Bug#779793: unblock: gnupg/1.4.18-7
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Please unblock gnupg. It fixes CVE-2015-1607, CVE-2015-1606,
CVE-2015-0837 and CVE-2014-3591.
unblock gnupg/1.4.18-7
debdiff:
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/changelog gnupg-1.4.18/debian/changelog
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/changelog 2014-12-04 21:58:21.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/changelog 2015-03-02 19:30:21.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+gnupg (1.4.18-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * import a series of DoS and vulnerabilities from upstream, including
+ CVE-2014-3591
+
+ -- Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Mon, 02 Mar 2015 19:29:26 +0100
+
gnupg (1.4.18-6) unstable; urgency=medium
* revert to debhelper 7
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0019-gpg-release-DEK-soon-after-its-use.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0019-gpg-release-DEK-soon-after-its-use.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0019-gpg-release-DEK-soon-after-its-use.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0019-gpg-release-DEK-soon-after-its-use.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From da66ad5bba4215b9ddd0cb927a89aa75355632aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 17:41:56 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 19/45] gpg: release DEK soon after its use.
+
+* g10/keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Release DEK soon.
+
+--
+
+This fixes the out_of_core error in the test case of adding
+RSA-4096 subkey to RSA-4096 primary key with configuration:
+
+ s2k-cipher-algo S10
+
+Debian-bug-id: 772780
+---
+ g10/keygen.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
+index 9020908..5af0043 100644
+--- a/g10/keygen.c
++++ b/g10/keygen.c
+@@ -3447,6 +3447,7 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+
+ rc = do_create (algo, nbits, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
+ dek, s2k, &sub_sk, timestamp, expire, 1 );
++ xfree( dek );
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = write_keybinding (pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk,
+ use, timestamp);
+@@ -3463,7 +3464,6 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+ if( rc )
+ log_error(_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ xfree( passphrase );
+- xfree( dek );
+ xfree( s2k );
+ /* release the copy of the (now unprotected) secret keys */
+ if( pri_sk )
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0020-scd-fix-get_public_key-for-OpenPGPcard-v1.0.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0020-scd-fix-get_public_key-for-OpenPGPcard-v1.0.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0020-scd-fix-get_public_key-for-OpenPGPcard-v1.0.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0020-scd-fix-get_public_key-for-OpenPGPcard-v1.0.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 3ca1f4098c70d322658cfaaa0d12164e6ac6d5ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joshua Rogers <git@internot.info>
+Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 11:38:53 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 20/45] scd: fix get_public_key for OpenPGPcard v1.0.
+
+* scd/app-openpgp.c (get_public_key): correctly close 'fp' upon use.
+
+--
+
+Inside the get_public_key function, 'fp' was opened using popen, but
+incorrectly closed using fclose.
+
+Debian-Bug-Id: 773474
+---
+ g10/app-openpgp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/app-openpgp.c b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+index a3a977b..b51d418 100644
+--- a/g10/app-openpgp.c
++++ b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ get_public_key (app_t app, int keyno)
+ }
+
+ err = retrieve_key_material (fp, hexkeyid, &m, &mlen, &e, &elen);
+- fclose (fp);
++ pclose (fp);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("error while retrieving key material through pipe: %s\n",
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0021-scd-Fix-possibly-inhibited-checkpin-of-the-admin-pin.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0021-scd-Fix-possibly-inhibited-checkpin-of-the-admin-pin.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0021-scd-Fix-possibly-inhibited-checkpin-of-the-admin-pin.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0021-scd-Fix-possibly-inhibited-checkpin-of-the-admin-pin.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From c83e250ef36c28a275de74d96e89898e9f99cb1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 20:08:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 21/45] scd: Fix possibly inhibited checkpin of the admin pin.
+
+* scd/app-openpgp.c (do_check_pin): Do not check a byte of a released
+buffer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+---
+ g10/app-openpgp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/app-openpgp.c b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+index b51d418..c3b4fae 100644
+--- a/g10/app-openpgp.c
++++ b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+@@ -3497,7 +3497,7 @@ do_check_pin (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+ log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n"));
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+ }
+- else if (value[6] < 3)
++ else if (count < 3)
+ {
+ log_info (_("verification of Admin PIN is currently prohibited "
+ "through this command\n"));
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0022-gpg-Fix-possible-read-of-unallocated-memory.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0022-gpg-Fix-possible-read-of-unallocated-memory.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0022-gpg-Fix-possible-read-of-unallocated-memory.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0022-gpg-Fix-possible-read-of-unallocated-memory.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From aab282855ada8dddee99c777c91829344e91f31a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 10:41:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 22/45] gpg: Fix possible read of unallocated memory
+
+* g10/parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Check content length
+before calling can_handle_critical_notation.
+--
+
+The problem was found by Jan Bee and gniibe proposed the used fix.
+Thanks.
+
+This bug can't be exploited: Only if the announced length of the
+notation is 21 or 32 a memcmp against fixed strings using that length
+would be done. The compared data is followed by the actual signature
+and thus it is highly likely that not even read of unallocated memory
+will happen. Nevertheless such a bug needs to be fixed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+---
+ g10/parse-packet.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
+index 01600e4..e4e524c 100644
+--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
++++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
+@@ -1123,10 +1123,13 @@ can_handle_critical( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type )
+ switch( type )
+ {
+ case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+- if(n>=8)
+- return can_handle_critical_notation(buffer+8,(buffer[4]<<8)|buffer[5]);
+- else
+- return 0;
++ if (n >= 8)
++ {
++ size_t notation_len = ((buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]);
++ if (n - 8 >= notation_len)
++ return can_handle_critical_notation (buffer + 8, notation_len);
++ }
++ return 0;
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0023-doc-Fix-memory-leak-in-yat2m.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0023-doc-Fix-memory-leak-in-yat2m.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0023-doc-Fix-memory-leak-in-yat2m.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0023-doc-Fix-memory-leak-in-yat2m.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From e2e822d22526c1545e095bc24173b732137f5737 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 12:44:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 23/45] doc: Fix memory leak in yat2m.
+
+* doc/yat2m.c (write_th): Free NAME.
+--
+
+Reported-by: Joshua Rogers <git@internot.info>
+---
+ doc/yat2m.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/doc/yat2m.c b/doc/yat2m.c
+index f780952..86c3c70 100644
+--- a/doc/yat2m.c
++++ b/doc/yat2m.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ write_th (FILE *fp)
+ *p++ = 0;
+ fprintf (fp, ".TH %s %s %s \"%s\" \"%s\"\n",
+ name, p, isodatestring (), opt_release, opt_source);
++ free (name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0024-avoid-future-chance-of-using-uninitialized-memory.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0024-avoid-future-chance-of-using-uninitialized-memory.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0024-avoid-future-chance-of-using-uninitialized-memory.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0024-avoid-future-chance-of-using-uninitialized-memory.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From e7cbce8fb2b7417fd1048f916b3e3281f5b9dd7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:53:36 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 24/45] avoid future chance of using uninitialized memory
+
+* util/iobuf.c: (iobuf_open): initialize len
+
+--
+
+Cherry-pick 367b073ab5f439ccf0750461d10c69f36998bd62.
+
+In iobuf_open, IOBUFCTRL_DESC and IOBUFCTRL_INIT commands are invoked
+(via file_filter()) on fcx, passing in a pointer to an uninitialized
+len.
+
+With these two commands, file_filter doesn't actually do anything with
+the value of len, so there's no actual risk of use of uninitialized
+memory in the code as it stands.
