_name, "EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations") == 0)
+ server_handle_enumerate_temporary_authorizations (server, parameters, caller, invocation);
+ else if (g_strcmp0 (method_name, "RevokeTemporaryAuthorizations") == 0)
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.h b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.h
+index a564054..1c212e0 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.h
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.h
+@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ struct _PolkitBackendAuthorityClass
+
+ gboolean (*authentication_agent_response) (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ uid_t uid,
+ const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitIdentity *identity,
+ GError **error);
+@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ gboolean polkit_backend_authority_unregister_authentication_agent (PolkitBackend
+
+ gboolean polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ uid_t uid,
+ const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitIdentity *identity,
+ GError **error);
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+index 10eda2c..5e29af2 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+@@ -106,8 +106,9 @@ static AuthenticationAgent *get_authentication_agent_for_subject (PolkitBackendI
+ PolkitSubject *subject);
+
+
+-static AuthenticationSession *get_authentication_session_for_cookie (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
+- const gchar *cookie);
++static AuthenticationSession *get_authentication_session_for_uid_and_cookie (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
++ uid_t uid,
++ const gchar *cookie);
+
+ static GList *get_authentication_sessions_initiated_by_system_bus_unique_name (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
+ const gchar *system_bus_unique_name);
+@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ static gboolean polkit_backend_interactive_authority_unregister_authentication_a
+
+ static gboolean polkit_backend_interactive_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ uid_t uid,
+ const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitIdentity *identity,
+ GError **error);
+@@ -431,6 +433,7 @@ struct AuthenticationAgent
+ {
+ volatile gint ref_count;
+
++ uid_t creator_uid;
+ PolkitSubject *scope;
+ guint64 serial;
+
+@@ -1603,6 +1606,7 @@ authentication_agent_unref (AuthenticationAgent *agent)
+ static AuthenticationAgent *
+ authentication_agent_new (guint64 serial,
+ PolkitSubject *scope,
++ PolkitIdentity *creator,
+ const gchar *unique_system_bus_name,
+ const gchar *locale,
+ const gchar *object_path,
+@@ -1611,6 +1615,10 @@ authentication_agent_new (guint64 serial,
+ {
+ AuthenticationAgent *agent;
+ GDBusProxy *proxy;
++ PolkitUnixUser *creator_user;
++
++ g_assert (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_USER (creator));
++ creator_user = POLKIT_UNIX_USER (creator);
+
+ if (!g_variant_is_object_path (object_path))
+ {
+@@ -1638,6 +1646,7 @@ authentication_agent_new (guint64 serial,
+ agent->ref_count = 1;
+ agent->serial = serial;
+ agent->scope = g_object_ref (scope);
++ agent->creator_uid = (uid_t)polkit_unix_user_get_uid (creator_user);
+ agent->object_path = g_strdup (object_path);
+ agent->unique_system_bus_name = g_strdup (unique_system_bus_name);
+ agent->locale = g_strdup (locale);
+@@ -1736,8 +1745,9 @@ get_authentication_agent_for_subject (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authori
+ }
+
+ static AuthenticationSession *
+-get_authentication_session_for_cookie (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
+- const gchar *cookie)
++get_authentication_session_for_uid_and_cookie (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
++ uid_t uid,
++ const gchar *cookie)
+ {
+ PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthorityPrivate *priv;
+ GHashTableIter hash_iter;
+@@ -1755,6 +1765,23 @@ get_authentication_session_for_cookie (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *author
+ {
+ GList *l;
+
++ /* We need to ensure that if somehow we have duplicate cookies
++ * due to wrapping, that the cookie used is matched to the user
++ * who called AuthenticationAgentResponse2. See
++ * http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/polkit-devel/2015-June/000425.html
++ *
++ * Except if the legacy AuthenticationAgentResponse is invoked,
++ * we don't know the uid and hence use -1. Continue to support
++ * the old behavior for backwards compatibility, although everyone
++ * who is using our own setuid helper will automatically be updated
++ * to the new API.
++ */
++ if (uid != (uid_t)-1)
++ {
++ if (agent->creator_uid != uid)
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ for (l = agent->active_sessions; l != NULL; l = l->next)
+ {
+ AuthenticationSession *session = l->data;
+@@ -2388,6 +2415,7 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_register_authentication_agent (PolkitBacken
+ priv->agent_serial++;
+ agent = authentication_agent_new (priv->agent_serial,
+ subject,
++ user_of_caller,
+ polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (caller)),
+ locale,
+ object_path,
+@@ -2601,6 +2629,7 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_unregister_authentication_agent (PolkitBack
+ static gboolean
+ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
++ uid_t uid,
+ const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitIdentity *identity,
+ GError **error)
+@@ -2643,7 +2672,7 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_authentication_agent_response (PolkitBacken
+ }
+
+ /* find the authentication session */
+- session = get_authentication_session_for_cookie (interactive_authority, cookie);
++ session = get_authentication_session_for_uid_and_cookie (interactive_authority, uid, cookie);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ {
+ g_set_error (error,
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Use-unpredictable-cookie-values-keep-t.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Use-unpredictable-cookie-values-keep-t.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fae0e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Use-unpredictable-cookie-values-keep-t.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 12:15:18 -0400
+Subject: CVE-2015-4625: Use unpredictable cookie values, keep them secret
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Tavis noted that it'd be possible with a 32 bit counter for someone to
+cause the cookie to wrap by creating Authentication requests in a
+loop.
+
+Something important to note here is that wrapping of signed integers
+is undefined behavior in C, so we definitely want to fix that. All
+counter integers used in this patch are unsigned.
+
+See the comment above `authentication_agent_generate_cookie` for
+details, but basically we're now using a cookie of the form:
+
+```
+ <agent serial> - <agent random id> - <session serial> - <session
+random id>
+```
+
+Which has multiple 64 bit counters, plus unpredictable random 128 bit
+integer ids (effectively UUIDs, but we're not calling them that
+because we don't need to be globally unique.
+
+We further ensure that the cookies are not visible to other processes
+by changing the setuid helper to accept them over standard input. This
+means that an attacker would have to guess both ids.
+
+In any case, the security hole here is better fixed with the other
+change to bind user id (uid) of the agent with cookie lookups, making
+cookie guessing worthless.
+
+Nevertheless, I think it's worth doing this change too, for defense in
+depth.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90832
+CVE: CVE-2015-4625
+Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:ea544ffc18405237ccd95d28d7f45afef49aca17
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/796134
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c | 12 ++-
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-shadow.c | 12 ++-
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c | 33 ++++++++
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.h | 2 +
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c | 30 ++++---
+ .../polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++-----
+ 7 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index aa2760f..388605d 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ if test "x$GCC" = "xyes"; then
+ changequote([,])dnl
+ fi
+
+-PKG_CHECK_MODULES(GLIB, [gio-2.0 >= 2.28.0])
++PKG_CHECK_MODULES(GLIB, [gmodule-2.0 gio-unix-2.0 >= 2.30.0])
+ AC_SUBST(GLIB_CFLAGS)
+ AC_SUBST(GLIB_LIBS)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c
+index 85a2671..e1747c1 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ int rc;
+ const char *user_to_auth;
+- const char *cookie;
++ char *cookie = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv pam_conversation;
+ pam_handle_t *pam_h;
+ const void *authed_user;
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ openlog ("polkit-agent-helper-1", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+
+ /* check for correct invocation */
+- if (argc != 3)
++ if (!(argc == 2 || argc == 3))
+ {
+ syslog (LOG_NOTICE, "inappropriate use of helper, wrong number of arguments [uid=%d]", getuid ());
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: wrong number of arguments. This incident has been logged.\n");
+@@ -105,7 +105,10 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+
+ user_to_auth = argv[1];
+- cookie = argv[2];
++
++ cookie = read_cookie (argc, argv);
++ if (!cookie)
++ goto error;
+
+ if (getuid () != 0)
+ {
+@@ -203,6 +206,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto error;
+ }
+
++ free (cookie);
++
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: successfully sent D-Bus message to PolicyKit daemon\n");
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+@@ -212,6 +217,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ return 0;
+
+ error:
++ free (cookie);
+ if (pam_h != NULL)
+ pam_end (pam_h, rc);
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-shadow.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-shadow.c
+index a4f73ac..e877915 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-shadow.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-shadow.c
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ struct spwd *shadow;
+ const char *user_to_auth;
+- const char *cookie;
++ char *cookie = NULL;
+ time_t now;
+
+ /* clear the entire environment to avoid attacks with
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ openlog ("polkit-agent-helper-1", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+
+ /* check for correct invocation */
+- if (argc != 3)
++ if (!(argc == 2 || argc == 3))
+ {
+ syslog (LOG_NOTICE, "inappropriate use of helper, wrong number of arguments [uid=%d]", getuid ());
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: wrong number of arguments. This incident has been logged.\n");
+@@ -86,7 +86,10 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+
+ user_to_auth = argv[1];
+- cookie = argv[2];
++
++ cookie = read_cookie (argc, argv);
++ if (!cookie)
++ goto error;
+
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: user to auth is '%s'.\n", user_to_auth);
+@@ -153,6 +156,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto error;
+ }
+
++ free (cookie);
++
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: successfully sent D-Bus message to PolicyKit daemon\n");
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+@@ -162,6 +167,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ return 0;
+
+ error:
++ free (cookie);
+ fprintf (stdout, "FAILURE\n");
+ flush_and_wait ();
+ return 1;
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c
+index 4417e70..a99de7d 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "config.h"
+ #include "polkitagenthelperprivate.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+@@ -45,6 +46,38 @@ _polkit_clearenv (void)
+ #endif
+
+
++char *
++read_cookie (int argc, char **argv)
++{
++ /* As part of CVE-2015-4625, we started passing the cookie
++ * on standard input, to ensure it's not visible to other
++ * processes. However, to ensure that things continue
++ * to work if the setuid binary is upgraded while old
++ * agents are still running (this will be common with
++ * package managers), we support both modes.
