Re: Range Voting - the simpler better alternative to Condorcet voting
> It always amuses me how people pull out these examples close to
> Condorcet cycles as examples of strategy in Condorcet methods while
> ignoring the strategy issues in even simpler Range Voting elections
> that push it towards Approval-style voting.
Well (a) that wasn't *my* example, and (b) it wasn't cyclic! (It
looks like it was based on the idea that everyone thought C>B>A>X>D
except that the A supporters pulled A to the front of that list and
the B supporters pulled B to the front. That seems about as
non-cyclic as you can get.)
You make another point, which is interesting, but which actually when
carried to its logical conclusion ends up being in support of Range
Voting over Condorcet. If you continue with the logic asking what
happens when Range Voting voters vote strategically, you find that in
Range Voting where all voters are well informed of the opinions of the
electorate in general, and all voters cast optimal strategic ballots,
you get approval voting, which results in ... the winner being what
would have been the winner of a "100% honest" Condorcet election.
In other words, if you want to see the winner be whichever candidate
*would* have won an honest Condorcet election, you'd be better off
having a Range Voting election and encouraging people to vote
strategically. That is a strength of Range Voting, not a weakness.
--
Barak A. Pearlmutter
Hamilton Institute & Dept Comp Sci, NUI Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland
http://www.bcl.hamilton.ie/~barak/
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