+
+However, some static analysis tools might flag this situation with a
+warning, and initializing the value doesn't hurt anything, so i think
+this trivial cleanup is warranted.
+
+Debian-Bug-Id: 773469
+---
+ util/iobuf.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/iobuf.c b/util/iobuf.c
+index 35de020..a330460 100644
+--- a/util/iobuf.c
++++ b/util/iobuf.c
+@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ iobuf_open( const char *fname )
+ IOBUF a;
+ FILEP_OR_FD fp;
+ file_filter_ctx_t *fcx;
+- size_t len;
++ size_t len = 0;
+ int print_only = 0;
+ int fd;
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0029-Use-ciphertext-blinding-for-Elgamal-decryption.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0029-Use-ciphertext-blinding-for-Elgamal-decryption.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0029-Use-ciphertext-blinding-for-Elgamal-decryption.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0029-Use-ciphertext-blinding-for-Elgamal-decryption.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From ff53cf06e966dce0daba5f2c84e03ab9db2c3c8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 16:15:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/45] Use ciphertext blinding for Elgamal decryption.
+
+* cipher/elgamal.c (USE_BLINDING): New.
+(decrypt): Rewrite to use ciphertext blinding.
+--
+
+CVE-id: CVE-2014-3591
+
+As a countermeasure to a new side-channel attacks on sliding windows
+exponentiation we blind the ciphertext for Elgamal decryption. This
+is similar to what we are doing with RSA.
+
+Unfortunately, the performance impact of Elgamal blinding is quite
+noticeable: For a 3072 bit Elgamal key the decryption used to take
+13ms; with the blinding it takes 24ms. This has been measured using
+time(1), calling gpg with a 100 byte message, and having gpg modified
+to run the pubkey_decrypt function 100 times and finally scale the
+result (using an i5-2410M CPU @ 2.30GHz TP 220).
+---
+ cipher/elgamal.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
+index 5143ecc..2ec5217 100644
+--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
++++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ #include "elgamal.h"
+
++/* Blinding is used to mitigate side-channel attacks. You may undef
++ this to speed up the operation in case the system is secured
++ against physical and network mounted side-channel attacks. */
++#define USE_BLINDING 1
++
+ typedef struct {
+ MPI p; /* prime */
+ MPI g; /* group generator */
+@@ -372,25 +377,55 @@ do_encrypt(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
+ static void
+ decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+ {
+- MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
++ MPI t1, t2, r;
++ unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p);
++
++ mpi_normalize (a);
++ mpi_normalize (b);
++
++ t1 = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_nlimb_hint_from_nbits (nbits));
++#ifdef USE_BLINDING
++
++ t2 = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_nlimb_hint_from_nbits (nbits));
++ r = mpi_alloc (mpi_nlimb_hint_from_nbits (nbits));
++
++ /* We need a random number of about the prime size. The random
++ number merely needs to be unpredictable; thus we use level 0. */
++ randomize_mpi (r, nbits, 0);
++
++ /* t1 = r^x mod p */
++ mpi_powm (t1, r, skey->x, skey->p);
++ /* t2 = (a * r)^-x mod p */
++ mpi_mulm (t2, a, r, skey->p);
++ mpi_powm (t2, t2, skey->x, skey->p);
++ mpi_invm (t2, t2, skey->p);
++ /* t1 = (t1 * t2) mod p*/
++ mpi_mulm (t1, t1, t2, skey->p);
+
+- mpi_normalize (a);
+- mpi_normalize (b);
++ mpi_free (r);
++ mpi_free (t2);
++
++#else /*!USE_BLINDING*/
++
++ /* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
++ mpi_powm (t1, a, skey->x, skey->p);
++ mpi_invm (t1, t1, skey->p);
++
++#endif /*!USE_BLINDING*/
++
++ mpi_mulm (output, b, t1, skey->p);
+
+- /* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
+- mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
+- mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
+- mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
+ #if 0
+- if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+- log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
+- log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
+- log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
+- log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
+- log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
++ if (DBG_CIPHER)
++ {
++ log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
++ log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
++ log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
++ log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
++ log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
+ }
+ #endif
+- mpi_free(t1);
++ mpi_free (t1);
+ }
+
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0032-gpg-Limit-the-size-of-key-packets-to-a-sensible-valu.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0032-gpg-Limit-the-size-of-key-packets-to-a-sensible-valu.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0032-gpg-Limit-the-size-of-key-packets-to-a-sensible-valu.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0032-gpg-Limit-the-size-of-key-packets-to-a-sensible-valu.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 27d7addccf782d5cb0084cb17522d712d4a6d6b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:27 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 32/45] gpg: Limit the size of key packets to a sensible value.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* g10/parse-packet.c (MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
+(MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
+(MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
+(MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
+(parse_key): Limit the size of a key packet to 256k.
+(parse_user_id): Use macro for the packet size limit.
+(parse_attribute): Ditto.
+(parse_comment): Ditto.
+--
+
+Without that it is possible to force gpg to allocate large amounts of
+memory by using a bad encoded MPI. This would be an too easy DoS.
+Another way to mitigate would be to change the MPI read function to
+allocate memory dynamically while reading the MPI. However, that
+complicates and possibly slows down the code. A too large key packet
+is in any case a sign for broken data and thus gpg should not use it.
+
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck
+GnuPG-bug-id: 1823
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+(back ported from commit 382ba4b137b42d5f25a7e256bb7c053ee5ac7b64)
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/parse-packet.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
+index e4e524c..c0b6ad6 100644
+--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
++++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
+ #define MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS 16384
+ #endif
+
++/* Maximum length of packets to avoid excessive memory allocation. */
++#define MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH (256 * 1024)
++#define MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH ( 2 * 1024)
++#define MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH ( 64 * 1024)
++#define MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH ( 16 * 1024*1024)
++
+
+ static int mpi_print_mode;
+ static int list_mode;
+@@ -1663,6 +1669,13 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+ rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+ goto leave;
+ }
++ else if (pktlen > MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH) {
++ log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
++ if (list_mode)
++ fputs (":key packet: [too large]\n", listfp);
++ rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
++ goto leave;
++ }
+
+ timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+ if( is_v4 ) {
+@@ -2083,7 +2096,7 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+ allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
+ allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
+
+- if(pktlen>2048)
++ if (pktlen > MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH)
+ {
+ log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
+ iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+@@ -2152,6 +2165,19 @@ parse_attribute( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+ {
+ byte *p;
+
++ (void)pkttype;
++
++ /* We better cap the size of an attribute packet to make DoS not
++ too easy. 16MB should be more then enough for one attribute
++ packet (ie. a photo). */
++ if (pktlen > MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH) {
++ log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
++ if (list_mode)
++ fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: [too large]\n");
++ iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
++ return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
++ }
++
+ #define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
+ packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id
+ + EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
+@@ -2186,7 +2212,7 @@ parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+ overflow in the malloc below. Comment packets are actually not
+ anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our
+ private comment packet. */
+- if (pktlen>65536)
++ if (pktlen > MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH)
+ {
+ log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
+ iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0033-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-due-to-empty-ring-trust-packets.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0033-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-due-to-empty-ring-trust-packets.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0033-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-due-to-empty-ring-trust-packets.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0033-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-due-to-empty-ring-trust-packets.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 2e8db53854506572e9d5b5908e143b5ca28f30f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:28 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 33/45] gpg: Fix a NULL-deref due to empty ring trust packets.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Always allocate a packet.