++ */
++ if (argc == 3)
++ return strdup (argv[2]);
++ else
++ {
++ char *ret = NULL;
++ size_t n = 0;
++ ssize_t r = getline (&ret, &n, stdin);
++ if (r == -1)
++ {
++ if (!feof (stdin))
++ perror ("getline");
++ free (ret);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ g_strchomp (ret);
++ return ret;
++ }
++ }
++}
++
+ gboolean
+ send_dbus_message (const char *cookie, const char *user)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.h b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.h
+index aeca2c7..547fdcc 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.h
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.h
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+
+ int _polkit_clearenv (void);
+
++char *read_cookie (int argc, char **argv);
++
+ gboolean send_dbus_message (const char *cookie, const char *user);
+
+ void flush_and_wait ();
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+index a658a22..6a3d6bc 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
++#include <gio/gunixoutputstream.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+
+ #include "polkitagentmarshal.h"
+@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ struct _PolkitAgentSession
+ gchar *cookie;
+ PolkitIdentity *identity;
+
+- int child_stdin;
++ GOutputStream *child_stdin;
+ int child_stdout;
+ GPid child_pid;
+
+@@ -129,7 +130,6 @@ G_DEFINE_TYPE (PolkitAgentSession, polkit_agent_session, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
+ static void
+ polkit_agent_session_init (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ {
+- session->child_stdin = -1;
+ session->child_stdout = -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -395,11 +395,7 @@ kill_helper (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ session->child_stdout = -1;
+ }
+
+- if (session->child_stdin != -1)
+- {
+- g_warn_if_fail (close (session->child_stdin) == 0);
+- session->child_stdin = -1;
+- }
++ g_clear_object (&session->child_stdin);
+
+ session->helper_is_running = FALSE;
+
+@@ -545,9 +541,9 @@ polkit_agent_session_response (PolkitAgentSession *session,
+
+ add_newline = (response[response_len] != '\n');
+
+- write (session->child_stdin, response, response_len);
++ (void) g_output_stream_write_all (session->child_stdin, response, response_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (add_newline)
+- write (session->child_stdin, newline, 1);
++ (void) g_output_stream_write_all (session->child_stdin, newline, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -567,8 +563,9 @@ polkit_agent_session_initiate (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ {
+ uid_t uid;
+ GError *error;
+- gchar *helper_argv[4];
++ gchar *helper_argv[3];
+ struct passwd *passwd;
++ int stdin_fd = -1;
+
+ g_return_if_fail (POLKIT_AGENT_IS_SESSION (session));
+
+@@ -600,10 +597,8 @@ polkit_agent_session_initiate (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+
+ helper_argv[0] = PACKAGE_LIBEXEC_DIR "/polkit-agent-helper-1";
+ helper_argv[1] = passwd->pw_name;
+- helper_argv[2] = session->cookie;
+- helper_argv[3] = NULL;
++ helper_argv[2] = NULL;
+
+- session->child_stdin = -1;
+ session->child_stdout = -1;
+
+ error = NULL;
+@@ -615,7 +610,7 @@ polkit_agent_session_initiate (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ &session->child_pid,
+- &session->child_stdin,
++ &stdin_fd,
+ &session->child_stdout,
+ NULL,
+ &error))
+@@ -628,6 +623,13 @@ polkit_agent_session_initiate (PolkitAgentSession *session)
+ if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
+ g_print ("PolkitAgentSession: spawned helper with pid %d\n", (gint) session->child_pid);
+
++ session->child_stdin = (GOutputStream*)g_unix_output_stream_new (stdin_fd, TRUE);
++
++ /* Write the cookie on stdin so it can't be seen by other processes */
++ (void) g_output_stream_write_all (session->child_stdin, session->cookie, strlen (session->cookie),
++ NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (void) g_output_stream_write_all (session->child_stdin, "\n", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
+ session->child_stdout_channel = g_io_channel_unix_new (session->child_stdout);
+ session->child_stdout_watch_source = g_io_create_watch (session->child_stdout_channel,
+ G_IO_IN | G_IO_ERR | G_IO_HUP);
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+index 00ee044..10eda2c 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ typedef struct
+
+ GDBusConnection *system_bus_connection;
+ guint name_owner_changed_signal_id;
++
++ guint64 agent_serial;
+ } PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthorityPrivate;
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+@@ -430,11 +432,15 @@ struct AuthenticationAgent
+ volatile gint ref_count;
+
+ PolkitSubject *scope;
++ guint64 serial;
+
+ gchar *locale;
+ GVariant *registration_options;
+ gchar *object_path;
+ gchar *unique_system_bus_name;
++ GRand *cookie_pool;
++ gchar *cookie_prefix;
++ guint64 cookie_serial;
+
+ GDBusProxy *proxy;
+
+@@ -1430,9 +1436,54 @@ authentication_session_cancelled_cb (GCancellable *cancellable,
+ authentication_session_cancel (session);
+ }
+
++/* We're not calling this a UUID, but it's basically
++ * the same thing, just not formatted that way because:
++ *
++ * - I'm too lazy to do it
++ * - If we did, people might think it was actually
++ * generated from /dev/random, which we're not doing
++ * because this value doesn't actually need to be
++ * globally unique.
++ */
++static void
++append_rand_u128_str (GString *buf,
++ GRand *pool)
++{
++ g_string_append_printf (buf, "%08x%08x%08x%08x",
++ g_rand_int (pool),
++ g_rand_int (pool),
++ g_rand_int (pool),
++ g_rand_int (pool));
++}
++
++/* A value that should be unique to the (AuthenticationAgent, AuthenticationSession)
++ * pair, and not guessable by other agents.
++ *
++ * <agent serial> - <agent uuid> - <session serial> - <session uuid>
++ *
++ * See http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/polkit-devel/2015-June/000425.html
++ *
++ */
++static gchar *
++authentication_agent_generate_cookie (AuthenticationAgent *agent)
++{
++ GString *buf = g_string_new ("");
++
++ g_string_append (buf, agent->cookie_prefix);
++
++ g_string_append_c (buf, '-');
++ agent->cookie_serial++;
++ g_string_append_printf (buf, "%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
++ agent->cookie_serial);
++ g_string_append_c (buf, '-');
++ append_rand_u128_str (buf, agent->cookie_pool);
++
++ return g_string_free (buf, FALSE);
++}
++
++
+ static AuthenticationSession *
+ authentication_session_new (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+- const gchar *cookie,
+ PolkitSubject *subject,
+ PolkitIdentity *user_of_subject,
+ PolkitSubject *caller,
+@@ -1449,7 +1500,7 @@ authentication_session_new (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+
+ session = g_new0 (AuthenticationSession, 1);
+ session->agent = authentication_agent_ref (agent);
+- session->cookie = g_strdup (cookie);
++ session->cookie = authentication_agent_generate_cookie (agent);
+ session->subject = g_object_ref (subject);
+ session->user_of_subject = g_object_ref (user_of_subject);
+ session->caller = g_object_ref (caller);
+@@ -1496,16 +1547,6 @@ authentication_session_free (AuthenticationSession *session)
+ g_free (session);
+ }
+
+-static gchar *
+-authentication_agent_new_cookie (AuthenticationAgent *agent)
+-{
+- static gint counter = 0;
+-
+- /* TODO: use a more random-looking cookie */
+-
+- return g_strdup_printf ("cookie%d", counter++);
+-}
+-
+ static PolkitSubject *
+ authentication_agent_get_scope (AuthenticationAgent *agent)
+ {
+@@ -1553,12 +1594,15 @@ authentication_agent_unref (AuthenticationAgent *agent)
+ g_free (agent->unique_system_bus_name);
+ if (agent->registration_options != NULL)
+ g_variant_unref (agent->registration_options);
++ g_rand_free (agent->cookie_pool);
++ g_free (agent->cookie_prefix);
+ g_free (agent);
+ }
+ }
+
+ static AuthenticationAgent *
+-authentication_agent_new (PolkitSubject *scope,
++authentication_agent_new (guint64 serial,
++ PolkitSubject *scope,
+ const gchar *unique_system_bus_name,
+ const gchar *locale,
+ const gchar *object_path,
+@@ -1592,6 +1636,7 @@ authentication_agent_new (PolkitSubject *scope,
+
+ agent = g_new0 (AuthenticationAgent, 1);
+ agent->ref_count = 1;
++ agent->serial = serial;
+ agent->scope = g_object_ref (scope);
+ agent->object_path = g_strdup (object_path);
+ agent->unique_system_bus_name = g_strdup (unique_system_bus_name);
+@@ -1599,6 +1644,25 @@ authentication_agent_new (PolkitSubject *scope,
+ agent->registration_options = registration_options != NULL ? g_variant_ref (registration_options) : NULL;
+ agent->proxy = proxy;
+
++ {
++ GString *cookie_prefix = g_string_new ("");
++ GRand *agent_private_rand = g_rand_new ();
++
++ g_string_append_printf (cookie_prefix, "%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "-", agent->serial);
++
++ /* Use a uniquely seeded PRNG to get a prefix cookie for this agent,
++ * whose sequence will not correlate with the per-authentication session
++ * cookies.
++ */
++ append_rand_u128_str (cookie_prefix, agent_private_rand);
++ g_rand_free (agent_private_rand);
++
++ agent->cookie_prefix = g_string_free (cookie_prefix, FALSE);
++
++ /* And a newly seeded pool for per-session cookies */
++ agent->cookie_pool = g_rand_new ();
++ }
++
+ return agent;
+ }
+
+@@ -2083,7 +2147,6 @@ authentication_agent_initiate_challenge (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+ gpointer user_data)
+ {
+ AuthenticationSession *session;
+- gchar *cookie;
+ GList *l;
+ GList *identities;
+ gchar *localized_message;
+@@ -2104,8 +2167,6 @@ authentication_agent_initiate_challenge (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+ &localized_icon_name,
+ &localized_details);
+
+- cookie = authentication_agent_new_cookie (agent);
+-
+ identities = NULL;
+
+ /* select admin user if required by the implicit authorization */
+@@ -2125,7 +2186,6 @@ authentication_agent_initiate_challenge (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+ }
+
+ session = authentication_session_new (agent,
+- cookie,
+ subject,
+ user_of_subject,
+ caller,
+@@ -2179,7 +2239,6 @@ authentication_agent_initiate_challenge (AuthenticationAgent *agent,
+
+ g_list_foreach (identities, (GFunc) g_object_unref, NULL);
+ g_list_free (identities);
+- g_free (cookie);
+
+ g_free (localized_message);
+ g_free (localized_icon_name);
+@@ -2326,7 +2385,9 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_register_authentication_agent (PolkitBacken
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- agent = authentication_agent_new (subject,
++ priv->agent_serial++;
++ agent = authentication_agent_new (priv->agent_serial,
++ subject,
+ polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (caller)),
+ locale,
+ object_path,
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Don-t-discard-error-data-returned-by-polkit_system_b.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Don-t-discard-error-data-returned-by-polkit_system_b.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e49e47e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Don-t-discard-error-data-returned-by-polkit_system_b.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 23:51:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Don't discard error data returned by
+ polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync
+
+https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=71458
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit: 145d43b9c891f248ad68ebe597cb151a865bdb3a
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/798769
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+index 05f51c5..e1a9ab3 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))
+ {
+- ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, NULL);
++ ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, error);
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_SESSION (subject))
+ {
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-crash-when-two-authentication-requests-are-in-.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-crash-when-two-authentication-requests-are-in-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee44531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-crash-when-two-authentication-requests-are-in-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2015 01:07:08 +0200
+Subject: Fix a crash when two authentication requests are in flight.
+
+To reproduce:
+1. pkttyagent -p $$ # or another suitable PID
+2. pkcheck -p $that_pid -a org.freedesktop.policykit.exec -u
+3. pkcheck -p $that_pid -a org.freedesktop.policykit.exec -u
+4. Then, in the pkttyagent prompt, press Enter.
