# Re: Range Voting - the simpler better alternative to Condorcet voting

```"Barak A. Pearlmutter" writes:

> The example you give is a perfect instance of the DH3 problem.
>
> You have a population of voters whose true preferences are
>
>   31x  A>C>B>X>D
>   32x  B>C>A>X>D
>   37x  C>B>A>X>D

It always amuses me how people pull out these examples close to
Condorcet cycles as examples of strategy in Condorcet methods while
ignoring the strategy issues in even simpler Range Voting elections
that push it towards Approval-style voting.

Suppose that voters have true preferences of:

60x  A=60,B=40
40x  B=60,A=40

It only takes six of the second group to vote B=99,A=0 to change the
outcome, which is a major victory for the extreme supporters but a
loss for honest moderates.

Even using the full range for "serious" candidates does not solve
this.  In the five-candidate example above, if the most preferred
candidate is given 99 points and the least preferred three candidates
all get 0, the outcome is still quite susceptible to strategic scoring
of the second place candidate.

Michael Poole

```