+--
+
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+(back ported from commit 39978487863066e59bb657f5fe4e8baab510da7e)
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/parse-packet.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
+index c0b6ad6..e7e923b 100644
+--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
++++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
+@@ -2245,11 +2245,13 @@ parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt )
+ {
+ int c;
+
++ (void)pkttype;
++
++ pkt->pkt.ring_trust = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt->pkt.ring_trust );
+ if (pktlen)
+ {
+ c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+ pktlen--;
+- pkt->pkt.ring_trust = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt->pkt.ring_trust );
+ pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = c;
+ pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
+ if (!c && pktlen==1)
+@@ -2267,8 +2269,10 @@ parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt )
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- if( list_mode )
+- fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n");
++ pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = 0;
++ pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
++ if (list_mode)
++ fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n");
+ }
+ iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
+ }
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0034-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-in-export-due-to-invalid-packet.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0034-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-in-export-due-to-invalid-packet.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0034-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-in-export-due-to-invalid-packet.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0034-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-in-export-due-to-invalid-packet.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 68f260f77a9e4f5cacf0a58e4f55ddee125d3f00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:29 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 34/45] gpg: Fix a NULL-deref in export due to invalid packet
+ lengths.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* g10/build-packet.c (write_fake_data): Take care of a NULL stored as
+opaque MPI.
+--
+
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
+
+(back ported from commit 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f)
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/build-packet.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
+index abe0181..499dd68 100644
+--- a/g10/build-packet.c
++++ b/g10/build-packet.c
+@@ -193,7 +193,8 @@ write_fake_data( IOBUF out, MPI a )
+ void *p;
+
+ p = mpi_get_opaque( a, &i );
+- iobuf_write( out, p, i );
++ if (p)
++ iobuf_write( out, p, i );
+ }
+ }
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0035-gpg-Prevent-an-invalid-memory-read-using-a-garbled-k.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0035-gpg-Prevent-an-invalid-memory-read-using-a-garbled-k.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0035-gpg-Prevent-an-invalid-memory-read-using-a-garbled-k.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0035-gpg-Prevent-an-invalid-memory-read-using-a-garbled-k.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 81d3e541326e94d26a953aa70afc3cb149d11ebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:30 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 35/45] gpg: Prevent an invalid memory read using a garbled
+ keyring.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Whitelist allowed packet
+types.
+--
+
+The keyring DB code did not reject packets which don't belong into a
+keyring. If for example the keyblock contains a literal data packet
+it is expected that the processing code stops at the data packet and
+reads from the input stream which is referenced from the data packets.
+Obviously the keyring processing code does not and cannot do that.
+However, when exporting this messes up the IOBUF and leads to an
+invalid read of sizeof (int).
+
+We now skip all packets which are not allowed in a keyring.
+
+Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
+
+(back ported from commit f0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648)
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/keyring.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/keyring.c b/g10/keyring.c
+index 108e107..270bf8e 100644
+--- a/g10/keyring.c
++++ b/g10/keyring.c
+@@ -400,8 +400,26 @@ keyring_get_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb)
+ rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
+ break;
+ }
+- if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) {
+- log_error ("skipped compressed packet in keyring\n");
++
++ /* Filter allowed packets. */
++ switch (pkt->pkttype){
++ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
++ case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
++ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
++ case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
++ case PKT_USER_ID:
++ case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
++ case PKT_SIGNATURE:
++ break; /* Allowed per RFC. */
++ case PKT_RING_TRUST:
++ case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
++ case PKT_COMMENT:
++ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
++ break; /* Allowed by us. */
++
++ default:
++ log_error ("skipped packet of type %d in keyring\n",
++ (int)pkt->pkttype);
+ free_packet(pkt);
+ init_packet(pkt);
+ continue;
+@@ -467,7 +485,7 @@ keyring_get_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb)
+ if (rc || !ret_kb)
+ release_kbnode (keyblock);
+ else {
+- /*(duplicated form the loop body)*/
++ /*(duplicated from the loop body)*/
+ if ( pkt && pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST
+ && lastnode
+ && lastnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0036-doc-Change-remaining-http-links-to-gnupg.org-to-http.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0036-doc-Change-remaining-http-links-to-gnupg.org-to-http.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0036-doc-Change-remaining-http-links-to-gnupg.org-to-http.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0036-doc-Change-remaining-http-links-to-gnupg.org-to-http.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 7106165fd3161b614445d459df3b333d557d9d02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:31 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 36/45] doc: Change remaining http links to gnupg.org to https
+
+--
+GnuPG-bug-id: 1830
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ doc/gpg.texi | 2 +-
+ g10/misc.c | 4 ++--
+ g10/sig-check.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
+index 7d08756..67dc3d0 100644
+--- a/doc/gpg.texi
++++ b/doc/gpg.texi
+@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ useful for debugging.
+ Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
+ an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
+ see the Card HOWTO at
+-http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .
++https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .
+
+ @item --card-status
+ @opindex card-status
+diff --git a/g10/misc.c b/g10/misc.c
+index 68b4cea..60ecf96 100644
+--- a/g10/misc.c
++++ b/g10/misc.c
+@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ md5_digest_warn (int show)
+ log_info (_("WARNING: digest algorithm %s is deprecated\n"),
+ digest_algo_to_string (DIGEST_ALGO_MD5));
+ log_info (_("please see %s for more information\n"),
+- "http://www.gnupg.org/faq/weak-digest-algos.html";);
++ "https://gnupg.org/faq/weak-digest-algos.html";);
+ warned = 1;
+ }
+ }
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ not_in_gpg1_notice (void)
+ {
+ log_info (_("NOTE: This feature is not available in %s\n"), "GnuPG 1.x");
+ log_info (_("please see %s for more information\n"),
+- "http://www.gnupg.org/faq/features-not-in-gnupg-1.html";);
++ "https://gnupg.org/faq/features-not-in-gnupg-1.html";);
+ warned = 1;
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
+index d6bbb92..b7709c1 100644
+--- a/g10/sig-check.c
++++ b/g10/sig-check.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ signature_check2( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
+ log_info(_("WARNING: signing subkey %s is not"
+ " cross-certified\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+ log_info(_("please see %s for more information\n"),
+- "http://www.gnupg.org/faq/subkey-cross-certify.html";);
++ "https://gnupg.org/faq/subkey-cross-certify.html";);
+ /* --require-cross-certification makes this warning an
+ error. TODO: change the default to require this
+ after more keys have backsigs. */
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0037-Use-inline-functions-to-convert-buffer-data-to-scala.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0037-Use-inline-functions-to-convert-buffer-data-to-scala.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0037-Use-inline-functions-to-convert-buffer-data-to-scala.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0037-Use-inline-functions-to-convert-buffer-data-to-scala.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,741 @@
+From 57af33d9e7c9b20b413b96882e670e75a67a5e65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:32 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 37/45] Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* include/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
+(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
+(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
+--
+
+This fixes sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
+with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that almost all uses
+of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to use an inline
+function from host2net.h.