+
+polkit_agent_text_listener_initiate_authentication was already setting
+an appropriate error code, so the g_assert was unnecessary.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90879
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:e2d2fafd106624ddfea4b17d3f40704b2031c00b
+---
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagenttextlistener.c | 2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenttextlistener.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenttextlistener.c
+index b5c8a3f..e63c285 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagenttextlistener.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagenttextlistener.c
+@@ -546,12 +546,10 @@ polkit_agent_text_listener_initiate_authentication_finish (PolkitAgentListener
+ GAsyncResult *res,
+ GError **error)
+ {
+- PolkitAgentTextListener *listener = POLKIT_AGENT_TEXT_LISTENER (_listener);
+ gboolean ret;
+
+ g_warn_if_fail (g_simple_async_result_get_source_tag (G_SIMPLE_ASYNC_RESULT (res)) ==
+ polkit_agent_text_listener_initiate_authentication);
+- g_assert (listener->active_session == NULL);
+
+ ret = FALSE;
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-memory-leak-when-registering-an-authentication.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-memory-leak-when-registering-an-authentication.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7fdcf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-memory-leak-when-registering-an-authentication.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 20:00:48 +0200
+Subject: Fix a memory leak when registering an authentication agent
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69501
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:ec039f9d7ede5b839f5511e26d5cd6ae9107cb2e
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+index 39eb5b9..afe5b90 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ server_handle_register_authentication_agent (Server *server,
+ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (invocation, g_variant_new ("()"));
+
+ out:
++ g_variant_unref (subject_gvariant);
+ if (subject != NULL)
+ g_object_unref (subject);
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-per-authorization-memory-leak.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-per-authorization-memory-leak.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaafed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-per-authorization-memory-leak.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 20:00:48 +0200
+Subject: Fix a per-authorization memory leak
+
+We were leaking PolkitAuthorizationResult on every request, primarily on
+the success path, but also on various error paths as well.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69501
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:0f5852a4bdabe377ddcdbed09a0c1f95710e17fe
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c | 1 +
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c | 5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+index 10b8af3..39eb5b9 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,7 @@ check_auth_cb (GObject *source_object,
+ g_variant_ref_sink (value);
+ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (data->invocation, g_variant_new ("(@(bba{ss}))", value));
+ g_variant_unref (value);
++ g_object_unref (result);
+ }
+
+ check_auth_data_free (data);
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+index 5e29af2..73d0a0e 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization (PolkitBackendAuthority
+
+ /* Otherwise just return the result */
+ g_simple_async_result_set_op_res_gpointer (simple,
+- result,
++ g_object_ref (result),
+ g_object_unref);
+ g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
+ g_object_unref (simple);
+@@ -1032,6 +1032,9 @@ polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization (PolkitBackendAuthority
+ g_free (subject_str);
+ g_free (user_of_caller_str);
+ g_free (user_of_subject_str);
++
++ if (result != NULL)
++ g_object_unref (result);
+ }
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-possible-NULL-dereference.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba685eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-a-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 22:36:50 +0200
+Subject: Fix a possible NULL dereference.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject() may return NULL
+(and because it is using external processes, we can’t really rule it
+out). The code was already anticipating NULL in the cleanup section, so
+handle it also when actually using the value.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80767
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:6109543303def367b84eaac97d2ff9cefe735efb
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+index 25e13fb..00ee044 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c
+@@ -557,7 +557,11 @@ log_result (PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority,
+ user_of_subject = polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (priv->session_monitor, subject, NULL);
+
+ subject_str = polkit_subject_to_string (subject);
+- user_of_subject_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_subject);
++
++ if (user_of_subject != NULL)
++ user_of_subject_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_subject);
++ else
++ user_of_subject_str = g_strdup ("<unknown>");
+ caller_str = polkit_subject_to_string (caller);
+
+ subject_cmdline = _polkit_subject_get_cmdline (subject);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-duplicate-GError-use-when-uid-is-missing.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-duplicate-GError-use-when-uid-is-missing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f11cb3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-duplicate-GError-use-when-uid-is-missing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 19:45:15 +0200
+Subject: Fix duplicate GError use when "uid" is missing
+
+Some GLib versions complain loudly about this.
+
+To reproduce, call e.g. RegisterAuthenticationAgent with the following
+parameters:
+("unix-process", {"pid": __import__('gi.repository.GLib', globals(),
+locals(), ['Variant']).Variant("u", 1), "start-time":
+__import__('gi.repository.GLib', globals(), locals(),
+['Variant']).Variant("t", 1)}), "cs", "/"
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90877
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:2c8738941be18ef05ce724df46547f41dbc02fb5
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitsubject.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
+index aed5795..78ec745 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c
+@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ polkit_subject_new_for_gvariant (GVariant *variant,
+ start_time = g_variant_get_uint64 (v);
+ g_variant_unref (v);
+
+- v = lookup_asv (details_gvariant, "uid", G_VARIANT_TYPE_INT32, error);
++ v = lookup_asv (details_gvariant, "uid", G_VARIANT_TYPE_INT32, NULL);
+ if (v != NULL)
+ {
+ uid = g_variant_get_int32 (v);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-use-after-free-in-polkitagentsession.c.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-use-after-free-in-polkitagentsession.c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f7bd35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fix-use-after-free-in-polkitagentsession.c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 22:27:41 +0200
+Subject: Fix use-after-free in polkitagentsession.c
+
+PolkitAgentTextListener's "completed" handler drops the last reference
+to the session; in fact this is explicitly recommended in the signal's
+documentation. So we must not access any members of session after
+emitting the signal.
+
+Found while dealing with
+https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69501
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:efb6cd56a423ba15bb1f44ee3c4987aad5a5fd45
+---
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+index 6a3d6bc..46fbaf0 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
+@@ -412,8 +412,9 @@ complete_session (PolkitAgentSession *session,
+ {
+ if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
+ g_print ("PolkitAgentSession: emitting ::completed(%s)\n", result ? "TRUE" : "FALSE");
+- g_signal_emit_by_name (session, "completed", result);
+ session->have_emitted_completed = TRUE;
++ /* Note that the signal handler may drop the last reference to session. */
++ g_signal_emit_by_name (session, "completed", result);
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Fixed-compilation-problem-in-the-backend.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Fixed-compilation-problem-in-the-backend.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e37113
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Fixed-compilation-problem-in-the-backend.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: Xabier Rodriguez Calvar <calvaris@igalia.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2013 19:16:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed compilation problem in the backend
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit: dbbb7dc60abdd970af0a8fae404484181fa909c9
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/798769
+---
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+index 4075d3f..05f51c5 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))
+ {
+- ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject));
++ ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_SESSION (subject))
+ {
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/PolkitSystemBusName-Add-public-API-to-retrieve-Unix-.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/PolkitSystemBusName-Add-public-API-to-retrieve-Unix-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a162aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/PolkitSystemBusName-Add-public-API-to-retrieve-Unix-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 12:23:55 -0400
+Subject: PolkitSystemBusName: Add public API to retrieve Unix user
+
+And change the duplicated code in the backend session monitors to use
+it. This just a code cleanup resulting from review after
+CVE-2013-4288. There's no security impact from this patch, it just
+removes duplicated code.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69538
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:904d8404d93dec45fce3b719eb1a626acc6b8a73
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.h | 4 ++
+ .../polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c | 20 +-------
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c | 20 +-------
+ 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c
+index 2a297c4..51e4a69 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include "polkitsystembusname.h"
++#include "polkitunixuser.h"
+ #include "polkitsubject.h"
+ #include "polkitprivate.h"
+
+@@ -396,3 +397,58 @@ polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus_name,
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync:
++ * @system_bus_name: A #PolkitSystemBusName.
++ * @cancellable: (allow-none): A #GCancellable or %NULL.
++ * @error: (allow-none): Return location for error or %NULL.
++ *
++ * Synchronously gets a #PolkitUnixUser object for @system_bus_name;
++ * the calling thread is blocked until a reply is received.
++ *
++ * Returns: (allow-none) (transfer full): A #PolkitUnixUser object or %NULL if @error is set.
++ **/
++PolkitUnixUser *
++polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus_name,
++ GCancellable *cancellable,
++ GError **error)
++{
++ GDBusConnection *connection;
++ PolkitUnixUser *ret;
++ GVariant *result;
++ guint32 uid;
++
++ g_return_val_if_fail (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (system_bus_name), NULL);
++ g_return_val_if_fail (cancellable == NULL || G_IS_CANCELLABLE (cancellable), NULL);
++ g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, NULL);
++
++ ret = NULL;
++
++ connection = g_bus_get_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM, cancellable, error);
++ if (connection == NULL)
++ goto out;
++
++ result = g_dbus_connection_call_sync (connection,
++ "org.freedesktop.DBus", /* name */
++ "/org/freedesktop/DBus", /* object path */
++ "org.freedesktop.DBus", /* interface name */
++ "GetConnectionUnixUser", /* method */
++ g_variant_new ("(s)", system_bus_name->name),
++ G_VARIANT_TYPE ("(u)"),
++ G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
++ -1,
++ cancellable,
++ error);
++ if (result == NULL)
++ goto out;
++
++ g_variant_get (result, "(u)", &uid);
++ g_variant_unref (result);
++
++ ret = (PolkitUnixUser*)polkit_unix_user_new (uid);
++
++ out:
++ if (connection != NULL)
++ g_object_unref (connection);
++ return ret;
++}
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.h b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.h
+index 1fc464f..38d31f7 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.h
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ PolkitSubject *polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (PolkitSystemBusName
+ GCancellable *cancellable,
+ GError **error);
+
++PolkitUnixUser * polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus_name,
++ GCancellable *cancellable,
++ GError **error);
++
+ G_END_DECLS
+
+ #endif /* __POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME_H */
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+index 58593c3..0185310 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+@@ -277,25 +277,7 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))
+ {
+- GVariant *result;
+-
+- result = g_dbus_connection_call_sync (monitor->system_bus,
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "/org/freedesktop/DBus",
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "GetConnectionUnixUser",
+- g_variant_new ("(s)", polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))),
+- G_VARIANT_TYPE ("(u)"),
+- G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
+- -1, /* timeout_msec */
+- NULL, /* GCancellable */
+- error);
+- if (result == NULL)
+- goto out;
+- g_variant_get (result, "(u)", &uid);
+- g_variant_unref (result);
+-
+- ret = polkit_unix_user_new (uid);
++ ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, error);
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_SESSION (subject))
+ {
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+index 9c331b6..4075d3f 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c
+@@ -306,25 +306,7 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))
+ {
+- GVariant *result;
+-
+- result = g_dbus_connection_call_sync (monitor->system_bus,
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "/org/freedesktop/DBus",
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "GetConnectionUnixUser",
+- g_variant_new ("(s)", polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))),
+- G_VARIANT_TYPE ("(u)"),
+- G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
+- -1, /* timeout_msec */
+- NULL, /* GCancellable */
+- error);
+- if (result == NULL)
+- goto out;
+- g_variant_get (result, "(u)", &uid);
+- g_variant_unref (result);
+-
+- ret = polkit_unix_user_new (uid);
++ ret = (PolkitIdentity*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_user_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject));
+ }
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_SESSION (subject))
+ {
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Port-internals-non-deprecated-PolkitProcess-API-wher.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Port-internals-non-deprecated-PolkitProcess-API-wher.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a8fa3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Port-internals-non-deprecated-PolkitProcess-API-wher.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2013 13:48:21 -0500
+Subject: Port internals non-deprecated PolkitProcess API where possible
+
+We can't port everything, but in PolkitPermission and these test
+cases, we can use _for_owner() with the right information.
+
+[smcv: drop the part that touches
+test/polkitbackend/test-polkitbackendjsauthority.c which is not
+in this branch]
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:6d3d0a8ffb0fd8ae59eb35593b305ec87da8858d
+---
+ src/polkit/polkitpermission.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitpermission.c b/src/polkit/polkitpermission.c
+index 22d195f..f8a666e 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitpermission.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitpermission.c
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ polkit_permission_constructed (GObject *object)
+ PolkitPermission *permission = POLKIT_PERMISSION (object);
+
+ if (permission->subject == NULL)
+- permission->subject = polkit_unix_process_new (getpid ());
++ permission->subject = polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (getpid (), 0, getuid ());
+
+ if (G_OBJECT_CLASS (polkit_permission_parent_class)->constructed != NULL)
+ G_OBJECT_CLASS (polkit_permission_parent_class)->constructed (object);
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/README-Note-to-send-security-reports-via-DBus-s-mech.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/README-Note-to-send-security-reports-via-DBus-s-mech.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9484699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/README-Note-to-send-security-reports-via-DBus-s-mech.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 08:41:36 -0400
+Subject: README: Note to send security reports via DBus's mechanism
+
+This avoids duplicating effort.
