[DONE] wml://security/2016/dsa-36{49,50}.wml
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- --- english/security/2016/dsa-3649.wml 2016-08-18 02:30:59.000000000 +0500
+++ russian/security/2016/dsa-3649.wml 2016-08-18 11:50:42.258936209 +0500
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
- -<define-tag description>security update</define-tag>
+#use wml::debian::translation-check translation="1.1" maintainer="Lev Lamberov"
+<define-tag description>обновление безопаÑ?ноÑ?Ñ?и</define-tag>
<define-tag moreinfo>
- -<p>Felix Doerre and Vladimir Klebanov from the Karlsruhe Institute of
- -Technology discovered a flaw in the mixing functions of GnuPG's random
- -number generator. An attacker who obtains 4640 bits from the RNG can
- -trivially predict the next 160 bits of output.</p>
+<p>ФеликÑ? Ð?оеÑ?Ñ?е и Ð?ладимиÑ? Ð?лебанов из ТеÑ?нологиÑ?еÑ?кого инÑ?Ñ?иÑ?Ñ?Ñ?а
+Ð?аÑ?лