A required change? Re: [linux-security] Re: kerneld and module security
On Mon, 29 Sep 1997 15:05:20 -0400 (EDT), Patrick Cantwell wrote:
Seems like a serious hole to me. I just changed the permissions on my box, and
think it it warrants debian to change policy regarding permissions and modules.
>On Sun, 28 Sep 1997, Aleph One wrote:
>
>(forwarded from linux-security@redhat.com)
>
><snip>
>
>> Corollary: Any module in /lib/modules can be loaded into kernel memory by
>> any user at any time. There are potential denial-of-service attacks
>> from autoprobes and device initialization all kinds of other goo that
>> I wish I didn't have to think about here.
>
>see Brian Mitchell's "hacked_setuid" module, that was released in phrack
>50, article 5 (along with his linspy terminal snooper program)..
>what this module does is redirect the setuid() call so you can become
>superuser using a magic number.
>just think, if you could load this module at will without being root, all
>you'd need to do is whip up some code that does setuid(magic_number) and
>spawns a shell!
>
>> Here are four alternative fixes:
>
>#5 make /usr/lib/modules root read/write only
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