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:ccec766c509d16dab417582e94f43d906cefd4ae
+---
+ README | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/README b/README
+index b075162..0723002 100644
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -22,6 +22,22 @@ To verify the authenticity of the compressed tarball, use this command
+ BUGS and DEVELOPMENT
+ ====================
+
+-Please report bugs via the freedesktop.org bugzilla at
++Please report non-security bugs via the freedesktop.org bugzilla at
+
+ https://bugs.freedesktop.org/enter_bug.cgi?product=PolicyKit
++
++SECURITY ISSUES
++===============
++
++polkit uses the same mechanism for reporting security issues as dbus,
++the most recent copy of instructions can be found in the DBus git
++repository:
++
++http://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/tree/HACKING
++
++A copy of the instructions as of 2015-06-04:
++
++If you find a security vulnerability that is not known to the public,
++please report it privately to dbus-security@lists.freedesktop.org
++or by reporting a freedesktop.org bug that is marked as
++restricted to the "D-BUS security group".
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/Refuse-duplicate-user-arguments-to-pkexec.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/Refuse-duplicate-user-arguments-to-pkexec.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c64a87a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/Refuse-duplicate-user-arguments-to-pkexec.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 17:59:47 +0200
+Subject: Refuse duplicate --user arguments to pkexec
+
+This usage is clearly errorneous, so we should tell the users they are
+making a mistake.
+
+Besides, this allows an attacker to cause a high number of heap
+allocations with attacker-controlled sizes (
+http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.cz/2014/08/the-poisoned-nul-byte-2014-edition.html
+), making some exploits easier.
+
+(To be clear, this is not a pkexec vulnerability, and we will not
+refuse attacker-affected malloc() usage as a matter of policy; but this
+commit is both user-friendly and adding some hardening.)
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83093
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:6c992bc8aefa195a41eaa41c07f46f17de18e25c
+---
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 5e99044..abc660d 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,11 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (opt_user != NULL)
++ {
++ g_printerr ("--user specified twice\n");
++ goto out;
++ }
+ opt_user = g_strdup (argv[n]);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp (argv[n], "--disable-internal-agent") == 0)
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/docs-Update-for-changes-to-uid-binding-Authenticatio.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/docs-Update-for-changes-to-uid-binding-Authenticatio.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..451c299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/docs-Update-for-changes-to-uid-binding-Authenticatio.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Miloslav_Trma=C4=8D?= <mitr@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 01:01:27 +0200
+Subject: docs: Update for changes to uid binding/AuthenticationAgentResponse2
+
+ - Refer to PolkitAgentSession in general instead of to _response only
+ - Revert to the original description of authentication cancellation, the
+ agent really needs to return an error to the caller (in addition to dealing
+ with the session if any).
+ - Explicitly document the UID assumption; in the process fixing bug #69980.
+ - Keep documenting that we need a sufficiently privileged caller.
+ - Refer to the ...Response2 API in more places.
+ - Also update docbook documentation.
+ - Drop a paragraph suggesting non-PolkitAgentSession implementations are
+ expected and commonplace.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90837
+Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:fb5076b7c05d01a532d593a4079a29cf2d63a228
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/796134
+---
+ ....freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml | 6 +++---
+ data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml | 11 ++++++----
+ ....freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml | 7 +++++--
+ ...erface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml | 12 +++++++----
+ docs/polkit/overview.xml | 8 ++++----
+ src/polkit/polkitauthority.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/polkitagent/polkitagentlistener.c | 5 +----
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c | 1 +
+ 8 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+index 5beef7d..482332f 100644
+--- a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
++++ b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@
+ user to authenticate as one of the identities in @identities for
+ the action with the identifier @action_id.</para><para>This
+ authentication is normally achieved via the
+- polkit_agent_session_response() API, which invokes a private
++ PolkitAgentSession API, which invokes a private
+ setuid helper process to verify the authentication. When
+ successful, it calls the
+ org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2()
+ method on the #org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface of
+ the PolicyKit daemon before returning. If the user dismisses the
+- authentication dialog, the authentication agent should call
+- polkit_agent_session_cancel().</para>"/>
++ authentication dialog, the authentication agent should return an
++ error.</para>"/>
+
+ <arg name="action_id" direction="in" type="s">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The identifier for the action that the user is authentication for."/>
+diff --git a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+index f9021ee..88da3c0 100644
+--- a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
++++ b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
+ <!-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -->
+
+ <method name="RegisterAuthenticationAgent">
+- <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="<para>Register an authentication agent.</para><para>Note that current versions of PolicyKit will only work if @session_id is set to the empty string. In the future it might work for non-empty strings if the caller is sufficiently privileged.</para>"/>
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="<para>Register an authentication agent.</para><para>Note that this should be called by the same effective UID which will be passed to org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2().</para>"/>
+
+ <arg name="subject" direction="in" type="(sa{sv})">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.Type" value="Subject"/>
+@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@
+ <method name="AuthenticationAgentResponse">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
+ authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
+-internal to polkit."/>
++internal to polkit. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged
++caller invokes it. Deprecated in favor of org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2."/>
+
+ <arg name="cookie" direction="in" type="s">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The cookie identifying the authentication request that was passed to the authentication agent."/>
+@@ -330,11 +331,13 @@ internal to polkit."/>
+ <method name="AuthenticationAgentResponse2">
+ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
+ authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
+-internal to polkit. Note this method was added in 0.114, and should be preferred over AuthenticationAgentResponse
++internal to polkit. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged
++caller invokes it. Note this method was added in 0.114, and should be preferred over org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse()
+ as it fixes a security issue."/>
+
+ <arg name="uid" direction="in" type="u">
+- <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The real uid of the agent. Normally set by the setuid helper program."/>
++ <annotation name="org.gtk.EggDBus.DocString" value="The real uid of the agent. Normally set by the setuid helper program.
++Must match the effective UID of the caller of org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.RegisterAuthenticationAgent()."/>
+ </arg>
+
+ <arg name="cookie" direction="in" type="s">
+diff --git a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+index ec59626..ab27b2f 100644
+--- a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
++++ b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent.xml
+@@ -47,10 +47,13 @@ BeginAuthentication (IN String action_id,
+ identifier <parameter>action_id</parameter>.</para><para>Upon
+ succesful authentication, the authentication agent must invoke
+ the <link
+- linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse()</link>
++ linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">AuthenticationAgentResponse2()</link>
+ method on the <link
+ linkend="eggdbus-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority">org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority</link>
+- interface of the PolicyKit daemon before returning.
++ interface of the PolicyKit daemon before returning. This is normally
++ achieved via the <link linkend="PolkitAgentSession">PolkitAgentSession</link>
++ API, which invokes a private setuid helper process to verify the
++ authentication.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ The authentication agent should not return until after authentication is complete.
+diff --git a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+index e66bf53..f2eed63 100644
+--- a/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
++++ b/docs/polkit/docbook-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.xml
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Structure <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-TemporaryAuthorization">TemporaryAuth
+ IN String object_path)
+ <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse</link> (IN String cookie,
+ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
+-<link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse2</link> (IN uint32 uid, IN String cookie,
++<link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">AuthenticationAgentResponse2</link> (IN uint32 uid, IN String cookie,
+ IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Identity">Identity</link> identity)
+ <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations">EnumerateTemporaryAuthorizations</link> (IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Subject">Subject</link> subject,
+ OUT Array<<link linkend="eggdbus-struct-TemporaryAuthorization">TemporaryAuthorization</link>> temporary_authorizations)
+@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ RegisterAuthenticationAgent (IN <link linkend="eggdbus-struct-Subject">Subject<
+ IN String object_path)
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+-<para>Register an authentication agent.</para><para>Note that current versions of PolicyKit will only work if <parameter>session_id</parameter> is set to the empty string. In the future it might work for non-empty strings if the caller is sufficiently privileged.</para>
++<para>Register an authentication agent.</para><para>Note that this should be called by same effective UID which will be passed to <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">AuthenticationAgentResponse2()</link>.</para>
+ </para>
+ <variablelist role="params">
+ <varlistentry>
+@@ -781,7 +781,8 @@ AuthenticationAgentResponse (IN String cookie,
+ <para>
+ Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
+ authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
+-internal to polkit. Deprecated in favor of AuthenticationAgentResponse2.
++internal to polkit. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged
+++caller invokes it. Deprecated in favor of <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">AuthenticationAgentResponse2()</link>.
+ </para>
+ <variablelist role="params">
+ <varlistentry>
+@@ -812,7 +813,10 @@ AuthenticationAgentResponse2 (IN uint32 uid,
+ <para>
+ Method for authentication agents to invoke on successful
+ authentication, intended only for use by a privileged helper process
+-internal to polkit. Note this method was introduced in 0.114 to fix a security issue.
++internal to polkit. This method will fail unless a sufficiently privileged
++caller invokes it. Note this method was introduced in 0.114 and should be
++preferred over <link linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse()</link>
++as it fixes a security issue.
+ </para>
+ <variablelist role="params">
+ <varlistentry>
+diff --git a/docs/polkit/overview.xml b/docs/polkit/overview.xml
+index c29d8da..8ddb34c 100644
+--- a/docs/polkit/overview.xml
++++ b/docs/polkit/overview.xml
+@@ -73,11 +73,11 @@
+ linkend="eggdbus-interface-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent">org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.AuthenticationAgent</link>
+ D-Bus interface. Once the user is authenticated, (a privileged
+ part of) the agent invokes the <link
+- linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse">AuthenticationAgentResponse()</link>
++ linkend="eggdbus-method-org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority.AuthenticationAgentResponse2">AuthenticationAgentResponse2()</link>
+ method. This method should be treated as an internal
+- implementation detail, and callers should use the public shared
+- library API to invoke it, which currently uses a setuid helper
+- program.
++ implementation detail, and callers should use the
++ <link linkend="PolkitAgentSession">PolkitAgentSession</link> API to invoke
++ it, which currently uses a setuid helper program.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ The <link linkend="ref-authentication-agent-api">libpolkit-agent-1</link>
+diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+index f45abc4..4e882e6 100644
+--- a/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkit/polkitauthority.c
+@@ -1038,6 +1038,10 @@ polkit_authority_check_authorization_sync (PolkitAuthority *author
+ *
+ * Asynchronously registers an authentication agent.
+ *
++ * Note that this should be called by the same effective UID which will be
++ * the real UID using the #PolkitAgentSession API or otherwise calling
++ * polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response().
++ *
+ * When the operation is finished, @callback will be invoked in the
+ * <link linkend="g-main-context-push-thread-default">thread-default
+ * main loop</link> of the thread you are calling this method
+@@ -1129,7 +1133,13 @@ polkit_authority_register_authentication_agent_finish (PolkitAuthority *authorit
+ * @cancellable: (allow-none): A #GCancellable or %NULL.
+ * @error: (allow-none): Return location for error or %NULL.
+ *
+- * Registers an authentication agent. The calling thread is blocked
++ * Registers an authentication agent.
++ *
++ * Note that this should be called by the same effective UID which will be
++ * the real UID using the #PolkitAgentSession API or otherwise calling
++ * polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response().
++ *
++ * The calling thread is blocked
+ * until a reply is received. See
+ * polkit_authority_register_authentication_agent() for the
+ * asynchronous version.