+
+(back ported from commit 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392)
+
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/apdu.c | 27 ++++++++----------
+ g10/app-openpgp.c | 3 +-
+ g10/build-packet.c | 6 ++--
+ g10/ccid-driver.c | 3 +-
+ g10/getkey.c | 17 ++++++------
+ g10/keygen.c | 14 ++++------
+ g10/keyid.c | 28 ++++++++-----------
+ g10/misc.c | 11 --------
+ g10/parse-packet.c | 41 ++++++++++++++--------------
+ g10/tdbio.c | 22 +++++++--------
+ g10/trustdb.c | 2 +-
+ include/host2net.h | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 12 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/apdu.c b/g10/apdu.c
+index 66cf30b..ffc7d36 100644
+--- a/g10/apdu.c
++++ b/g10/apdu.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ #include "scdaemon.h"
+ #include "exechelp.h"
+ #endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
++#include "../include/host2net.h"
+
+ #include "apdu.h"
+ #include "ccid-driver.h"
+@@ -916,15 +917,14 @@ pcsc_get_status_wrapped (int slot, unsigned int *status)
+ i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
++ len = buf32_to_size_t (msgbuf+1);
+ if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+ len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+- err = PCSC_ERR_MASK ((msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16)
+- | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8]);
++ err = PCSC_ERR_MASK (buf32_to_ulong (msgbuf+5));
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("pcsc_status failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+@@ -1084,15 +1084,14 @@ pcsc_send_apdu_wrapped (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+ i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
++ len = buf32_to_size_t (msgbuf+1);
+ if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+ len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+- err = PCSC_ERR_MASK ((msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16)
+- | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8]);
++ err = PCSC_ERR_MASK (buf32_to_ulong (msgbuf+5));
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("pcsc_transmit failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+@@ -1217,15 +1216,14 @@ close_pcsc_reader_wrapped (int slot)
+ i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
++ len = buf32_to_size_t (msgbuf+1);
+ if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+ len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+- err = PCSC_ERR_MASK ((msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16)
+- | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8]);
++ err = PCSC_ERR_MASK (buf32_to_ulong (msgbuf+5));
+ if (err)
+ log_error ("pcsc_close failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+ pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+@@ -1405,7 +1403,7 @@ reset_pcsc_reader_wrapped (int slot)
+ i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
++ len = buf32_to_size_t (msgbuf+1);
+ if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+@@ -1419,8 +1417,7 @@ reset_pcsc_reader_wrapped (int slot)
+ sw = SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- err = PCSC_ERR_MASK ((msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16)
+- | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8]);
++ err = PCSC_ERR_MASK (buf32_to_ulong (msgbuf+5));
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("PC/SC RESET failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+@@ -1719,7 +1716,7 @@ open_pcsc_reader_wrapped (const char *portstr)
+ i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
++ len = buf32_to_size_t (msgbuf+1);
+ if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+@@ -1732,8 +1729,8 @@ open_pcsc_reader_wrapped (const char *portstr)
+ (unsigned long)len);
+ goto command_failed;
+ }
+- err = PCSC_ERR_MASK ((msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16)
+- | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8]);
++ err = PCSC_ERR_MASK (buf32_to_ulong (msgbuf+5));
++
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("PC/SC OPEN failed: %s\n", pcsc_error_string (err));
+diff --git a/g10/app-openpgp.c b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+index c3b4fae..192680c 100644
+--- a/g10/app-openpgp.c
++++ b/g10/app-openpgp.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
+ #include "iso7816.h"
+ #include "app-common.h"
+ #include "tlv.h"
++#include "../include/host2net.h"
+
+
+ /* A table describing the DOs of the card. */
+@@ -744,7 +745,7 @@ send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword,
+ char numbuf1[50], numbuf2[50];
+ unsigned long value;
+
+- value = (stamp[0] << 24) | (stamp[1]<<16) | (stamp[2]<<8) | stamp[3];
++ value = buf32_to_ulong (stamp);
+ if (!value)
+ return;
+ sprintf (numbuf1, "%d", number);
+diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
+index 499dd68..60eb3c8 100644
+--- a/g10/build-packet.c
++++ b/g10/build-packet.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include "memory.h"
+ #include "i18n.h"
+ #include "options.h"
++#include "../include/host2net.h"
+
+ static int do_user_id( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_user_id *uid );
+ static int do_public_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk );
+@@ -586,8 +587,7 @@ delete_sig_subpkt (subpktarea_t *area, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype )
+ if( n == 255 ) {
+ if( buflen < 4 )
+ break;
+- n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+- | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
++ n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
+ buffer += 4;
+ buflen -= 4;
+ }
+@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
+ /* This should never happen since we don't currently allow
+ creating such a subpacket, but just in case... */
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+- if(buffer_to_u32(buffer)+sig->timestamp<=make_timestamp())
++ if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer) + sig->timestamp <= make_timestamp())
+ sig->flags.expired=1;
+ else
+ sig->flags.expired=0;
+diff --git a/g10/ccid-driver.c b/g10/ccid-driver.c
+index 8c362d7..515b15a 100644
+--- a/g10/ccid-driver.c
++++ b/g10/ccid-driver.c
+@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
+ #include <usb.h>
+
+ #include "ccid-driver.h"
++#include "../include/host2net.h"
+
+ #define DRVNAME "ccid-driver: "
+
+@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ static int abort_cmd (ccid_driver_t handle, int seqno);
+ static unsigned int
+ convert_le_u32 (const unsigned char *buf)
+ {
+- return buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24);
++ return buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | ((unsigned int)buf[3] << 24);
+ }
+
+
+diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
+index 3c953d6..9870710 100644
+--- a/g10/getkey.c
++++ b/g10/getkey.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include "trustdb.h"
+ #include "i18n.h"
+ #include "keyserver-internal.h"
++#include "../include/host2net.h"
+
+ #define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
+ #define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
+@@ -1427,14 +1428,14 @@ merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
+ if( pk ) {
+- ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
++ ed = p? pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p):0;
+ if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+ pk->expiredate = ed;
+ sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+- ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
++ ed = p? sk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p):0;
+ if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+ sk->expiredate = ed;
+ sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+@@ -1559,8 +1560,8 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
+
+ /* ditto for the key expiration */
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+- if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
+- uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
++ if( p && buf32_to_u32 (p) )
++ uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buf32_to_u32(p);
+ else
+ uid->help_key_expire = 0;
+
+@@ -1774,9 +1775,9 @@ merge_selfsigs_main(KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked, struct revoke_info *rinfo)
+ key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+- if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
++ if( p && buf32_to_u32 (p) )
+ {
+- key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
++ key_expire = keytimestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
+ key_expire_seen = 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -2198,8 +2199,8 @@ merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
+ subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+- if ( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
+- key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
++ if ( p && buf32_to_u32 (p) )
++ key_expire = keytimestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
+ else
+ key_expire = 0;
+ subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
+diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
+index 995ba63..76ee74e 100644
+--- a/g10/keygen.c
++++ b/g10/keygen.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include "i18n.h"
+ #include "cardglue.h"
+ #include "keyserver-internal.h"
++#include "host2net.h"
+
+ #define MAX_PREFS 30
+
+@@ -832,10 +833,7 @@ make_backsig (PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+ }
+ else if(buf[1]==255)
+ {
+- pktlen =buf[2] << 24;
+- pktlen|=buf[3] << 16;
+- pktlen|=buf[4] << 8;
+- pktlen|=buf[5];
++ pktlen = buf32_to_size_t (buf+2);
+ buf+=6;
+ }
+ else
+@@ -852,14 +850,14 @@ make_backsig (PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+- pktlen =buf[mark++] << 24;
+- pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 16;
++ pktlen = (size_t)buf[mark++] << 24;
++ pktlen |= buf[mark++] << 16;
+
+ case 1:
+- pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 8;
++ pktlen |= buf[mark++] << 8;
+
+ case 0:
+- pktlen|=buf[mark++];
++ pktlen |= buf[mark++];
+ }
+
+ buf+=mark;
+diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
+index d7072d4..ed30cff 100644
+--- a/g10/keyid.c
++++ b/g10/keyid.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "mpi.h"
+ #include "keydb.h"
+ #include "i18n.h"
++#include "host2net.h"
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_UNSIGNED_TIME_T
+ # define INVALID_TIME_CHECK(a) ((a) == (time_t)(-1))
+@@ -241,15 +242,8 @@ keystr_from_desc(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc)
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+- keyid[0] = (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[12] << 24
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[13] << 16
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[14] << 8
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[15] ;
+- keyid[1] = (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[16] << 24
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[17] << 16
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[18] << 8
+- | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[19] ;
+-
++ keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (desc->u.fpr+12);
++ keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (desc->u.fpr+16);
