--- Begin Message ---
- To: Debian Bug Tracking System <submit@bugs.debian.org>
- Subject: unblock: openconnect/3.20-3 (Fixes CVE-2012-6128)
- From: Mike Miller <mtmiller@ieee.org>
- Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 13:12:25 -0500
- Message-id: <20130217181225.GA26301@xps14z.home.local>
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Dear Release Team,
Please unblock package openconnect, version 3.20-3 already uploaded to
unstable. This upload fixes RC bug #700794 (CVE-2012-6128), a
stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability.
The fix was made upstream and this change is a backport of that patch to
version 3.20. The debdiff is included below. Thanks in advance.
diffstat for openconnect-3.20 openconnect-3.20
changelog | 7 +
patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch | 281 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
patches/series | 1
3 files changed, 289 insertions(+)
diff -Nru openconnect-3.20/debian/changelog openconnect-3.20/debian/changelog
--- openconnect-3.20/debian/changelog 2012-06-06 08:54:48.000000000 -0400
+++ openconnect-3.20/debian/changelog 2013-02-17 12:25:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+openconnect (3.20-3) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * debian/patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch: Backport patch from upstream to fix
+ buffer overflow (CVE-2012-6128). (Closes: #700794)
+
+ -- Mike Miller <mtmiller@ieee.org> Sun, 17 Feb 2013 11:56:35 -0500
+
openconnect (3.20-2) unstable; urgency=low
* Depend on vpnc-scripts for routing and DNS configuration. (Closes:
diff -Nru openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch
--- openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/02_CVE-2012-6128.patch 2013-02-17 12:25:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+Origin: upstream, http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/commitdiff/26f752c3dbf69227679fc6bebb4ae071aecec491
+From: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@gmail.com>
+Subject: http: Fix overflow on HTTP request buffers
+
+A malicious VPN gateway can send a very long hostname/path (for redirects)
+or cookie list (in general), which OpenConnect will attempt to sprintf()
+into a fixed length buffer. Each HTTP server response line can add
+roughly MAX_BUF_LEN (131072) bytes to the next OpenConnect HTTP request,
+but the request buffer (buf) is capped at MAX_BUF_LEN bytes and is
+allocated on the stack.
+
+The result of passing a long "Location:" header looks like:
+
+ Attempting to connect to server 127.0.0.1:443
+ SSL negotiation with localhost
+ Server certificate verify failed: self signed certificate in certificate chain
+ Connected to HTTPS on localhost
+ GET https://localhost/
+ Got HTTP response: HTTP/1.0 301 Moved
+ Ignoring unknown HTTP response line 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
+ SSL negotiation with localhost
+ Server certificate verify failed: self signed certificate in certificate chain
+ Connected to HTTPS on localhost
+ *** buffer overflow detected ***: /scr/openconnect2/.libs/lt-openconnect terminated
+ ======= Backtrace: =========
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__fortify_fail+0x5c)[0x7fd62729b82c]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x109700)[0x7fd62729a700]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x108b69)[0x7fd627299b69]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(_IO_default_xsputn+0xdd)[0x7fd62720d13d]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(_IO_vfprintf+0x1ae7)[0x7fd6271db4a7]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__vsprintf_chk+0x94)[0x7fd627299c04]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__sprintf_chk+0x7d)[0x7fd627299b4d]
+ /scr/openconnect2/.libs/libopenconnect.so.2(openconnect_obtain_cookie+0xc0)[0x7fd62832d210]
+ /scr/openconnect2/.libs/lt-openconnect[0x40413f]
+ /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xed)[0x7fd6271b276d]
+ /scr/openconnect2/.libs/lt-openconnect[0x404579]
+
+The proposed fix is to use dynamically allocated buffers with overflow
+checking.
