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Let’s not make GRs with mixtures of 3:1 and 1:1 majority options anymore. (was: Re: Draft vote on constitutional issues)

Le Fri, May 01, 2009 at 10:49:48PM +0100, Matthew Johnson a écrit :
> As suggested [0] I think we should clarify these issues before any other
> votes. As such I'd like to suggest a draft for the vote.
> I'm proposing several options for a couple of reasons. Several of them I
> would rank above further discussion, but I also want to make sure that
> there is an option for everyone on here. I'm trying to clarify our
> current situation. Resolving the vote without such a clarification does
> not help this. You should all see an option below which you think is the
> Status quo, but I'm certain that not everyone agrees with which one, so,
> if you want the status quo, please vote for the option which describes
> it, not for further discussion. If you _can't_ see what you think is the
> status quo below, now is the time to point this out. (note, I'm not
> formally proposing this as a vote yet, but would like to fairly soon)
> Option 1 - No Supermajority
> Option 2 - All conflicting GR options require a Supermajority

[I lost the option 3]

> Option 4 - Balancing issues between users and freedom
> Option 5 - Temporary overrides without Supermajority
> Option 6 - Votes may modify or be a position statement, but must be explicit

Hi Matthew,

I think that it was a good idea (and a lot of work, thank you for that) to
prepare options that reflect the different opinion expressed in the previous
discussion, but I would recommend that each of them should be sponsored
separately, so that there is a chance to reduce the complexity of the ballot if
some do not manage to attract enough sponsors.

The biggest problem of the “Lenny release” vote – in my opinion – was the
mixture of supermajority and simple majority options. I am tempted to propose
another option, that would change the constitution so that supermajority
applies to whole votes and is decided at the beginning of the process. In short:

 - When proposing a GR, a DD announces if his proposition falls under §4.1.2 or
   §, and in that case the GR is a supermajority GR. His analysis can be
   challenged by other DDs, in which case the Secretary makes the final decision.

 - All options except FD need a 3:1 majority in supermajority GRs.

 - Amendments that fall under §4.1.2 or § can not be added to simple
   majority GRs (final decision to the Secretary in case of disagreements).

The rationale is the following:

 - If in a supermajority GR one option that does not fall under §4.1.2 or
   § gets most votes but the quorum is not reached, it is possible to
   run another GR.

 - If in a normal GR some DDs think that they have good chances to convince the
   other DDs that the problem can be solved by changing the Constitution of a
   Foundation Document, then they should be at least able to drive people voting
   FD for the non-supermajority GR, or better: convince the proposers to retract
   their GR and start a supermajority GR instead.

The obvious inconvenience is the risk of running two GRs instead of one, but
this has to be balanced with the benefit of never having a “Lenny GR” again,
where voting becomes very tactical. Note that in both scenarios above, the
first GR is a failure due to the lack of support to at least the original
option, and that it would be expected that GR proposers avoid to put themselves
in that embarassing situation.

If others are interested in the idea, I can draft a patch to the Constitution.

Have a nice day,

Charles Plessy
Tsurumi, Kanagawa, Japan

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