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Bug#639744: Compromised certificates for *.google.com issued by DigiNotar Root CA

On Tuesday 30 August 2011 01:08:29 Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On lun., 2011-08-29 at 20:24 -0700, Josh Triplett wrote:
> > I understand that they'd have to manually load the lists, but perhaps it
> > would make sense to standardize a location from which they should load
> > them?  Does OpenSSL or GnuTLS have any concept of a "revocation store"
> > format, similar to a "certificate store", or would this need some
> > special-purpose custom format?

AFAIR they only know about CRL (Certificate Revocation List,) which only allows 
for one issuer per-file.

What I can't tell for sure from the documentation is whether OpenSSL and 
GnuTLS do check the CRL's validity (signature and time.) It doesn't seem like 
they do.
This is relevant if we were to ship them in ca-certificates.

> And it'd be nice if nss could share that store...
> By the way, shouldn't this bug be clone to libnss3-1d (and maybe
> iceweasel and icedove if they ship the certificates themselves)?

Perhaps it's time to start a discussion as to how we can properly deal with 
all this mess:
* Multiple packages shipping their own certificates list
* Probably no app except web browsers support CRLs and/or OCSP
* configuration

Yves, do you know how the CRL stuff is handled in nss?

Raphael Geissert - Debian Developer
www.debian.org - get.debian.net

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