Re: Draft vote on constitutional issues
Matthew Johnson wrote:
As suggested [0] I think we should clarify these issues before any other
votes. As such I'd like to suggest a draft for the vote.
I'm proposing several options for a couple of reasons. Several of them I
would rank above further discussion, but I also want to make sure that
there is an option for everyone on here. I'm trying to clarify our
current situation. Resolving the vote without such a clarification does
not help this. You should all see an option below which you think is the
Status quo, but I'm certain that not everyone agrees with which one, so,
if you want the status quo, please vote for the option which describes
it, not for further discussion. If you _can't_ see what you think is the
status quo below, now is the time to point this out. (note, I'm not
formally proposing this as a vote yet, but would like to fairly soon)
I think trying to propose many options together is very wrong as you are
very probably not objective for all the options nor will you be able to
word it properly for the ones that do care about an option you don't
really care about.
The other risk you take by proposing many options at once is to mix
unrelated things in the same vote IMHO.
Option 1 - No Supermajority
We do not believe that we should require anything more than a simple
majority for any changes to the constitution or foundation documents.
- replace Constitution 4.1 point 2 with "Amend this constitution"
- in Constitution 4.1 point 5, point 3, remove "A Foundation Document
requires a 3:1 majority for its supersession. "
This option amends the constitution and hence requires a 3:1 majority.
I would be very surprised if this option would get enough seconds if you
would propose it.
Option 2 - All conflicting GR options require a Supermajority
We believe that any GR which has an option which overrides some or all
of a foundation document, even temporarily, implicitly modifies it to
contain this exception and thus requires a 3:1 majority
This all boils down to the definition of override which I tried to state
in the other thread. If you go by my definition, this is really a
non-option IMHO.
Option 4 - Balancing issues between users and freedom
We believe that there will be cases where the project must balance
between our priorities of our users and of Debian remaining 100% free.
Project decisions which make such a balance do not require a
Supermajority, but all others do
- Add Social Contract 6:
6. Works that our not 100% free but are required by our users.
We acknowledge that there may be occasions where it is not possible
to place the interests of our users first with purely free software.
As such, we may on occasion provide software which does not meet our
normal standards of freedom if it is necessary in the interests of
our users. In all cases we will work towards a free system where such
compromises are not necessary
- replace Constitution 4.1 point 5 with "Issue, supersede,
withdraw, amend and add exceptions to nontechnical policy
documents and statements."
- in Constitution 4.1 point 5 add point 4: "All GR options which
provide exceptions to a foundation document (temporary or
permanent) implicitly modify the document to contain that
exception and require a 3:1 majority"
Same remark as above.
This option amends the constitution and social contract and hence
requires a 3:1 majority.
This option does not look related to supermajority requirements to me.
Option 5 - Temporary overrides without Supermajority
We believe that GRs may temporarily override foundation documents
without requiring a 3:1 majority. Resolutions which are in conflict with
a foundation document and make a permanent change must modify the
foundation document and require a 3:1 majority
- replace Constitution 4.1 point 5 with "Issue, supersede,
withdraw, amend and add exceptions to nontechnical policy
documents and statements."
- in Constitution 4.1 point 5 add point 4: "All GR options which
provide permanent exceptions to a foundation document implicitly
modify the document to contain that exception and require
a 3:1 majority"
- in Constitution 4.1 point 5 add point 5: "All GR options which
provide temporary exceptions to a foundation document only require
a simple majority to pass.
This option amends the constitution and hence requires a 3:1 majority.
This boils down to the definition of override again...
Option 6 - Votes may modify or be a position statement, but must be explicit
We believe that any vote which overrides a Foundation Document modifies
it to contain that exception and must explicitly say so in the proposal
before the vote proceeds. Such overrides require a 3:1 majority.
This is already the case AFAICS
A GR which explicitly states that it does not override a Foundation
Document but instead offers a project interpretation of that Foundation
Document does not modify the document and therefore only requires a
simple majority. This is true even if the Secretary disagrees with the
interpretation. However, such interpretations are not binding on the
project.
This again boils down to the definition of override...
Cheers
Luk
PS: There is a reason why I send the mail about the definitions of the
terms even if Kurt as well as you seem to ignore it.
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