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Bug#702288: marked as done (unblock: openafs/1.6.1-3)



Your message dated Mon, 04 Mar 2013 19:57:10 +0000
with message-id <1362427030.19822.8.camel@jacala.jungle.funky-badger.org>
and subject line Re: Bug#702288: unblock: openafs/1.6.1-3
has caused the Debian Bug report #702288,
regarding unblock: openafs/1.6.1-3
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this
message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system
misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact owner@bugs.debian.org
immediately.)


-- 
702288: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=702288
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock

I'm sure you'll notice this anyway, but to save the effort of finding it
via an audit of new uploads with high urgency....

Please unblock package openafs for an upstream security fix.  The security
update for stable is in progress.  Changelog:

  * Apply upstream security patches:
    - OPENAFS-SA-2013-001: Fix fileserver buffer overflow when parsing
      client-supplied ACL entries and protect against client parsing of
      bad ACL entries.  (CVE-2013-1794)
    - OPENAFS-SA-2013-002: Fix ptserver buffer overflow via integer
      overflow in the IdToName RPC.  (CVE-2013-1795)

unblock openafs/1.6.1-3

-- System Information:
Debian Release: 7.0
  APT prefers testing
  APT policy: (990, 'testing'), (500, 'unstable'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: i386 (i686)

Kernel: Linux 3.2.0-4-686-pae (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
diff -Nru openafs-1.6.1/debian/changelog openafs-1.6.1/debian/changelog
--- openafs-1.6.1/debian/changelog	2012-08-21 17:12:01.000000000 -0700
+++ openafs-1.6.1/debian/changelog	2013-03-04 11:17:06.000000000 -0800
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+openafs (1.6.1-3) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * Apply upstream security patches:
+    - OPENAFS-SA-2013-001: Fix fileserver buffer overflow when parsing
+      client-supplied ACL entries and protect against client parsing of
+      bad ACL entries.  (CVE-2013-1794)
+    - OPENAFS-SA-2013-002: Fix ptserver buffer overflow via integer
+      overflow in the IdToName RPC.  (CVE-2013-1795)
+
+ -- Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>  Mon, 04 Mar 2013 11:17:02 -0800
+
 openafs (1.6.1-2) unstable; urgency=low
 