+
+--- a/http.c
++++ b/http.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+@@ -45,6 +46,85 @@ static int proxy_read(struct openconnect
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+ #define MAX_BUF_LEN 131072
++#define BUF_CHUNK_SIZE 4096
++
++struct oc_text_buf {
++ char *data;
++ int pos;
++ int buf_len;
++ int error;
++};
++
++static struct oc_text_buf *buf_alloc(void)
++{
++ return calloc(1, sizeof(struct oc_text_buf));
++}
++
++static void buf_append(struct oc_text_buf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ va_list ap;
++
++ if (!buf || buf->error)
++ return;
++
++ if (!buf->data) {
++ buf->data = malloc(BUF_CHUNK_SIZE);
++ if (!buf->data) {
++ buf->error = -ENOMEM;
++ return;
++ }
++ buf->buf_len = BUF_CHUNK_SIZE;
++ }
++
++ while (1) {
++ int max_len = buf->buf_len - buf->pos, ret;
++
++ va_start(ap, fmt);
++ ret = vsnprintf(buf->data + buf->pos, max_len, fmt, ap);
++ va_end(ap);
++ if (ret < 0) {
++ buf->error = -EIO;
++ break;
++ } else if (ret < max_len) {
++ buf->pos += ret;
++ break;
++ } else {
++ int new_buf_len = buf->buf_len + BUF_CHUNK_SIZE;
++
++ if (new_buf_len > MAX_BUF_LEN) {
++ /* probably means somebody is messing with us */
++ buf->error = -E2BIG;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ buf->data = realloc(buf->data, new_buf_len);
++ if (!buf->data) {
++ buf->error = -ENOMEM;
++ break;
++ }
++ buf->buf_len = new_buf_len;
++ }
++ }
++}
++
++static int buf_error(struct oc_text_buf *buf)
++{
++ return buf ? buf->error : -ENOMEM;
++}
++
++static int buf_free(struct oc_text_buf *buf)
++{
++ int error = buf_error(buf);
++
++ if (buf) {
++ if (buf->data)
++ free(buf->data);
++ free(buf);
++ }
++
++ return error;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We didn't really want to have to do this for ourselves -- one might have
+ * thought that it would be available in a library somewhere. But neither
+@@ -352,7 +432,7 @@ static int fetch_config(struct openconne
+ char *server_sha1)
+ {
+ struct vpn_option *opt;
+- char buf[MAX_BUF_LEN];
++ struct oc_text_buf *buf;
+ char *config_buf = NULL;
+ int result, buflen;
+ unsigned char local_sha1_bin[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+@@ -360,21 +440,26 @@ static int fetch_config(struct openconne
+ EVP_MD_CTX c;
+ int i;
+
+- sprintf(buf, "GET %s%s HTTP/1.1\r\n", fu, bu);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Accept: */*\r\n");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
++ buf = buf_alloc();
++ buf_append(buf, "GET %s%s HTTP/1.1\r\n", fu, bu);
++ buf_append(buf, "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
++ buf_append(buf, "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
++ buf_append(buf, "Accept: */*\r\n");
++ buf_append(buf, "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
+
+ if (vpninfo->cookies) {
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Cookie: ");
++ buf_append(buf, "Cookie: ");
+ for (opt = vpninfo->cookies; opt; opt = opt->next)
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "%s=%s%s", opt->option,
++ buf_append(buf, "%s=%s%s", opt->option,
+ opt->value, opt->next ? "; " : "\r\n");
+ }
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "X-Transcend-Version: 1\r\n\r\n");
++ buf_append(buf, "X-Transcend-Version: 1\r\n\r\n");
++
++ if (buf_error(buf))
++ return buf_free(buf);
+
+- SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, strlen(buf));
++ SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf->data, buf->pos);
++ buf_free(buf);
+
+ buflen = process_http_response(vpninfo, &result, NULL, &config_buf);
+ if (buflen < 0) {
+@@ -630,7 +715,7 @@ int internal_parse_url(char *url, char *
+ int openconnect_obtain_cookie(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
+ {
+ struct vpn_option *opt, *next;
+- char buf[MAX_BUF_LEN];
++ struct oc_text_buf *buf;
+ char *form_buf = NULL;
+ int result, buflen;
+ char request_body[2048];
+@@ -658,27 +743,26 @@ int openconnect_obtain_cookie(struct ope
+ *
+ * So we process the HTTP for ourselves...
