Bug#639744: Compromised certificates for *.google.com issued by DigiNotar Root CA
On Tuesday 30 August 2011 15:48:11 Mike Hommey wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 09:58:18PM +0200, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> > On mar., 2011-08-30 at 12:29 -0500, Raphael Geissert wrote:
> > > What I can't tell for sure from the documentation is whether OpenSSL
> > > and GnuTLS do check the CRL's validity (signature and time.) It
> > > doesn't seem like they do.
> > > This is relevant if we were to ship them in ca-certificates.
Mike, without digging into the documentation I found this reference 
regarding NSS and its CRL support. Do you know if any of what is said on that
email has changed? namely how 'next update' dates are handled.
> > > Yves, do you know how the CRL stuff is handled in nss?
> > (my first name is Yves-Alexis :)
Oops, sorry. Please accept my apologies.
> That being said, there is a huge problem with mitigation in basically
> all the SSL libraries. There simply is no way to handle the current
> situation without modifying applications.
> 1. Several fraudulent certificates whose fingerprint is unknown signed
> with several different intermediate certs that are cross-signed by other
> "safe" CAs (aiui).
Oh. Well, first thing first, I've NMUed ca-certs to remove the DigiNotar Root CA
and will probably release a DSA with the change too (I'm afraid it will give a
false sense of security.)
What is to be done next should probably be discussed in -devel and have input
from external people.
Raphael Geissert - Debian Developer
www.debian.org - get.debian.net