Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?
Raul Miller writes:
> On 5/17/05, Michael Poole <mdpoole@troilus.org> wrote:
>> > Further, you're claiming that violations of that license must
>> > be treated by the court as conduct within the scope of that
>> > contract.
>> >
>> > Further, you're claiming that people (such as myself) who
>> > claim otherwise are ignorant of the law.
>> >
>> > I think you're being rather presumptuous.
>>
>> The first threshold issue for treating the GPL as some sort of pure
>> copyright license is finding a basis in law for such treatment. The
>> US Copyright Act does not mention such a thing. Even in common law
>> countries, agreements to exchange things of value (such as rights
>> reserved under law) are customarily treated as contracts.
>
> I don't really know what a "pure copyright license" means,
> and I'm not arguing that that is the case. [I am arguing,
> elsewhere, that there are some reasonable moral standards
> associated with legal conduct in these areas, and that a
> person could be sued for neglecting those issues. But
> that's tangential in this context.[
>
> I am arguing, here, that the scope of that license does not
> include making unlicensed collective works.
This is circularly true. No license licenses (permits) acts that it
does not license.
>> Claiming he is being presumptuous without supporting that claim does
>> not help; it makes it seem like you have no better argument than a
>> belief that you and the FSF share.
>
> My claim that he's being presumption is based on this
> concept of his claims:
>
> < < Further, you're claiming that violations of that license must
> < < be treated by the court as conduct within the scope of that
> < < contract.
>
> This claim of his is too broad to be valid in all cases.
I do not read his argument as meaning that. I read his argument and
case citations as meaning that, when a contract exists, a court would
have to determine the proper forms of liability and relief by looking
at the contract first.
My layperson's interpretation of the rationale is that since the
contract is specific to the parties, it defines their rights and
responsibilities -- within the bounds of the contract -- rather than
using those defined by statute.
Michael Poole
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