+ return keystr(keyid);
+ }
+
+@@ -300,8 +294,8 @@ keyid_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
+ if(md)
+ {
+ dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+- keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+- keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
++ keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12);
++ keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16);
+ lowbits = keyid[1];
+ md_close(md);
+ sk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+@@ -354,8 +348,8 @@ keyid_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
+ if(md)
+ {
+ dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+- keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+- keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
++ keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12);
++ keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16);
+ lowbits = keyid[1];
+ md_close(md);
+ pk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+@@ -398,8 +392,8 @@ keyid_from_fingerprint( const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid )
+ }
+ else {
+ const byte *dp = fprint;
+- keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+- keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
++ keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12);
++ keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16);
+ }
+
+ return keyid[1];
+@@ -687,8 +681,8 @@ fingerprint_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len )
+ if( !array )
+ array = xmalloc( len );
+ memcpy(array, dp, len );
+- pk->keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+- pk->keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
++ pk->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12);
++ pk->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16);
+ md_close(md);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/g10/misc.c b/g10/misc.c
+index 60ecf96..2c5c6cc 100644
+--- a/g10/misc.c
++++ b/g10/misc.c
+@@ -295,17 +295,6 @@ checksum_mpi( MPI a )
+ return csum;
+ }
+
+-u32
+-buffer_to_u32( const byte *buffer )
+-{
+- unsigned long a;
+- a = *buffer << 24;
+- a |= buffer[1] << 16;
+- a |= buffer[2] << 8;
+- a |= buffer[3];
+- return a;
+-}
+-
+ void
+ print_pubkey_algo_note( int algo )
+ {
+diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
+index e7e923b..862ec6e 100644
+--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
++++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include "options.h"
+ #include "main.h"
+ #include "i18n.h"
++#include "host2net.h"
+
+ #ifndef MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS
+ #define MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS 16384
+@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static unsigned short
+ read_16(IOBUF inp)
+ {
+ unsigned short a;
+- a = iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
++ a = (unsigned short)iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
+ a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+ return a;
+ }
+@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ static unsigned long
+ read_32(IOBUF inp)
+ {
+ unsigned long a;
+- a = iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 24;
++ a = (unsigned long)iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 24;
+ a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 16;
+ a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
+ a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+@@ -383,7 +384,8 @@ parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t *retpos,
+ }
+ else if( c == 255 )
+ {
+- pktlen = (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 24;
++ pktlen =
++ (unsigned long)(hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 24;
+ pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 16;
+ pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 8;
+ if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 )
+@@ -878,14 +880,15 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
+ switch( type ) {
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+ if( length >= 4 )
+- fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
++ fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s",
++ strtimestamp (buf32_to_u32(buffer)) );
+ break;
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+ if( length >= 4 )
+ {
+- if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
++ if(buf32_to_u32(buffer))
+ fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
+- strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
++ strtimevalue( buf32_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+ else
+ fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
+ }
+@@ -918,9 +921,9 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
+ case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
+ if( length >= 4 )
+ {
+- if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
++ if(buf32_to_u32(buffer))
+ fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
+- strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
++ strtimevalue( buf32_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+ else
+ fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
+ }
+@@ -943,8 +946,8 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
+ case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
+ if( length >= 8 )
+ fprintf (listfp, "issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
+- (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer),
+- (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer+4) );
++ buf32_to_ulong (buffer),
++ buf32_to_ulong (buffer+4));
+ break;
+ case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+ {
+@@ -1192,8 +1195,7 @@ enum_sig_subpkt( const subpktarea_t *pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+ if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
+ if( buflen < 4 )
+ goto too_short;
+- n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+- | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
++ n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
+ buffer += 4;
+ buflen -= 4;
+ }
+@@ -1415,7 +1417,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL );
+ if(p)
+- sig->timestamp = buffer_to_u32(p);
++ sig->timestamp = buf32_to_u32 (p);
+ else if(!(sig->pubkey_algo>=100 && sig->pubkey_algo<=110)
+ && opt.verbose)
+ log_info ("signature packet without timestamp\n");
+@@ -1423,16 +1425,16 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER, NULL );
+ if(p)
+ {
+- sig->keyid[0] = buffer_to_u32(p);
+- sig->keyid[1] = buffer_to_u32(p+4);
++ sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p);
++ sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p+4);
+ }
+ else if(!(sig->pubkey_algo>=100 && sig->pubkey_algo<=110)
+ && opt.verbose)
+ log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");
+
+ p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL);
+- if(p && buffer_to_u32(p))
+- sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+buffer_to_u32(p);
++ if(p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
++ sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
+ if(sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate<=make_timestamp())
+ sig->flags.expired=1;
+
+@@ -2032,9 +2034,8 @@ parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid)
+ if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
+ if( buflen < 4 )
+ goto too_short;
+- n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+- | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
+- buffer += 4;
++ n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
++ buffer += 4;
+ buflen -= 4;
+ }
+ else if( n >= 192 ) { /* 2 byte special encoded length header */
+diff --git a/g10/tdbio.c b/g10/tdbio.c
+index f109dde..403b608 100644
+--- a/g10/tdbio.c
++++ b/g10/tdbio.c
+@@ -1219,13 +1219,13 @@ tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
+ rec->r.ver.trust_model = *p++;
+ rec->r.ver.min_cert_level = *p++;
+ p += 2;
+- rec->r.ver.created = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+- rec->r.ver.nextcheck = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.ver.created = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.ver.nextcheck = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ p += 4;
+ p += 4;
+- rec->r.ver.firstfree =buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.ver.firstfree =buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ p += 4;
+- rec->r.ver.trusthashtbl =buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.ver.trusthashtbl =buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ if( recnum ) {
+ log_error( _("%s: version record with recnum %lu\n"), db_name,
+ (ulong)recnum );
+@@ -1238,17 +1238,17 @@ tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
+ }
+ break;
+ case RECTYPE_FREE:
+- rec->r.free.next = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.free.next = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ break;
+ case RECTYPE_HTBL:
+ for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD; i++ ) {
+- rec->r.htbl.item[i] = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.htbl.item[i] = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RECTYPE_HLST:
+- rec->r.hlst.next = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.hlst.next = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+- rec->r.hlst.rnum[i] = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.hlst.rnum[i] = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RECTYPE_TRUST:
+@@ -1257,12 +1257,12 @@ tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
+ rec->r.trust.depth = *p++;
+ rec->r.trust.min_ownertrust = *p++;
+ p++;
+- rec->r.trust.validlist = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.trust.validlist = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ break;
+ case RECTYPE_VALID:
+ memcpy( rec->r.valid.namehash, p, 20); p+=20;
+ rec->r.valid.validity = *p++;
+- rec->r.valid.next = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
++ rec->r.valid.next = buf32_to_ulong (p); p += 4;
+ rec->r.valid.full_count = *p++;
+ rec->r.valid.marginal_count = *p++;
+ break;
+@@ -1570,7 +1570,7 @@ migrate_from_v2 ()
+ ottable_size += 1000;
+ ottable = xrealloc (ottable, ottable_size * sizeof *ottable);
+ }
+- ottable[ottable_used].keyrecno = buftoulong (oldbuf+6);
++ ottable[ottable_used].keyrecno = buf32_to_ulong (oldbuf+6);
+ ottable[ottable_used].ot = oldbuf[18];
+ ottable[ottable_used].okay = 0;
+ memset (ottable[ottable_used].fpr,0, 20);
+diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
+index a541106..e4317e2 100644
+--- a/g10/trustdb.c
++++ b/g10/trustdb.c
+@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
+ u32 expire;
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
+- expire = p? sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p) : 0;
++ expire = p? sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p) : 0;
+
+ if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
+ {
+diff --git a/include/host2net.h b/include/host2net.h
+index fe0ec41..ecb00dc 100644
+--- a/include/host2net.h
++++ b/include/host2net.h
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+-/* host2net.h - Some macros
+- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++/* host2net.h - Endian conversion macros
++ * Copyright (C) 1998, 2014, 2015 Werner Koch
+ *
+ * This file is part of GNUPG.