   * Translation updates:
diff -Nru openafs-1.6.1/debian/patches/debian-changes openafs-1.6.1/debian/patches/debian-changes
--- openafs-1.6.1/debian/patches/debian-changes	2012-08-21 17:14:42.000000000 -0700
+++ openafs-1.6.1/debian/patches/debian-changes	2013-03-04 11:20:37.000000000 -0800
@@ -30,3 +30,116 @@
      case $KVERS in
      2.4*)
          echo arm_linux24
+--- openafs-1.6.1.orig/src/ptserver/ptprocs.c
++++ openafs-1.6.1/src/ptserver/ptprocs.c
+@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ idToName(struct rx_call *call, idlist *a
+     size = aid->idlist_len;
+     if (size == 0)
+ 	return 0;
+-    if (size < 0)
++    if (size < 0 || size > INT_MAX / PR_MAXNAMELEN)
+ 	return PRTOOMANY;
+     aname->namelist_val = (prname *) malloc(size * PR_MAXNAMELEN);
+     aname->namelist_len = 0;
+--- openafs-1.6.1.orig/src/venus/fs.c
++++ openafs-1.6.1/src/venus/fs.c
+@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ EmptyAcl(char *astr)
+     tp->nplus = tp->nminus = 0;
+     tp->pluslist = tp->minuslist = 0;
+     tp->dfs = 0;
+-    sscanf(astr, "%d dfs:%d %s", &junk, &tp->dfs, tp->cell);
++    sscanf(astr, "%d dfs:%d %1024s", &junk, &tp->dfs, tp->cell);
+     return tp;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ ParseAcl(char *astr)
+     ta = (struct Acl *)malloc(sizeof(struct Acl));
+     assert(ta);
+     ta->dfs = 0;
+-    sscanf(astr, "%d dfs:%d %s", &ta->nplus, &ta->dfs, ta->cell);
++    sscanf(astr, "%d dfs:%d %1024s", &ta->nplus, &ta->dfs, ta->cell);
+     astr = SkipLine(astr);
+     sscanf(astr, "%d", &ta->nminus);
+     astr = SkipLine(astr);
+@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ ParseAcl(char *astr)
+     last = 0;
+     first = 0;
+     for (i = 0; i < nplus; i++) {
+-	sscanf(astr, "%100s %d", tname, &trights);
++	sscanf(astr, "%99s %d", tname, &trights);
+ 	astr = SkipLine(astr);
+ 	tl = (struct AclEntry *)malloc(sizeof(struct AclEntry));
+ 	assert(tl);
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ ParseAcl(char *astr)
+     last = 0;
+     first = 0;
+     for (i = 0; i < nminus; i++) {
+-	sscanf(astr, "%100s %d", tname, &trights);
++	sscanf(astr, "%99s %d", tname, &trights);
+ 	astr = SkipLine(astr);
+ 	tl = (struct AclEntry *)malloc(sizeof(struct AclEntry));
+ 	assert(tl);
+--- openafs-1.6.1.orig/src/libadmin/client/afs_clientAdmin.c
++++ openafs-1.6.1/src/libadmin/client/afs_clientAdmin.c
+@@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ afsclient_ACLEntryAdd(const char *direct
+      */
+ 
+     is_dfs =
+-	sscanf(old_acl_string, "%d dfs:%d %s", &cur_acl.nplus, &cur_acl.dfs,
++	sscanf(old_acl_string, "%d dfs:%d %1024s", &cur_acl.nplus, &cur_acl.dfs,
+ 	       cur_acl.cell);
+     ptr = strchr(old_acl_string, '\n');
+     ptr++;
+@@ -1567,7 +1567,7 @@ afsclient_ACLEntryAdd(const char *direct
+      */
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < (cur_acl.nplus + cur_acl.nminus); i++) {
+-	sscanf(ptr, "%s%d\n", cur_user, &cur_user_acl);
++	sscanf(ptr, "%63s%d\n", cur_user, &cur_user_acl);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Skip the entry for the user we are replacing/adding
+ 	 */
+--- openafs-1.6.1.orig/src/libacl/aclprocs.c
++++ openafs-1.6.1/src/libacl/aclprocs.c
+@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
+ #else
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #endif
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <rx/xdr.h>
+ #include <rx/rx.h>
+ #include <afs/ptclient.h>
+ #include <afs/ptuser.h>
+ #include "acl.h"
+-
+ #ifdef AFS_PTHREAD_ENV
+ #include <assert.h>
+ #include <pthread.h>
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ acl_Internalize_pr(int (*func)(namelist
+ 
+     if (sscanf(elist, "%d\n%d\n", &p, &n) != 2)
+ 	return -1;
+-    if (p + n > ACL_MAXENTRIES)
++    if (p < 0 || n < 0 || p > INT_MAX - n || p + n > ACL_MAXENTRIES)
+ 	return (-1);
+     acl_NewACL(p + n, acl);
+     (*acl)->total = p + n;
+@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ acl_Internalize_pr(int (*func)(namelist
+     nextc++;			/* now at the beginning of the entry list */
+     for (i = 0; i < (*acl)->positive; i++) {
+ 	int k;
+-	if (sscanf(nextc, "%s\t%d\n", lnames.namelist_val[i], &k) != 2) {
++	if (sscanf(nextc, "%63s\t%d\n", lnames.namelist_val[i], &k) != 2) {
+ 	    free(lnames.namelist_val);
+ 	    return (-1);
+ 	}
+@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ acl_Internalize_pr(int (*func)(namelist
+     for (i = (*acl)->total - 1; i >= (*acl)->total - (*acl)->negative;
+ 	 i--, j++) {
+ 	if (sscanf
+-	    (nextc, "%s\t%d\n", lnames.namelist_val[j],
++	    (nextc, "%63s\t%d\n", lnames.namelist_val[j],
+ 	     &((*acl)->entries[j].rights)) != 2) {
+ 	    free(lnames.namelist_val);
+ 	    return (-1);

--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
On Mon, 2013-03-04 at 11:41 -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
>   * Apply upstream security patches:
>     - OPENAFS-SA-2013-001: Fix fileserver buffer overflow when parsing
>       client-supplied ACL entries and protect against client parsing of
>       bad ACL entries.  (CVE-2013-1794)
>     - OPENAFS-SA-2013-002: Fix ptserver buffer overflow via integer
>       overflow in the IdToName RPC.  (CVE-2013-1795)

Unblocked; thanks.

Regards,

Adam

--- End Message ---

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