+@@ -1178,6 +1188,10 @@ polkit_authority_register_authentication_agent_sync (PolkitAuthority *author
+ *
+ * Asynchronously registers an authentication agent.
+ *
++ * Note that this should be called by the same effective UID which will be
++ * the real UID using the #PolkitAgentSession API or otherwise calling
++ * polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response().
++ *
+ * When the operation is finished, @callback will be invoked in the
+ * <link linkend="g-main-context-push-thread-default">thread-default
+ * main loop</link> of the thread you are calling this method
+@@ -1292,7 +1306,13 @@ polkit_authority_register_authentication_agent_with_options_finish (PolkitAuthor
+ * @cancellable: (allow-none): A #GCancellable or %NULL.
+ * @error: (allow-none): Return location for error or %NULL.
+ *
+- * Registers an authentication agent. The calling thread is blocked
++ * Registers an authentication agent.
++ *
++ * Note that this should be called by the same effective UID which will be
++ * the real UID using the #PolkitAgentSession API or otherwise calling
++ * polkit_authority_authentication_agent_response().
++ *
++ * The calling thread is blocked
+ * until a reply is received. See
+ * polkit_authority_register_authentication_agent_with_options() for the
+ * asynchronous version.
+diff --git a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentlistener.c b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentlistener.c
+index 0d97501..10dbfb9 100644
+--- a/src/polkitagent/polkitagentlistener.c
++++ b/src/polkitagent/polkitagentlistener.c
+@@ -37,10 +37,7 @@
+ *
+ * Typically authentication agents use #PolkitAgentSession to
+ * authenticate users (via passwords) and communicate back the
+- * authentication result to the PolicyKit daemon. This is however not
+- * requirement. Depending on the system an authentication agent may
+- * use other means (such as a Yes/No dialog) to obtain sufficient
+- * evidence that the user is one of the requested identities.
++ * authentication result to the PolicyKit daemon.
+ *
+ * To register a #PolkitAgentListener with the PolicyKit daemon, use
+ * polkit_agent_listener_register() or
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+index d1b1a25..10b8af3 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendauthority.c
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ polkit_backend_authority_unregister_authentication_agent (PolkitBackendAuthority
+ * polkit_backend_authority_authentication_agent_response:
+ * @authority: A #PolkitBackendAuthority.
+ * @caller: The system bus name that initiated the query.
++ * @uid: The real UID of the registered agent, or (uid_t)-1 if unknown.
+ * @cookie: The cookie passed to the authentication agent from the authority.
+ * @identity: The identity that was authenticated.
+ * @error: Return location for error or %NULL.
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/pkexec-Work-around-systemd-injecting-broken-XDG_RUNT.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/pkexec-Work-around-systemd-injecting-broken-XDG_RUNT.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8e9b6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/pkexec-Work-around-systemd-injecting-broken-XDG_RUNT.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2013 17:39:37 -0500
+Subject: pkexec: Work around systemd injecting broken XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
+
+This workaround isn't too much code, and it's often better to fix bugs
+in two places anyways.
+
+For more information:
+
+See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=753882
+See http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-November/014370.html
+
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:8635ffc16aeff6a07d675f861fe0dea03ea81d7e
+---
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 9a0570a..5e99044 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -139,8 +139,22 @@ pam_conversation_function (int n,
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+
++/* A work around for:
++ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=753882
++ */
++static gboolean
++xdg_runtime_dir_is_owned_by (const char *path,
++ uid_t target_uid)
++{
++ struct stat stbuf;
++
++ return stat (path, &stbuf) == 0 &&
++ stbuf.st_uid == target_uid;
++}
++
+ static gboolean
+-open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth)
++open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth,
++ uid_t target_uid)
+ {
+ gboolean ret;
+ gint rc;
+@@ -182,7 +196,19 @@ open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth)
+ {
+ guint n;
+ for (n = 0; envlist[n]; n++)
+- putenv (envlist[n]);
++ {
++ const char *envitem = envlist[n];
++
++ if (g_str_has_prefix (envitem, "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR="))
++ {
++ const char *eq = strchr (envitem, '=');
++ g_assert (eq);
++ if (!xdg_runtime_dir_is_owned_by (eq + 1, target_uid))
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ putenv (envlist[n]);
++ }
+ free (envlist);
+ }
+
+@@ -892,7 +918,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ * As evident above, neither su(1) (and, for that matter, nor sudo(8)) does this.
+ */
+ #ifdef POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM
+- if (!open_session (pw->pw_name))
++ if (!open_session (pw->pw_name,
++ pw->pw_uid))
+ {
+ goto out;
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/polkitd-Fix-problem-with-removing-non-existent-sourc.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/polkitd-Fix-problem-with-removing-non-existent-sourc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1737020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/polkitd-Fix-problem-with-removing-non-existent-sourc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From: Lukasz Skalski <l.skalski@samsung.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 11:11:20 +0200
+Subject: polkitd: Fix problem with removing non-existent source
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=77167
+Applied-upstream: 0.113, commit:3ca4e00c7e003ea80aa96b499bc7cd83246d7108
+---
+ src/polkitd/main.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitd/main.c b/src/polkitd/main.c
+index b21723f..f18fb91 100644
+--- a/src/polkitd/main.c
++++ b/src/polkitd/main.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ on_sigint (gpointer user_data)
+ {
+ g_print ("Handling SIGINT\n");
+ g_main_loop_quit (loop);
+- return FALSE;
++ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ int
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Deduplicate-code-paths.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Deduplicate-code-paths.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7d0a4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Deduplicate-code-paths.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
+Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2013 15:57:50 -0500
+Subject: sessionmonitor-systemd: Deduplicate code paths
+
+We had the code to go from pid -> session duplicated. If we have a
+PolkitSystemBusName, convert it to a PolkitUnixProcess.
+Then we can do PolkitUnixProcess -> pid -> session in one place.
+
+This is just a code cleanup.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69538
+Origin: upstream, 0.113, commit:26d0c0578211fb96fc8fe75572aa11ad6ecbf9b8
+---
+ .../polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c | 63 ++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+index 0185310..756b728 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+@@ -313,61 +313,42 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_session_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMoni
+ PolkitSubject *subject,
+ GError **error)
+ {
+- PolkitSubject *session;
+-
+- session = NULL;
++ PolkitUnixProcess *tmp_process = NULL;
++ PolkitUnixProcess *process = NULL;
++ PolkitSubject *session = NULL;
++ char *session_id = NULL;
++ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (subject))
+- {
+- gchar *session_id;
+- pid_t pid;
+-
+- pid = polkit_unix_process_get_pid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject));
+- if (sd_pid_get_session (pid, &session_id) < 0)
+- goto out;
+-
+- session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
+- free (session_id);
+- }
++ process = POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject); /* We already have a process */
+ else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))
+ {
+- guint32 pid;
+- gchar *session_id;
+- GVariant *result;
+-
+- result = g_dbus_connection_call_sync (monitor->system_bus,
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "/org/freedesktop/DBus",
+- "org.freedesktop.DBus",
+- "GetConnectionUnixProcessID",
+- g_variant_new ("(s)", polkit_system_bus_name_get_name (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject))),
+- G_VARIANT_TYPE ("(u)"),
+- G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
+- -1, /* timeout_msec */
+- NULL, /* GCancellable */
+- error);
+- if (result == NULL)
+- goto out;
+- g_variant_get (result, "(u)", &pid);
+- g_variant_unref (result);
+-
+- if (sd_pid_get_session (pid, &session_id) < 0)
+- goto out;
+-
+- session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
+- free (session_id);
++ /* Convert bus name to process */
++ tmp_process = (PolkitUnixProcess*)polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, error);
++ if (!tmp_process)
++ goto out;
++ process = tmp_process;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ g_set_error (error,
+ POLKIT_ERROR,
+ POLKIT_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+- "Cannot get user for subject of type %s",
++ "Cannot get session for subject of type %s",
+ g_type_name (G_TYPE_FROM_INSTANCE (subject)));
+ }
+
+- out:
++ /* Now do process -> pid -> session */
++ g_assert (process != NULL);
++ pid = polkit_unix_process_get_pid (process);
+
++ if (sd_pid_get_session (pid, &session_id) < 0)
++ goto out;
++
++ session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
++ free (session_id);
++ out:
++ if (tmp_process) g_object_unref (tmp_process);
+ return session;
+ }
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Use-sd_uid_get_state-to-check.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Use-sd_uid_get_state-to-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c0ca4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Use-sd_uid_get_state-to-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From: Philip Withnall <philip.withnall@collabora.co.uk>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 16:19:51 +0100
+Subject: sessionmonitor-systemd: Use sd_uid_get_state() to check session
+ activity
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Instead of using sd_pid_get_session() then sd_session_is_active() to
+determine whether the user is active, use sd_uid_get_state() directly.
+This gets the maximum of the states of all the user’s sessions, rather
+than the state of the session containing the subject process. Since the
+user is the security boundary, this is fine.
+
+This change is necessary for `systemd --user` sessions, where most user
+code will be forked off user@.service, rather than running inside the
+logind session (whether that be a foreground/active or background/online
+session).
+
+Policy-wise, the change is from checking whether the subject process is
+in an active session; to checking whether the subject process is owned
+by a user with at least one active session.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76358
+Applied-upstream: 0.113, commit:a29653ffa99e0809e15aa34afcd7b2df8593871c
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/779988
+---
+ .../polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+index ebd05ce..6bd517a 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+@@ -391,6 +391,37 @@ gboolean
+ polkit_backend_session_monitor_is_session_active (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor *monitor,
+ PolkitSubject *session)
+ {
+- return sd_session_is_active (polkit_unix_session_get_session_id (POLKIT_UNIX_SESSION (session)));
++ const char *session_id;
++ char *state;
++ uid_t uid;
++ gboolean is_active = FALSE;
++
++ session_id = polkit_unix_session_get_session_id (POLKIT_UNIX_SESSION (session));
++
++ g_debug ("Checking whether session %s is active.", session_id);
++
++ /* Check whether *any* of the user's current sessions are active. */
++ if (sd_session_get_uid (session_id, &uid) < 0)
++ goto fallback;
++
++ g_debug ("Session %s has UID %u.", session_id, uid);
++
++ if (sd_uid_get_state (uid, &state) < 0)
++ goto fallback;
++
++ g_debug ("UID %u has state %s.", uid, state);
++
++ is_active = (g_strcmp0 (state, "active") == 0);
++ free (state);
++
++ return is_active;
++
++fallback:
++ /* Fall back to checking the session. This is not ideal, since the user
++ * might have multiple sessions, and we cannot guarantee to have chosen
++ * the active one.
++ *
++ * See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76358. */
++ return sd_session_is_active (session_id);
+ }
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-prepare-for-D-Bus-user-bus-mo.patch b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-prepare-for-D-Bus-user-bus-mo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a722170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-prepare-for-D-Bus-user-bus-mo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 10:19:49 +0900
+Subject: sessionmonitor-systemd: prepare for D-Bus "user bus" model
+
+In the D-Bus "user bus" model, all sessions of a user share the same
+D-Bus instance, a polkit requesting process might live outside the
+login session which registered the user's polkit agent.
