According the social utility efficiency figures, it is substantially better - in all 720 different combinations of the 5 "knobs" he chose to tweak; from 0% strategy, to 100% strategic voters, few candidates, to many candidates, ignorant voters or informed voters. And Condorcet suffers much worse from strategic voting - especially considering things like the DH3 pathology. Range Voting handles strategic voting quite gracefully, such that its large advantage over Condorcet voting actually _increases_ with a more strategic electorate.
As for simplicity, it is pretty easy to show that Range Voting is objectively much simpler than Condorcet voting. Imagine the ease of writing a computer program to get the average of a set of ratings, as opposed to doing any type of Condorcet method. It is a demonstrable fact that the Range Voting program will be shorter.
And for voters, I do think that Range Voting is much simpler, and in some sense this is provable, especially the more candidates there are. Consider the process of going through a list of, say movies on IMDB.com, and rating them. This is rather simple, and the number of operations increases _linearly_ with increasing options ("candidates"). But in order to rank them properly, you are essentially doing a sort, making a very large number of comparisons, which increases exponentially with increasing candidates. Think about the number of comparisons required for a quicksort, and then realize that what most people do is actually more like a bubble sort - far less efficient. And Range Voting even allows voters to abstain for a candidate they do not know much about, without helping or hurting his average (it is not affected, but he must achieve a quorum of total points to be legitimate, regardless of his average). In Condorcet, you are effectively forced to rank all candidates, because any you do not rank must be treated as "tied for last place".
In some sense it does come down to personal preference as to what people "perceive" to be simple; but in any case, I don't think that its worth it to sacrifice the quality of the candidates elected in order to make an election _marginally_ simpler. And I actually did exit polling using Range Voting in Texas last November -
http://RangeVoting.org/Beaumont.html - and found that people had an easy time of it.
Also we must understand that the fundamental axiom of Condorcet voting is WRONG. That is what is so ironic about the differentiating factor in Condorcet methods - how they handle cyclic ambiguities. The fact that such an ambiguity can exist in the _first place_ proves that the axiom "if A is preferred by a majority over B, then A is a better winner" is wrong. Therefore the entire basis of Condorcet voting, that it aims for majoritarianism instead of social utility efficiency, is flawed.