+ *
+@@ -17,14 +17,11 @@
+ * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+-#ifndef G10_HOST2NET_H
+-#define G10_HOST2NET_H
++#ifndef GNUPG_COMMON_HOST2NET_H
++#define GNUPG_COMMON_HOST2NET_H
+
+ #include "types.h"
+
+-#define buftoulong( p ) ((*(byte*)(p) << 24) | (*((byte*)(p)+1)<< 16) | \
+- (*((byte*)(p)+2) << 8) | (*((byte*)(p)+3)))
+-#define buftoushort( p ) ((*((byte*)(p)) << 8) | (*((byte*)(p)+1)))
+ #define ulongtobuf( p, a ) do { \
+ ((byte*)p)[0] = a >> 24; \
+ ((byte*)p)[1] = a >> 16; \
+@@ -35,8 +32,71 @@
+ ((byte*)p)[0] = a >> 8; \
+ ((byte*)p)[1] = a ; \
+ } while(0)
+-#define buftou32( p) buftoulong( (p) )
+-#define u32tobuf( p, a) ulongtobuf( (p), (a) )
+
+
+-#endif /*G10_HOST2NET_H*/
++static inline unsigned long
++buf16_to_ulong (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((unsigned long)p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
++}
++
++static inline unsigned int
++buf16_to_uint (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((unsigned int)p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
++}
++
++static inline unsigned short
++buf16_to_ushort (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((unsigned short)p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
++}
++
++static inline u16
++buf16_to_u16 (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((u16)p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
++}
++
++static inline size_t
++buf32_to_size_t (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((size_t)p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
++}
++
++static inline unsigned long
++buf32_to_ulong (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((unsigned long)p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
++}
++
++static inline unsigned int
++buf32_to_uint (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((unsigned int)p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
++}
++
++static inline u32
++buf32_to_u32 (const void *buffer)
++{
++ const unsigned char *p = buffer;
++
++ return (((u32)p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
++}
++
++
++#endif /*GNUPG_COMMON_HOST2NET_H*/
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0039-curl-shim-clean-up-varargs.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0039-curl-shim-clean-up-varargs.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0039-curl-shim-clean-up-varargs.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0039-curl-shim-clean-up-varargs.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 2b2f2767851eccb12e591c7a3fa432e6bf9db8f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:35 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 39/45] curl-shim: clean up varargs
+
+* keyserver/curl-shim.c (curl_easy_setopt) : ensure that va_end is
+ called.
+
+--
+
+stdarg(3) says:
+ Each invocation of va_start() must be matched by a
+ corresponding invocation of va_end() in the same function.
+
+Observed by Joshua Rogers <honey@internot.info>
+
+Debian-Bug-Id: #773475
+
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ keyserver/curl-shim.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/keyserver/curl-shim.c b/keyserver/curl-shim.c
+index ce510cb..72c0f04 100644
+--- a/keyserver/curl-shim.c
++++ b/keyserver/curl-shim.c
+@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ curl_easy_setopt(CURL *curl,CURLoption option,...)
+ break;
+ }
+
++ va_end(ap);
++
+ return handle_error(curl,CURLE_OK,NULL);
+ }
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0041-gpg-Fix-segv-due-to-NULL-value-stored-as-opaque-MPI.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0041-gpg-Fix-segv-due-to-NULL-value-stored-as-opaque-MPI.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0041-gpg-Fix-segv-due-to-NULL-value-stored-as-opaque-MPI.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0041-gpg-Fix-segv-due-to-NULL-value-stored-as-opaque-MPI.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From 6f032181ba78c5eeb14f9aab4307a75bbaf0b115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:10:37 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 41/45] gpg: Fix segv due to NULL value stored as opaque MPI
+
+* g10/build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Check for NULL return from
+gcry_mpi_get_opaque.
+* g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Ditto.
+--
+
+This is a backport of 76c8122adfed0f0f443cce7bda702ba2b39661b3 from
+master to the STABLE-BRANCH-1-4
+
+On the STABLE-BRANCH-1-4, we may also want to patch g10/seckey-cert.c,
+but that has not been done in this patch.
+
+This fix extends commmit 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f.
+
+ gpg2 --export --no-default-keyring --keyring TESTDATA
+
+With TESTDATA being below after unpacking.
+
+-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
+
+mBMEhdkMmS8BcX8F//8F5voEhQAQmBMEnAAAZwAAo4D/f/8EhQAAAIAEnP8EhQAQ
+iBMEnP8AAAAABf8jIID///8EhQYQmBMEnIUAEIgTBKT/AAAAAAUAACCA/f//BIUA
+EJgTBJx/AP8ABPPzBJx/AP8ABPPz
+=2yE0
+-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
+
+Reported-by: Jodie Cunningham
+[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+---
+ g10/build-packet.c | 6 ++++--
+ g10/keyid.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
+index 60eb3c8..028d064 100644
+--- a/g10/build-packet.c
++++ b/g10/build-packet.c
+@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+
+ assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[npkey] ) );
+ p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[npkey], &ndata );
+- iobuf_write(a, p, ndata );
++ if (p)
++ iobuf_write(a, p, ndata );
+ }
+ else if( sk->is_protected ) {
+ /* The secret key is protected te old v4 way. */
+@@ -366,7 +367,8 @@ do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+
+ assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
+ p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
+- iobuf_write (a, p, ndata);
++ if (p)
++ iobuf_write (a, p, ndata);
+ }
+ write_16(a, sk->csum );
+ }
+diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
+index ed30cff..a86ac94 100644
+--- a/g10/keyid.c
++++ b/g10/keyid.c
+@@ -112,13 +112,17 @@ hash_public_key( MD_HANDLE md, PKT_public_key *pk )
+ md_putc( md, pk->pubkey_algo );
+
+ if(npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0] && mpi_is_opaque(pk->pkey[0]))
+- md_write(md,pp[0],nn[0]);
++ {
++ if (pp[0])
++ md_write(md,pp[0],nn[0]);
++ }
+ else
+ for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
+ {
+ md_putc( md, nb[i]>>8);
+ md_putc( md, nb[i] );
+- md_write( md, pp[i], nn[i] );
++ if (pp[i])
++ md_write( md, pp[i], nn[i] );
+ xfree(pp[i]);
+ }
+ }
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0042-Protect-against-NULL-return-of-mpi_get_opaque.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0042-Protect-against-NULL-return-of-mpi_get_opaque.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0042-Protect-against-NULL-return-of-mpi_get_opaque.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0042-Protect-against-NULL-return-of-mpi_get_opaque.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From e0c13ad5f290aec05706797b8f6c9e13d613eb66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 11:04:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 42/45] Protect against NULL return of mpi_get_opaque.