+ */
+- sprintf(buf, "%s /%s HTTP/1.1\r\n", method, vpninfo->urlpath ?: "");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Accept: */*\r\n");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
++ buf = buf_alloc();
++ buf_append(buf, "%s /%s HTTP/1.1\r\n", method, vpninfo->urlpath ?: "");
++ buf_append(buf, "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
++ buf_append(buf, "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
++ buf_append(buf, "Accept: */*\r\n");
++ buf_append(buf, "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
+
+ if (vpninfo->cookies) {
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Cookie: ");
++ buf_append(buf, "Cookie: ");
+ for (opt = vpninfo->cookies; opt; opt = opt->next)
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "%s=%s%s", opt->option,
+- opt->value, opt->next ? "; " : "\r\n");
++ buf_append(buf, "%s=%s%s", opt->option,
++ opt->value, opt->next ? "; " : "\r\n");
+ }
+ if (request_body_type) {
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Content-Type: %s\r\n",
+- request_body_type);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Content-Length: %zd\r\n",
+- strlen(request_body));
++ buf_append(buf, "Content-Type: %s\r\n", request_body_type);
++ buf_append(buf, "Content-Length: %zd\r\n", strlen(request_body));
+ }
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "X-Transcend-Version: 1\r\n\r\n");
++ buf_append(buf, "X-Transcend-Version: 1\r\n\r\n");
+ if (request_body_type)
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "%s", request_body);
++ buf_append(buf, "%s", request_body);
+
+ if (vpninfo->port == 443)
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, "%s https://%s/%s\n";,
+@@ -689,7 +773,11 @@ int openconnect_obtain_cookie(struct ope
+ method, vpninfo->hostname, vpninfo->port,
+ vpninfo->urlpath ?: "");
+
+- result = openconnect_SSL_write(vpninfo, buf, strlen(buf));
++ if (buf_error(buf))
++ return buf_free(buf);
++
++ result = openconnect_SSL_write(vpninfo, buf->data, buf->pos);
++ buf_free(buf);
+ if (result < 0)
+ return result;
+
+@@ -1114,21 +1202,28 @@ static int process_socks_proxy(struct op
+ static int process_http_proxy(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int ssl_sock)
+ {
+ char buf[MAX_BUF_LEN];
++ struct oc_text_buf *reqbuf;
+ int buflen, result;
+
+- sprintf(buf, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n", vpninfo->hostname, vpninfo->port);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Connection: keep-alive\r\n");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
+- sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), "\r\n");
++ reqbuf = buf_alloc();
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n", vpninfo->hostname, vpninfo->port);
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "Host: %s\r\n", vpninfo->hostname);
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "User-Agent: %s\r\n", vpninfo->useragent);
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n");
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "Connection: keep-alive\r\n");
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n");
++ buf_append(reqbuf, "\r\n");
++
++ if (buf_error(reqbuf))
++ return buf_free(reqbuf);
+
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
+ _("Requesting HTTP proxy connection to %s:%d\n"),
+ vpninfo->hostname, vpninfo->port);
+
+- result = proxy_write(vpninfo, ssl_sock, (unsigned char *)buf, strlen(buf));
++ result = proxy_write(vpninfo, ssl_sock, (unsigned char *)reqbuf->data, reqbuf->pos);
++ buf_free(reqbuf);
++
+ if (result) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Sending proxy request failed: %s\n"),
diff -Nru openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/series openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/series
--- openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/series 2012-06-06 08:54:48.000000000 -0400
+++ openconnect-3.20/debian/patches/series 2013-02-17 12:25:52.000000000 -0500
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
01_man-vpnc-script-path.patch
+02_CVE-2012-6128.patch
--- End Message ---