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[SECURITY] [DLA 4066-1] fort-validator security update



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Debian LTS Advisory DLA-4066-1                debian-lts@lists.debian.org
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/                       Daniel Leidert
February 24, 2025                             https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
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Package        : fort-validator
Version        : 1.5.3-1~deb11u2
CVE ID         : CVE-2024-45234 CVE-2024-45235 CVE-2024-45236 CVE-2024-45237 
                 CVE-2024-45238 CVE-2024-45239 CVE-2024-48943

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in fort-validator, a RPKI
validator and RTR server.

CVE-2024-45234

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) an ROA or a Manifest containing
   a signedAttrs encoded in non-canonical form. This bypasses Fort's
   BER decoder, reaching a point in the code that panics when faced
   with data not encoded in DER. Because Fort is an RPKI Relying Party,
   a panic can lead to Route Origin Validation unavailability, which
   can lead to compromised routing.


CVE-2024-45235

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) a resource certificate
   containing an Authority Key Identifier extension that lacks the
   keyIdentifier field. Fort references this pointer without sanitizing
   it first. Because Fort is an RPKI Relying Party, a crash can lead to
   Route Origin Validation unavailability, which can lead to
   compromised routing.

CVE-2024-45236

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) a signed object containing an
   empty signedAttributes field. Fort accesses the set's elements
   without sanitizing it first. Because Fort is an RPKI Relying Party,
   a crash can lead to Route Origin Validation unavailability, which
   can lead to compromised routing.

CVE-2024-45237

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) a resource certificate
   containing a Key Usage extension composed of more than two bytes of
   data. Fort writes this string into a 2-byte buffer without properly
   sanitizing its length, leading to a buffer overflow.

CVE-2024-45238

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) a resource certificate
   containing a bit string that doesn't properly decode into a Subject
   Public Key. OpenSSL does not report this problem during parsing, and
   when compiled with OpenSSL libcrypto versions below 3, Fort
   recklessly dereferences the pointer. Because Fort is an RPKI Relying
   Party, a crash can lead to Route Origin Validation unavailability,
   which can lead to compromised routing.

CVE-2024-45239

   A malicious RPKI repository that descends from a (trusted) Trust
   Anchor can serve (via rsync or RRDP) an ROA or a Manifest containing
   a null eContent field. Fort dereferences the pointer without
   sanitizing it first. Because Fort is an RPKI Relying Party, a crash
   can lead to Route Origin Validation unavailability, which can lead
   to compromised routing.

CVE-2024-48943

   A malicious RPKI rsync repository can prevent Fort from finishing
   its validation run by drip-feeding its content. The delayed
   validation can lead to stale or unavailable Route Origin Validation.

For Debian 11 bullseye, these problems have been fixed in version
1.5.3-1~deb11u2.

We recommend that you upgrade your fort-validator packages.

For the detailed security status of fort-validator please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/fort-validator

Further information about Debian LTS security advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://wiki.debian.org/LTS

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