+
+In case a polkit requesting process is not part of the user's login
+session, we ask systemd-logind for the the user's "display" session
+instead.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=78905
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/779988
+Applied-upstream: 0.113, commit:a68f5dfd7662767b7b9822090b70bc5bd145c50c
+[smcv: backport configure.ac changes; fail with #error if the required
+API is not found]
+---
+ configure.ac | 4 +++
+ .../polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index f4a0c41..aa2760f 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ if test "$enable_systemd" != "no"; then
+ have_systemd=no)
+ if test "$have_systemd" = "yes"; then
+ SESSION_TRACKING=systemd
++ save_LIBS=$LIBS
++ LIBS=$SYSTEMD_LIBS
++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(sd_uid_get_display)
++ LIBS=$save_LIBS
+ else
+ if test "$enable_systemd" = "yes"; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([systemd support requested but libsystemd-login1 library not found])
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+index 756b728..ebd05ce 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor-systemd.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_session_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMoni
+ PolkitSubject *session = NULL;
+ char *session_id = NULL;
+ pid_t pid;
++#if HAVE_SD_UID_GET_DISPLAY
++ uid_t uid;
++#endif
+
+ if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (subject))
+ process = POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject); /* We already have a process */
+@@ -338,16 +341,32 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_session_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMoni
+ g_type_name (G_TYPE_FROM_INSTANCE (subject)));
+ }
+
+- /* Now do process -> pid -> session */
++ /* Now do process -> pid -> same session */
+ g_assert (process != NULL);
+ pid = polkit_unix_process_get_pid (process);
+
+- if (sd_pid_get_session (pid, &session_id) < 0)
++ if (sd_pid_get_session (pid, &session_id) >= 0)
++ {
++ session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++#if HAVE_SD_UID_GET_DISPLAY
++ /* Now do process -> uid -> graphical session (systemd version 213)*/
++ if (sd_pid_get_owner_uid (pid, &uid) < 0)
+ goto out;
+-
+- session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
+- free (session_id);
++
++ if (sd_uid_get_display (uid, &session_id) >= 0)
++ {
++ session = polkit_unix_session_new (session_id);
++ goto out;
++ }
++#else
++#error Debian should have sd_uid_get_display()
++#endif
++
+ out:
++ free (session_id);
+ if (tmp_process) g_object_unref (tmp_process);
+ return session;
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/01_pam_polkit.patch b/debian/patches/01_pam_polkit.patch
index 17cbb3b..72d5d40 100644
--- a/debian/patches/01_pam_polkit.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/01_pam_polkit.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-Index: trunk/data/polkit-1.in
-===================================================================
---- trunk.orig/data/polkit-1.in
-+++ trunk/data/polkit-1.in
+From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2007 22:38:04 +0200
+Subject: Use Debian's common-* PAM infrastructure, plus pam_env
+
+Forwarded: no, Debian-specific
+---
+ data/polkit-1.in | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/data/polkit-1.in b/data/polkit-1.in
+index 142dadd..b890276 100644
+--- a/data/polkit-1.in
++++ b/data/polkit-1.in
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#%PAM-1.0
diff --git a/debian/patches/02_gettext.patch b/debian/patches/02_gettext.patch
index 8079481..7b2f07b 100644
--- a/debian/patches/02_gettext.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/02_gettext.patch
@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
-From c28ef44e1ba82e1a3419c740ac0bbb8aaa591bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robert Ancell <robert.ancell@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2010 16:26:15 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Use gettext for translations in .policy files
+Subject: Use gettext for translations in .policy files
+
Bug: http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=29639
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/619632
-
---
- src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+ src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+)
-Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
-===================================================================
---- policykit.orig/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c 2011-04-20 12:02:27.366174916 +0200
-+++ policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c 2011-08-08 14:14:31.713738052 +0200
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
+index 4270d4e..e2dbf9e 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
#include <polkit/polkit.h>
#include <polkit/polkitprivate.h>
-@@ -45,7 +47,9 @@
+@@ -44,7 +46,9 @@ typedef struct
gchar *vendor_url;
gchar *icon_name;
gchar *description;
@@ -32,7 +31,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
PolkitImplicitAuthorization implicit_authorization_any;
PolkitImplicitAuthorization implicit_authorization_inactive;
-@@ -67,7 +71,9 @@
+@@ -65,7 +69,9 @@ parsed_action_free (ParsedAction *action)
g_free (action->vendor_url);
g_free (action->icon_name);
g_free (action->description);
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
g_hash_table_unref (action->localized_description);
g_hash_table_unref (action->localized_message);
-@@ -87,6 +93,7 @@
+@@ -85,6 +91,7 @@ static void ensure_all_files (PolkitBackendActionPool *pool);
static const gchar *_localize (GHashTable *translations,
const gchar *untranslated,
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
const gchar *lang);
typedef struct
-@@ -387,9 +394,11 @@
+@@ -385,9 +392,11 @@ polkit_backend_action_pool_get_action (PolkitBackendActionPool *pool,
description = _localize (parsed_action->localized_description,
parsed_action->description,
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
locale);
ret = polkit_action_description_new (action_id,
-@@ -605,11 +614,16 @@
+@@ -603,11 +612,16 @@ typedef struct {
GHashTable *policy_messages;
char *policy_description_nolang;
@@ -79,7 +78,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
char *annotate_key;
GHashTable *annotations;
-@@ -631,8 +645,12 @@
+@@ -629,8 +643,12 @@ pd_unref_action_data (ParserData *pd)
g_free (pd->policy_description_nolang);
pd->policy_description_nolang = NULL;
@@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
if (pd->policy_descriptions != NULL)
{
g_hash_table_unref (pd->policy_descriptions);
-@@ -652,6 +670,8 @@
+@@ -650,6 +668,8 @@ pd_unref_action_data (ParserData *pd)
}
g_free (pd->elem_lang);
pd->elem_lang = NULL;
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
}
static void
-@@ -739,6 +759,10 @@
+@@ -737,6 +757,10 @@ _start (void *data, const char *el, const char **attr)
{
pd->elem_lang = g_strdup (attr[1]);
}
@@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
state = STATE_IN_ACTION_DESCRIPTION;
}
else if (strcmp (el, "message") == 0)
-@@ -747,6 +771,10 @@
+@@ -745,6 +769,10 @@ _start (void *data, const char *el, const char **attr)
{
pd->elem_lang = g_strdup (attr[1]);
}
@@ -123,7 +122,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
state = STATE_IN_ACTION_MESSAGE;
}
else if (strcmp (el, "vendor") == 0 && num_attr == 0)
-@@ -849,6 +877,7 @@
+@@ -847,6 +875,7 @@ _cdata (void *data, const char *s, int len)
{
g_free (pd->policy_description_nolang);
pd->policy_description_nolang = str;
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
str = NULL;
}
else
-@@ -865,6 +894,7 @@
+@@ -863,6 +892,7 @@ _cdata (void *data, const char *s, int len)
{
g_free (pd->policy_message_nolang);
pd->policy_message_nolang = str;
@@ -139,7 +138,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
str = NULL;
}
else
-@@ -962,6 +992,8 @@
+@@ -960,6 +990,8 @@ _end (void *data, const char *el)
g_free (pd->elem_lang);
pd->elem_lang = NULL;
@@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
switch (pd->state)
{
-@@ -993,7 +1025,9 @@
+@@ -990,7 +1022,9 @@ _end (void *data, const char *el)
action->vendor_url = g_strdup (vendor_url);
action->icon_name = g_strdup (icon_name);
action->description = g_strdup (pd->policy_description_nolang);
@@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
action->localized_description = pd->policy_descriptions;
action->localized_message = pd->policy_messages;
-@@ -1095,6 +1129,7 @@
+@@ -1093,6 +1127,7 @@ error:
* _localize:
* @translations: a mapping from xml:lang to the value, e.g. 'da' -> 'Smadre', 'en_CA' -> 'Punch, Aye!'
* @untranslated: the untranslated value, e.g. 'Punch'
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendactionpool.c
* @lang: the locale we're interested in, e.g. 'da_DK', 'da', 'en_CA', 'en_US'; basically just $LANG
* with the encoding cut off. Maybe be NULL.
*
-@@ -1105,11 +1140,25 @@
+@@ -1103,11 +1138,25 @@ error:
static const gchar *
_localize (GHashTable *translations,
const gchar *untranslated,
diff --git a/debian/patches/03_complete_session.patch b/debian/patches/03_complete_session.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7984313..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/03_complete_session.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From: James Westby <james.westby@linaro.org>
-Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2010 09:14:26 -0400
-Subject: Fix the race that leads to the password box disappearing, but the dialog remaining.
-Bug: http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30515
-Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/649939
-Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/445303
-
-Index: policykit-1/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1.orig/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c 2012-04-24 19:44:21.195751945 +0200
-+++ policykit-1/src/polkitagent/polkitagentsession.c 2012-04-24 21:03:20.487887522 +0200
-@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@
- gpointer user_data)
- {
- PolkitAgentSession *session = POLKIT_AGENT_SESSION (user_data);
-+ GMainContext *context = g_main_context_default();
-
- if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
- {
-@@ -446,6 +447,11 @@
-
- /* kill all the watches we have set up, except for the child since it has exited already */
- session->child_pid = 0;
-+ /* Allow the stdout of the child to be processed if we haven't finished yet */
-+ while (g_main_context_pending(context))
-+ {
-+ g_main_context_iteration(context, FALSE);
-+ }
- complete_session (session, FALSE);
- }
-
-@@ -650,15 +656,15 @@
- if (G_UNLIKELY (_show_debug ()))
- g_print ("PolkitAgentSession: spawned helper with pid %d\n", (gint) session->child_pid);
-
-- session->child_watch_source = g_child_watch_source_new (session->child_pid);
-- g_source_set_callback (session->child_watch_source, (GSourceFunc) child_watch_func, session, NULL);
-- g_source_attach (session->child_watch_source, g_main_context_get_thread_default ());
--
- session->child_stdout_channel = g_io_channel_unix_new (session->child_stdout);
- session->child_stdout_watch_source = g_io_create_watch (session->child_stdout_channel, G_IO_IN);
- g_source_set_callback (session->child_stdout_watch_source, (GSourceFunc) io_watch_have_data, session, NULL);
- g_source_attach (session->child_stdout_watch_source, g_main_context_get_thread_default ());
-
-+ session->child_watch_source = g_child_watch_source_new (session->child_pid);
-+ g_source_set_callback (session->child_watch_source, (GSourceFunc) child_watch_func, session, NULL);
-+ g_source_attach (session->child_watch_source, g_main_context_get_thread_default ());
-+
-
- session->success = FALSE;
-
diff --git a/debian/patches/04_get_cwd.patch b/debian/patches/04_get_cwd.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3634137..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/04_get_cwd.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From cd184d77f57d45ffce34f0210bbff72f6fd3116f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Emilio Pozuelo Monfort <pochu27@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2011 07:28:14 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix build on GNU Hurd
-
-https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=35685
----
- src/programs/pkexec.c | 5 +++--
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-Index: policykit-1/src/programs/pkexec.c
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1.orig/src/programs/pkexec.c 2011-08-02 03:16:07.070394919 +0200
-+++ policykit-1/src/programs/pkexec.c 2011-08-02 03:16:43.241940179 +0200
-@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
- #include <polkitagent/polkitagent.h>
-
- static gchar *original_user_name = NULL;
--static gchar original_cwd[PATH_MAX];
-+static gchar *original_cwd;
- static gchar *command_line = NULL;
- static struct passwd *pw;
-
-@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@
- goto out;
- }
-
-- if (getcwd (original_cwd, sizeof (original_cwd)) == NULL)
-+ if ((original_cwd = g_get_current_dir ()) == NULL)
- {
- g_printerr ("Error getting cwd: %s\n",
- g_strerror (errno));
-@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@
- g_ptr_array_free (saved_env, TRUE);
- }
-
-+ g_free (original_cwd);
- g_free (path);
- g_free (command_line);
- g_free (opt_user);
diff --git a/debian/patches/05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch b/debian/patches/05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch
index 1562e69..bd6e9b9 100644
--- a/debian/patches/05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch
@@ -1,36 +1,32 @@
-From 1892aeb9c13841335a4ac383e8a787a3c2728c45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2011 00:31:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Default to AdminIdentities=unix-group:wheel for
- local authority"
+Subject: Revert "Default to AdminIdentities=unix-group:wheel for local
+ authority"
This reverts commit 763faf434b445c20ae9529100d3ef5290976d0c9.
