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Re: GPL and linking (was: Urgently need GPL compatible libsnmp5-dev replacement :-()



Raul Miller wrote:

On 5/9/05, Michael K. Edwards <m.k.edwards@gmail.com> wrote:
On 5/8/05, Raul Miller <moth.debian@gmail.com> wrote:
The only time a collective work is not a derivative work is when the
the collective work lacks sufficient originality under copyright law
to be granted separate copyright protection.
This is not true under the Berne Convention or under 17 USC as I read
them; indeed, the term "collective works" and its superset
"compilations" appear to be explicitly reserved in 17 USC 101 (1976
and later) for classes of "original works of authorship".  As I
discuss below, there are considerable grounds for believing that the
category "derivative works" is completely disjoint from "collective
works".  Is there a lawyer in the house?

17 USC 101: "A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works"
how much plainer do you need this t

I'm asserting that copyrightable collective works are derivatives
of the contained works.  Can you show me some legal basis
to believe otherwise?
Could you quote 17 USC 101 in full, please, ?

[stuff I wrote about Quagga -> net-snmp -> libssl]
This doesn't seem to be put together logically.  Appearing in VM
seems to me to fall under mere aggregation unless there's also
some specific use of non-exported functionality.
Evidently you missed or have forgotten the origin of this thread,
which still retains "Urgently need GPL compatible libsnmp5-dev
replacement" in its title.  Quagga is not a virtual machine, it is a
routing daemon.  (I can understand your being misled by my poor usage
of "running inside".)  It can be linked against the net-snmp library
in order to publish routing tables to snmpd; in the Debian build, that
pulls in libssl (against which net-snmp is linked to provide SNMP v3
functionality), which (in the FSF's reading, not mine) triggers a GPL
violation.  Automatically terminating the GPL with respect to Quagga,
etc., etc.

I haven't studied that issue, and so don't have much of an opinion
about it.  However, it certainly sounds like libssl could be a part of
Quagga.

To be a part of Quagga (instead of mere aggregation), I'd expect more
libssl to mean more than "it just sits there'. Can you show that creative elements of libssl are a part of Quagga? Does libssl
do anything significant here?

If your concern is only a reference by name, and sitting there in
memory, you have the same issues with emacs when it's
editting a non-free document.

This seems to be based on a concept of "derivative works" which
is at odds with that held by the U.S. Copyright office.

I highly recommend you read circular 14, and pay particular
attention to the examples which use the phrase "based on".
Let me get this straight.  You are offering me, as sufficient legal
precedent to outweigh the text of the Berne Convention and of 17 USC
(in which "compilations" and "derivative works" are always both stated
when both are meant), ... an instruction sheet for filling out a
copyright registration form?  Even if you interpret that document
correctly to say that "collective works" \subset "derivative works"
(which I do not immediately see grounds to read into it), what status
as a legal precedent to you expect it to have?

What text, specifically, are you referring to?   I've read the Berne
Convention and 17 USC 101, and I don't see any statement there
that these are disjoint concepts.  They are different concepts, but
that's not the same thing as disjoint.  I can see that you've stated
that these two concepts are disjoint, but I don't see any legal
reasons for believing that that is the case.
At least in Brazilian Law and hermeneutics, distinct concepts that are separated in an enumeration are considered to be disjoint concepts in principle. IOW: you can modify the work A, creating the derivative work B, and then compile B in an anthology with C. C is not a derivative work of A, B is. C is an anthology work containing B and C. C is not a derivative work of B nor of C. That is everything I have to say about Brazilian statute.

Hmm, ten minutes with FindLaw.  First hit on "collective work" for the
Ninth Circuit:  Columbia Pictures v. Krypton (
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/9455816.html ), from
which I offer you section VII.B.  It cites several authorities to
demonstrate that television episodes offered individually for
broadcast or rental remained separate works for the purpose of damage
calculations even if the copyright holder offers them only as a
complete set -- notwithstanding language in 17 USC 504(c)1 saying that
"all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one
work".  Darn, the key citation Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly
(2nd circ, cert. denied 1976, meaning that the Supremes looked at it
and let it stand) is too old for FindLaw.  Oh, that reminds me; you
are paying attention to the 1976 boundary, right?

As near as I can tell, Feltner was arguing that even though Columbia had a contract entitlnig it to the individual works that the series as
a whole had sufficient new creative content to be a copyrightable
work in and of itself, and that Columbia did not have a contract
that granted it a right to this unique and copyrightable work.

As near as I can tell, the Court held that that was not the case.

Anyways, if my argument were that there were no difference between
"collective" and "derivative" works, then those would be proof that
I was wrong.  But that's not my argument.  I recognize that they
are different.

I'm arguing that these concepts are not disjoint.

Not all collective works have sufficient creative content to be
copyrightable
in their own right.  That means that not all collective works qualify as
derivative works. But since the original works still have copyright protection, it's useful to have a word to discuss this issue.
What is creative in a collective work is the choice and disposition of its contents.

Not all derivative works are based on more than one distinct original
work, so not all derivative works are collective works.
But there are examples of derivative works which are collective works ("Best * of <year>" collections are a fairly classic example). If

you have some legal basis for thinking this is not the case, I'd be interested in hearing about it.
It's a question of having case law when we talk about 17USC (and I don't have any access to it right now), but in case of Brazilian Law (that is not common law) it's a quite simple question of hermeneutics.

Anyways, I'll grant you, the words are different, and you can easily
find
examples of works which are one but not the other.  But "different" and
"disjoint" are different concepts.

<citation article="2" section="3" title="Derivative works">
Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations
of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works
without prejudice to the copyright in the original work.
</citation>

When I look at the text of this treaty:
http://www.cerebalaw.com/berne.htm
I don't see the word "Derivative works" anywhere in that section.

Is that the best you can do?





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