+
+* g10/seckey-cert.c (do_check): Call BUG for NULL return of
+get_opaque.
+--
+
+This is the suggested addition from commit 6f03218. We better run
+into an fatal error than into a segv.
+
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+---
+ g10/seckey-cert.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
+index cad4e63..4edd74e 100644
+--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
++++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
+@@ -91,8 +91,12 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
+ u16 csumc = 0;
+
+ i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+- assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
+- p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
++ if (!mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]))
++ p = NULL;
++ else
++ p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
++ if (!p)
++ BUG ();
+ if ( ndata > 1 )
+ csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
+ data = xmalloc_secure( ndata );
+@@ -169,9 +173,12 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
+ byte *p;
+ unsigned int ndata;
+
+- assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
+- p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
+- assert (ndata >= 2);
++ if (!mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]))
++ p = NULL;
++ else
++ p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
++ if (!p || !(ndata >= 2))
++ BUG ();
+ assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
+ buffer = xmalloc_secure (ndata);
+ cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0043-doc-Add-warning-note-about-not-acting-as-an-oracle-t.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0043-doc-Add-warning-note-about-not-acting-as-an-oracle-t.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0043-doc-Add-warning-note-about-not-acting-as-an-oracle-t.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0043-doc-Add-warning-note-about-not-acting-as-an-oracle-t.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 6186637cc9a4cbe4964ae0ca2aa00ed1738fc6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 13:10:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 43/45] doc: Add warning note about not acting as an oracle to
+ --batch.
+
+--
+---
+ doc/gpg.texi | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
+index 67dc3d0..d311732 100644
+--- a/doc/gpg.texi
++++ b/doc/gpg.texi
+@@ -949,12 +949,23 @@ Try to be as quiet as possible.
+ @opindex batch
+ @opindex no-batch
+ Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
+-@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
+-filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
+-STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
+-detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
+-do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
+-@file{/dev/null}.
++@option{--no-batch} disables this option. This option is commonly
++used for unattended operations.
++
++WARNING: Unattended operation bears a higher risk of being exposed to
++security attacks. In particular any unattended use of GnuPG which
++involves the use of secret keys should take care not to provide an
++decryption oracle. There are several standard pre-cautions against
++being used as an oracle. For example never return detailed error
++messages or any diagnostics printed by your software to the remote
++site. Consult with an expert in case of doubt.
++
++Note that even with a filename given on the command line, gpg might
++still need to read from STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the
++input is a detached signature and no data file has been specified).
++Thus if you do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect
++STDIN to @file{/dev/null}.
++
+
+ @item --no-tty
+ @opindex no-tty
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0044-mpi-Avoid-data-dependent-timing-variations-in-mpi_po.patch gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0044-mpi-Avoid-data-dependent-timing-variations-in-mpi_po.patch
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0044-mpi-Avoid-data-dependent-timing-variations-in-mpi_po.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/0044-mpi-Avoid-data-dependent-timing-variations-in-mpi_po.patch 2015-03-02 18:47:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+From 6cbc75e71295f23431c4ab95edc7573f2fc28476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:00:05 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 44/45] mpi: Avoid data-dependent timing variations in
+ mpi_powm.
+
+* include/mpi.h, mpi/mpiutils.c (mpi_set_cond): New.
+* mpi/mpi-pow.c (SIZE_PRECOMP): Rename from SIZE_B_2I3.
+(mpi_powm): Access all data in the table and use mpi_set_cond.
+
+--
+
+Access to the precomputed table was indexed by a portion of EXPO,
+which could be mounted by a side channel attack. This change fixes
+this particular data-dependent access pattern.
+---
+ include/mpi.h | 1 +
+ mpi/mpi-pow.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ mpi/mpiutil.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/mpi.h b/include/mpi.h
+index a027d2a..a4c16f5 100644
+--- a/include/mpi.h
++++ b/include/mpi.h
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void *mpi_get_opaque( MPI a, unsigned int *len );
+ void mpi_set_secure( MPI a );
+ void mpi_clear( MPI a );
+ void mpi_set( MPI w, MPI u);
++void mpi_set_cond( MPI w, MPI u, unsigned long set);
+ void mpi_set_ui( MPI w, ulong u);
+ MPI mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u);
+ void mpi_m_check( MPI a );
+diff --git a/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+index 1c3fadb..7f23a5a 100644
+--- a/mpi/mpi-pow.c
++++ b/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ mul_mod (mpi_ptr_t xp, mpi_size_t *xsize_p,
+ *xsize_p = rsize + ssize;
+ }
+
+-#define SIZE_B_2I3 ((1 << (5 - 1)) - 1)
++#define SIZE_PRECOMP ((1 << (5 - 1)))
+
+ /****************
+ * RES = BASE ^ EXPO mod MOD
+@@ -375,11 +375,12 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+ mpi_ptr_t bp_marker = NULL;
+ mpi_ptr_t ep_marker = NULL;
+ mpi_ptr_t xp_marker = NULL;
+- mpi_ptr_t b_2i3[SIZE_B_2I3]; /* Pre-computed array: BASE^3, ^5, ^7, ... */
+- mpi_size_t b_2i3size[SIZE_B_2I3];
++ mpi_ptr_t precomp[SIZE_PRECOMP]; /* Pre-computed array: BASE^1, ^3, ^5, ... */
++ mpi_size_t precomp_size[SIZE_PRECOMP];
+ mpi_size_t W;
+ mpi_ptr_t base_u;
+ mpi_size_t base_u_size;
++ mpi_size_t max_u_size;
+
+ esize = expo->nlimbs;
+ msize = mod->nlimbs;
+@@ -493,7 +494,7 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+
+ /* Main processing. */
+ {
+- mpi_size_t i, j;
++ mpi_size_t i, j, k;
+ mpi_ptr_t xp;
+ mpi_size_t xsize;
+ int c;
+@@ -507,33 +508,29 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+ memset( &karactx, 0, sizeof karactx );
+ negative_result = (ep[0] & 1) && bsign;
+
+- /* Precompute B_2I3[], BASE^(2 * i + 3), BASE^3, ^5, ^7, ... */
++ /* Precompute PRECOMP[], BASE^(2 * i + 1), BASE^1, ^3, ^5, ... */
+ if (W > 1) /* X := BASE^2 */
+ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, bp, bsize, bp, bsize, mp, msize, &karactx);
+- for (i = 0; i < (1 << (W - 1)) - 1; i++)
+- { /* B_2I3[i] = BASE^(2 * i + 3) */
+- if (i == 0)
+- {
+- base_u = bp;
+- base_u_size = bsize;
+- }
+- else
+- {
+- base_u = b_2i3[i-1];
+- base_u_size = b_2i3size[i-1];
+- }
+-
++ base_u = precomp[0] = mpi_alloc_limb_space (bsize, esec);
++ base_u_size = max_u_size = precomp_size[0] = bsize;
++ MPN_COPY (precomp[0], bp, bsize);
++ for (i = 1; i < (1 << (W - 1)); i++)
++ { /* PRECOMP[i] = BASE^(2 * i + 1) */
+ if (xsize >= base_u_size)
+ mul_mod (rp, &rsize, xp, xsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+ mp, msize, &karactx);
+ else
+ mul_mod (rp, &rsize, base_u, base_u_size, xp, xsize,
+ mp, msize, &karactx);
+- b_2i3[i] = mpi_alloc_limb_space (rsize, esec);
+- b_2i3size[i] = rsize;
+- MPN_COPY (b_2i3[i], rp, rsize);
++ base_u = precomp[i] = mpi_alloc_limb_space (rsize, esec);
++ base_u_size = precomp_size[i] = rsize;
++ if (max_u_size < base_u_size)
++ max_u_size = base_u_size;
++ MPN_COPY (precomp[i], rp, rsize);
+ }
+
++ base_u = mpi_alloc_limb_space (max_u_size, esec);
++
+ i = esize - 1;
+
+ /* Main loop.