+
+On Red Hat derivatives, every member of group 'wheel' is necessarily
+privileged. On Debian derivatives, there is no wheel group, and gid 0
+(root) is not used in this way. Change the default rule to consider
+uid 0 to be privileged, instead.
+
+On Red Hat derivatives, 50-default.rules is not preserved by upgrades;
+on dpkg-based systems, it is a proper conffile and may be edited
+(at the sysadmin's own risk), so the comment about not editing it is
+misleading.
+
+[smcv: added longer explanation of why we make this change;
+remove unrelated cosmetic change to a man page]
+
+Forwarded: no, Debian-specific
---
- docs/man/pklocalauthority.xml | 4 ++--
- src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-Index: policykit/docs/man/pklocalauthority.xml
-===================================================================
---- policykit.orig/docs/man/pklocalauthority.xml 2012-01-06 10:34:01.830221577 +0100
-+++ policykit/docs/man/pklocalauthority.xml 2012-01-06 10:39:24.206237179 +0100
-@@ -385,10 +385,10 @@
- </para>
- <programlisting>
- [Configuration]
--AdminIdentities=unix-group:staff
-+AdminIdentities=unix-group:desktop_admin_r
- </programlisting>
- <para>
-- specifies that any user in the <literal>staff</literal> UNIX
-+ that any user in the <literal>desktop_admin_r</literal> UNIX
- group can be used for authentication when administrator
- authentication is needed. This file would typically be installed
- in the <filename>/etc/polkit-1/localauthority.conf.d</filename>
-Index: policykit/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf
-===================================================================
---- policykit.orig/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf 2012-01-06 10:33:58.254221404 +0100
-+++ policykit/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf 2012-01-06 10:39:24.210237180 +0100
+diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf b/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf
+index 5e44bde..20e0ba3 100644
+--- a/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf
++++ b/src/polkitbackend/50-localauthority.conf
@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@
#
diff --git a/debian/patches/06_systemd-service.patch b/debian/patches/06_systemd-service.patch
index f8e9a63..faf5415 100644
--- a/debian/patches/06_systemd-service.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/06_systemd-service.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-Index: policykit-1/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1.orig/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in 2012-02-01 01:54:58.291191682 +0100
-+++ policykit-1/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in 2012-02-11 23:45:15.946856853 +0100
+From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
+Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2012 23:48:29 +0100
+Subject: Install systemd service file for polkitd.
+
+Forwarded: no, obsoleted by an upstream commit in 0.106
+---
+ data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in
+index b6cd02b..ba3a1b6 100644
+--- a/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in
++++ b/data/org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.service.in
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
Name=org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1
Exec=@libexecdir@/polkitd --no-debug
diff --git a/debian/patches/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch b/debian/patches/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f98295f..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From d6acecdd0ebb42e28ff28e04e0207cb01fa20910 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2012 14:28:29 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Set XAUTHORITY environment variable if is unset
-
-The way it works is that if XAUTHORITY is unset, then its default
-value is $HOME/.Xauthority. But since we're changing user identity
-this will not work since $HOME will now change. Therefore, if
-XAUTHORITY is unset, just set its default value before changing
-identity. This bug only affected login managers using X Window
-Authorization but not explicitly setting the XAUTHORITY variable.
-
-You can argue that XAUTHORITY is broken since it forces uid-changing
-apps like pkexec(1) to do more work - and get involved in intimate
-details of how X works and so on - but that doesn't change how things
-work.
-
-Based on a patch from Peter Wu <lekensteyn@gmail.com>.
-
-https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51623
-
-Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
----
- src/programs/pkexec.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
-
-Index: policykit-1/src/programs/pkexec.c
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1.orig/src/programs/pkexec.c 2012-12-20 18:41:37.714807215 +0100
-+++ policykit-1/src/programs/pkexec.c 2012-12-20 18:41:37.790805274 +0100
-@@ -597,6 +597,28 @@
- g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (value));
- }
-
-+ /* $XAUTHORITY is "special" - if unset, we need to set it to ~/.Xauthority. Yes,
-+ * this is broken but it's unfortunately how things work (see fdo #51623 for
-+ * details)
-+ */
-+ if (g_getenv ("XAUTHORITY") == NULL)
-+ {
-+ const gchar *home;
-+
-+ /* pre-2.36 GLib does not examine $HOME (it always looks in /etc/passwd) and
-+ * this is not what we want
-+ */
-+ home = g_getenv ("HOME");
-+ if (home == NULL)
-+ home = g_get_home_dir ();
-+
-+ if (home != NULL)
-+ {
-+ g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("XAUTHORITY"));
-+ g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_build_filename (home, ".Xauthority", NULL));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- /* Nuke the environment to get a well-known and sanitized environment to avoid attacks
- * via e.g. the DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS environment variable and similar.
- */
diff --git a/debian/patches/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch b/debian/patches/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 73c356c..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-commit 08291789a1f99d4ab29c74c39344304bcca43023
-Author: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 20 15:15:31 2013 -0400
-
- polkitunixprocess: Deprecate racy APIs
-
- It's only safe for processes to be created with their owning uid,
- (without kernel support, which we don't have). Anything else is
- subject to clients exec()ing setuid binaries after the fact.
-
-diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
-index 531a57d..f5ed1a7 100644
---- a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
-+++ b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.h
-@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ typedef struct _PolkitUnixProcess PolkitUnixProcess;
- typedef struct _PolkitUnixProcessClass PolkitUnixProcessClass;
-
- GType polkit_unix_process_get_type (void) G_GNUC_CONST;
-+G_GNUC_DEPRECATED_FOR(polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner)
- PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new (gint pid);
-+G_GNUC_DEPRECATED_FOR(polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner)
- PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new_full (gint pid,
- guint64 start_time);
- PolkitSubject *polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (gint pid,
diff --git a/debian/patches/09_pam_environment.patch b/debian/patches/09_pam_environment.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f0e137c..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/09_pam_environment.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-Author: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com>
-Description: set process environment from pam_getenvlist()
- Various pam modules provide environment variables that are intended to be
- set in the environment of the pam session. pkexec needs to process the
- output of pam_getenvlist() to get these.
-Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/982684
-Index: trunk/src/programs/pkexec.c
-===================================================================
---- trunk.orig/src/programs/pkexec.c
-+++ trunk/src/programs/pkexec.c
-@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
- gboolean ret;
- gint rc;
- pam_handle_t *pam_h;
-+ char **envlist;
- struct pam_conv conversation;
-
- ret = FALSE;
-@@ -176,6 +177,14 @@
-
- ret = TRUE;
-
-+ envlist = pam_getenvlist (pam_h);
-+ if (envlist != NULL) {
-+ int i;
-+ for (i = 0; envlist[i]; i++)
-+ putenv(envlist[i]);
-+ free (envlist);
-+ }
-+
- out:
- if (pam_h != NULL)
- pam_end (pam_h, rc);
diff --git a/debian/patches/10_build-against-libsystemd.patch b/debian/patches/10_build-against-libsystemd.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6230a63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/10_build-against-libsystemd.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 02:08:33 +0200
+Subject: Build against libsystemd
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=779756
+Forwarded: no, obsoleted by upstream commit 2291767a014f5a04a92ca6f0eb472794f212ca67 in 0.113
+---
+ configure.ac | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 388605d..f55ddb7 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([systemd],
+ [enable_systemd=auto])
+ if test "$enable_systemd" != "no"; then
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(SYSTEMD,
+- [libsystemd-login],
++ [libsystemd],
+ have_systemd=yes,
+ have_systemd=no)
+ if test "$have_systemd" = "yes"; then
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ if test "$enable_systemd" != "no"; then
+ LIBS=$save_LIBS
+ else
+ if test "$enable_systemd" = "yes"; then
+- AC_MSG_ERROR([systemd support requested but libsystemd-login1 library not found])
++ AC_MSG_ERROR([systemd support requested but libsystemd library not found])
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
diff --git a/debian/patches/cve-2013-4288.patch b/debian/patches/cve-2013-4288.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2aad36c..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/cve-2013-4288.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-From 52c927893a2ab135462b616c2e00fec377da9885 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
-Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:16:11 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 2/4] pkcheck: Support --process=pid,start-time,uid syntax too
-
-The uid is a new addition; this allows callers such as libvirt to
-close a race condition in reading the uid of the process talking to
-them. They can read it via getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) or equivalent,
-rather than having pkcheck look at /proc later after the fact.
-
-Programs which invoke pkcheck but need to know beforehand (i.e. at
-compile time) whether or not it supports passing the uid can
-use:
-
-pkcheck_supports_uid=$($PKG_CONFIG --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1)
-test x$pkcheck_supports_uid = xyes
----
- data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in | 3 +++
- docs/man/pkcheck.xml | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
- src/programs/pkcheck.c | 9 +++++++--
- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-Index: policykit-1-0.105/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1-0.105.orig/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in 2013-09-11 09:40:56.604225567 -0400
-+++ policykit-1-0.105/data/polkit-gobject-1.pc.in 2013-09-11 09:40:56.596225567 -0400
-@@ -11,3 +11,6 @@
- Libs: -L${libdir} -lpolkit-gobject-1
- Cflags: -I${includedir}/polkit-1
- Requires: gio-2.0 >= 2.18 glib-2.0 >= 2.18
-+# Programs using pkcheck can use this to determine
-+# whether or not it can be passed a uid.
-+pkcheck_supports_uid=true
-Index: policykit-1-0.105/docs/man/pkcheck.xml
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1-0.105.orig/docs/man/pkcheck.xml 2013-09-11 09:40:56.604225567 -0400
-+++ policykit-1-0.105/docs/man/pkcheck.xml 2013-09-11 09:42:28.272223569 -0400
-@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
- <arg choice="plain">
- <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time</replaceable>
- </arg>
-+ <arg choice="plain">
-+ <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time,uid</replaceable>
-+ </arg>
- </group>
- </arg>
- <arg choice="plain">
-@@ -90,7 +93,7 @@
- <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
- <para>
- <command>pkcheck</command> is used to check whether a process, specified by
-- either <option>--process</option> or <option>--system-bus-name</option>,
-+ either <option>--process</option> (see below) or <option>--system-bus-name</option>,
- is authorized for <replaceable>action</replaceable>. The <option>--detail</option>
- option can be used zero or more times to pass details about <replaceable>action</replaceable>.
- If <option>--allow-user-interaction</option> is passed, <command>pkcheck</command> blocks
-@@ -160,17 +163,25 @@
- <refsect1 id="pkcheck-notes">
- <title>NOTES</title>
- <para>
-- Since process identifiers can be recycled, the caller should always use
-- <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time</replaceable> to specify the process
-- to check for authorization when using the <option>--process</option> option.
-- The value of <replaceable>pid-start-time</replaceable>
-- can be determined by consulting e.g. the
-+ Do not use either the bare <replaceable>pid</replaceable> or
-+ <replaceable>pid,start-time</replaceable> syntax forms for
-+ <option>--process</option>. There are race conditions in both.