+@@ -619,17 +616,26 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+ rsize = xsize;
+ }
+
+- if (e0 == 0)
++ /*
++ * base_u <= precomp[e0]
++ * base_u_size <= precomp_size[e0];
++ */
++ base_u_size = 0;
++ for (k = 0; k < (1<< (W - 1)); k++)
+ {
+- base_u = bp;
+- base_u_size = bsize;
++ struct gcry_mpi w, u;
++ w.alloced = w.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ u.alloced = u.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ w.nbits = w.nlimbs * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
++ u.nbits = u.nlimbs * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
++ w.sign = u.sign = 0;
++ w.flags = u.flags = 0;
++ w.d = base_u;
++ u.d = precomp[k];
++
++ mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == e0);
++ base_u_size |= (precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == e0)) );
+ }
+- else
+- {
+- base_u = b_2i3[e0 - 1];
+- base_u_size = b_2i3size[e0 -1];
+- }
+-
+ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+ mp, msize, &karactx);
+ tp = rp; rp = xp; xp = tp;
+@@ -655,15 +661,21 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+
+ if (e != 0)
+ {
+- if ((e>>1) == 0)
+- {
+- base_u = bp;
+- base_u_size = bsize;
+- }
+- else
++ base_u_size = 0;
++ for (k = 0; k < (1<< (W - 1)); k++)
+ {
+- base_u = b_2i3[(e>>1) - 1];
+- base_u_size = b_2i3size[(e>>1) -1];
++ struct gcry_mpi w, u;
++ w.alloced = w.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ u.alloced = u.nlimbs = precomp_size[k];
++ w.nbits = w.nlimbs * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
++ u.nbits = u.nlimbs * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
++ w.sign = u.sign = 0;
++ w.flags = u.flags = 0;
++ w.d = base_u;
++ u.d = precomp[k];
++
++ mpi_set_cond (&w, &u, k == (e>>1));
++ base_u_size |= (precomp_size[k] & ((mpi_size_t)0 - (k == (e>>1))) );
+ }
+
+ mul_mod (xp, &xsize, rp, rsize, base_u, base_u_size,
+@@ -713,8 +725,9 @@ mpi_powm (MPI res, MPI base, MPI expo, MPI mod)
+ MPN_NORMALIZE (rp, rsize);
+
+ mpihelp_release_karatsuba_ctx (&karactx );
+- for (i = 0; i < (1 << (W - 1)) - 1; i++)
+- mpi_free_limb_space (b_2i3[i]);
++ for (i = 0; i < (1 << (W - 1)); i++)
++ mpi_free_limb_space (precomp[i]);
++ mpi_free_limb_space (base_u);
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup for negative results. */
+diff --git a/mpi/mpiutil.c b/mpi/mpiutil.c
+index 3a1d71f..8b2071a 100644
+--- a/mpi/mpiutil.c
++++ b/mpi/mpiutil.c
+@@ -433,6 +433,34 @@ mpi_set( MPI w, MPI u)
+
+
+ void
++mpi_set_cond( MPI w, MPI u, unsigned long set)
++{
++ mpi_size_t i;
++ mpi_size_t nlimbs = u->alloced;
++ mpi_limb_t mask = ((mpi_limb_t)0) - !!set;
++ mpi_limb_t x;
++
++ if (w->alloced != u->alloced)
++ log_bug ("mpi_set_cond: different sizes\n");
++
++ for (i = 0; i < nlimbs; i++)
++ {
++ x = mask & (w->d[i] ^ u->d[i]);
++ w->d[i] = w->d[i] ^ x;
++ }
++
++ x = mask & (w->nlimbs ^ u->nlimbs);
++ w->nlimbs = w->nlimbs ^ x;
++
++ x = mask & (w->nbits ^ u->nbits);
++ w->nbits = w->nbits ^ x;
++
++ x = mask & (w->sign ^ u->sign);
++ w->sign = w->sign ^ x;
++}
++
++
++void
+ mpi_set_ui( MPI w, unsigned long u)
+ {
+ RESIZE_IF_NEEDED(w, 1);
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -Nru gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/series gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/series
--- gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/series 2014-12-04 21:55:41.000000000 +0100
+++ gnupg-1.4.18/debian/patches/series 2015-03-02 19:25:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -19,3 +19,21 @@
0018-gpg-Fix-use-of-uninit.value-in-listing-sig-subpkts.patch
0015-gpg-Make-the-use-of-verify-FILE-for-detached-sigs-ha.patch
sync-docs-with-upstream.patch
+0019-gpg-release-DEK-soon-after-its-use.patch
+0020-scd-fix-get_public_key-for-OpenPGPcard-v1.0.patch
+0021-scd-Fix-possibly-inhibited-checkpin-of-the-admin-pin.patch
+0022-gpg-Fix-possible-read-of-unallocated-memory.patch
+0023-doc-Fix-memory-leak-in-yat2m.patch
+0024-avoid-future-chance-of-using-uninitialized-memory.patch
+0029-Use-ciphertext-blinding-for-Elgamal-decryption.patch
+0032-gpg-Limit-the-size-of-key-packets-to-a-sensible-valu.patch
+0033-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-due-to-empty-ring-trust-packets.patch
+0034-gpg-Fix-a-NULL-deref-in-export-due-to-invalid-packet.patch
+0035-gpg-Prevent-an-invalid-memory-read-using-a-garbled-k.patch
+0036-doc-Change-remaining-http-links-to-gnupg.org-to-http.patch
+0037-Use-inline-functions-to-convert-buffer-data-to-scala.patch
+0039-curl-shim-clean-up-varargs.patch
+0041-gpg-Fix-segv-due-to-NULL-value-stored-as-opaque-MPI.patch
+0042-Protect-against-NULL-return-of-mpi_get_opaque.patch
+0043-doc-Add-warning-note-about-not-acting-as-an-oracle-t.patch
+0044-mpi-Avoid-data-dependent-timing-variations-in-mpi_po.patch
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 8.0
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Foreign Architectures: i386
Kernel: Linux 3.16.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=de_DE.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=de_DE.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
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