-+ New code should always use
-+ <replaceable>pid,pid-start-time,uid</replaceable>. The value of
-+ <replaceable>start-time</replaceable> can be determined by
-+ consulting e.g. the
- <citerefentry>
- <refentrytitle>proc</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry>
-- file system depending on the operating system. If only <replaceable>pid</replaceable>
-- is passed to the <option>--process</option> option, then <command>pkcheck</command>
-- will look up the start time itself but note that this may be racy.
-+ file system depending on the operating system. If fewer than 3
-+ arguments are passed, <command>pkcheck</command> will attempt to
-+ look up them up internally, but note that this may be racy.
-+ </para>
-+ <para>
-+ If your program is a daemon with e.g. a custom Unix domain
-+ socket, you should determine the <replaceable>uid</replaceable>
-+ parameter via operating system mechanisms such as
-+ <literal>PEERCRED</literal>.
- </para>
- </refsect1>
-
-Index: policykit-1-0.105/src/programs/pkcheck.c
-===================================================================
---- policykit-1-0.105.orig/src/programs/pkcheck.c 2013-09-11 09:40:56.604225567 -0400
-+++ policykit-1-0.105/src/programs/pkcheck.c 2013-09-11 09:40:56.600225567 -0400
-@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
- else if (g_strcmp0 (argv[n], "--process") == 0 || g_strcmp0 (argv[n], "-p") == 0)
- {
- gint pid;
-+ guint uid;
- guint64 pid_start_time;
-
- n++;
-@@ -381,7 +382,11 @@
- goto out;
- }
-
-- if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT, &pid, &pid_start_time) == 2)
-+ if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ",%u", &pid, &pid_start_time, &uid) == 3)
-+ {
-+ subject = polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (pid, pid_start_time, uid);
-+ }
-+ else if (sscanf (argv[n], "%i,%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT, &pid, &pid_start_time) == 2)
- {
- subject = polkit_unix_process_new_full (pid, pid_start_time);
- }
diff --git a/debian/patches/master/Fix-multi-line-pam-text-info.patch b/debian/patches/master/Fix-multi-line-pam-text-info.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3717ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/master/Fix-multi-line-pam-text-info.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+Description: Escape helper output to handle multiline messages
+ Some pam modules produce multiline messages which caused errors in
+ PolkitAgentSession as the subsequent lines were interpreted as separate
+ messages unrecognized by the authenticator. Escaping every message allows
+ to avoid such behaviour.
+Author: Dariusz Gadomski <dariusz.gadomski@canonical.com>
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1510824
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92886
+Origin: upstream
+
+--- policykit-1-0.105.orig/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c
++++ policykit-1-0.105/src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelper-pam.c
+@@ -39,25 +39,35 @@ static void
+ send_to_helper (const gchar *str1,
+ const gchar *str2)
+ {
++ char *escaped;
++ char *tmp2;
++ size_t len2;
++
++ tmp2 = g_strdup(str2);
++ len2 = strlen(tmp2);
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `%s' to stdout\n", str1);
++ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `%s ' to stdout\n", str1);
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fprintf (stdout, "%s", str1);
++ fprintf (stdout, "%s ", str1);
++
++ if (len2 > 0 && tmp2[len2 - 1] == '\n')
++ tmp2[len2 - 1] = '\0';
++ escaped = g_strescape (tmp2, NULL);
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `%s' to stdout\n", str2);
++ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `%s' to stdout\n", escaped);
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fprintf (stdout, "%s", str2);
+- if (strlen (str2) > 0 && str2[strlen (str2) - 1] != '\n')
+- {
++ fprintf (stdout, "%s", escaped);
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing newline to stdout\n");
++ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing newline to stdout\n");
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fputc ('\n', stdout);
+- }
++ fputc ('\n', stdout);
+ #ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+ fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: flushing stdout\n");
+ #endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+ fflush (stdout);
++
++ g_free (escaped);
++ g_free (tmp2);
+ }
+
+ int
+@@ -89,7 +99,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+
+ /* Special-case a very common error triggered in jhbuild setups */
+ s = g_strdup_printf ("Incorrect permissions on %s (needs to be setuid root)", argv[0]);
+- send_to_helper ("PAM_ERROR_MSG ", s);
++ send_to_helper ("PAM_ERROR_MSG", s);
+ g_free (s);
+ goto error;
+ }
+@@ -232,7 +242,6 @@ conversation_function (int n, const stru
+ struct pam_response *aresp;
+ char buf[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE];
+ int i;
+- gchar *escaped = NULL;
+
+ data = data;
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+@@ -249,35 +258,13 @@ conversation_function (int n, const stru
+ {
+
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+-#ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF ' to stdout\n");
+-#endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fprintf (stdout, "PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF ");
++ send_to_helper ("PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF", msg[i]->msg);
+ goto conv1;
+
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+-#ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON ' to stdout\n");
+-#endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fprintf (stdout, "PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON ");
+- conv1:
+-#ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing `%s' to stdout\n", msg[i]->msg);
+-#endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- if (strlen (msg[i]->msg) > 0 && msg[i]->msg[strlen (msg[i]->msg) - 1] == '\n')
+- msg[i]->msg[strlen (msg[i]->msg) - 1] == '\0';
+- escaped = g_strescape (msg[i]->msg, NULL);
+- fputs (escaped, stdout);
+- g_free (escaped);
+-#ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: writing newline to stdout\n");
+-#endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fputc ('\n', stdout);
+-#ifdef PAH_DEBUG
+- fprintf (stderr, "polkit-agent-helper-1: flushing stdout\n");
+-#endif /* PAH_DEBUG */
+- fflush (stdout);
++ send_to_helper ("PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON", msg[i]->msg);
+
++ conv1:
+ if (fgets (buf, sizeof buf, stdin) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+@@ -291,17 +278,11 @@ conversation_function (int n, const stru
+ break;
+
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+- fprintf (stdout, "PAM_ERROR_MSG ");
+- goto conv2;
++ send_to_helper ("PAM_ERROR_MSG", msg[i]->msg);
++ break;
+
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+- fprintf (stdout, "PAM_TEXT_INFO ");
+- conv2:
+- fputs (msg[i]->msg, stdout);
+- if (strlen (msg[i]->msg) > 0 &&
+- msg[i]->msg[strlen (msg[i]->msg) - 1] != '\n')
+- fputc ('\n', stdout);
+- fflush (stdout);
++ send_to_helper ("PAM_TEXT_INFO", msg[i]->msg);
+ break;
+
+ default:
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 3f5d0bc..bb91422 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -1,10 +1,36 @@
+0.110/07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
+0.110/04_get_cwd.patch
+0.111/09_pam_environment.patch
+0.112/00git_type_registration.patch
+0.112/08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
+0.112/cve-2013-4288.patch
+0.113/Port-internals-non-deprecated-PolkitProcess-API-wher.patch
+0.113/pkexec-Work-around-systemd-injecting-broken-XDG_RUNT.patch
+0.113/03_PolkitAgentSession-fix-race-between-child-and-io-wat.patch
+0.113/polkitd-Fix-problem-with-removing-non-existent-sourc.patch
+0.113/PolkitSystemBusName-Add-public-API-to-retrieve-Unix-.patch
+0.113/Fixed-compilation-problem-in-the-backend.patch
+0.113/Don-t-discard-error-data-returned-by-polkit_system_b.patch
+0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Deduplicate-code-paths.patch
+0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-prepare-for-D-Bus-user-bus-mo.patch
+0.113/Refuse-duplicate-user-arguments-to-pkexec.patch
+0.113/00git_fix_memleak.patch
+0.113/00git_invalid_object_paths.patch
+0.113/sessionmonitor-systemd-Use-sd_uid_get_state-to-check.patch
+0.113/Fix-a-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
+0.113/Fix-duplicate-GError-use-when-uid-is-missing.patch
+0.113/Fix-a-crash-when-two-authentication-requests-are-in-.patch
+0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Use-unpredictable-cookie-values-keep-t.patch
+0.113/CVE-2015-4625-Bind-use-of-cookies-to-specific-uids.patch
+0.113/docs-Update-for-changes-to-uid-binding-Authenticatio.patch
+0.113/Fix-a-per-authorization-memory-leak.patch
+0.113/Fix-a-memory-leak-when-registering-an-authentication.patch
+0.113/CVE-2015-3255-Fix-GHashTable-usage.patch
+0.113/Fix-use-after-free-in-polkitagentsession.c.patch
+0.113/README-Note-to-send-security-reports-via-DBus-s-mech.patch
+master/Fix-multi-line-pam-text-info.patch
01_pam_polkit.patch
02_gettext.patch
-03_complete_session.patch
-04_get_cwd.patch
05_revert-admin-identities-unix-group-wheel.patch
06_systemd-service.patch
-07_set-XAUTHORITY-environment-variable-if-unset.patch
-08_deprecate_racy_APIs.patch
-cve-2013-4288.patch
-09_pam_environment.patch
+10_build-against-libsystemd.patch
diff --git a/debian/policykit-1.postinst b/debian/policykit-1.postinst
index c6a39de..8689294 100644
--- a/debian/policykit-1.postinst
+++ b/debian/policykit-1.postinst
@@ -46,7 +46,14 @@ case "$1" in
# Kill the old polkitd daemon on upgrade, to ensure that the new
# version will be used at the next occasion.
- kill $(get_pid org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1) 2>/dev/null || true
+ if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+ # remove the temporary mask from preinst
+ systemctl unmask --runtime polkitd.service
+ systemctl daemon-reload
+ deb-systemd-invoke restart polkitd.service || true
+ else
+ kill $(get_pid org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1) 2>/dev/null || true
+ fi
;;
abort-upgrade|abort-remove|abort-deconfigure)
diff --git a/debian/policykit-1.preinst b/debian/policykit-1.preinst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35c34ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/policykit-1.preinst
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+
+case "$1" in
+ install|upgrade)
+ # avoid attempts to start polkitd.service while we are unconfigured and
+ # might not yet have our D-Bus policy in /etc
+ if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+ systemctl mask --runtime polkitd.service
+ fi
+ ;;
+
+ abort-upgrade)
+ if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+ systemctl unmask --runtime polkitd.service
+ fi
+ ;;
+esac
+
+#DEBHELPER#
diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules
index 5e91c4c..1965264 100755
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ override_dh_auto_configure:
--libexecdir=\$${prefix}/lib/policykit-1
override_dh_auto_test:
- # the system D-BUS tests can't work on the buildds, so don't let a
- # failed test fail the build
- make check || true
+ # on buildds we can't rely on actually having a system bus
+ dbus-run-session -- sh -c 'DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS=$$DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS make check'
override_dh_makeshlibs:
dh_makeshlibs -Xusr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/polkit-1/
@@ -36,8 +35,8 @@ override_dh_shlibdeps:
dh_shlibdeps
dh_girepository
-override_dh_install:
- dh_install
+override_dh_install-arch:
+ dh_install -a
# on Debian use sudo group; on Ubuntu, also allow the admin group for
# historical reasons
if dpkg-vendor --is ubuntu; then \
diff --git a/debian/shlibs.local b/debian/shlibs.local
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fbda1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shlibs.local
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+libpolkit-agent-1 0 libpolkit-agent-1-0 (= ${binary:Version})
+libpolkit-backend-1 0 libpolkit-backend-1-0 (= ${binary:Version})
+libpolkit-gobject-1 0 libpolkit-gobject-1-0 (= ${binary:Version})
--- End Message ---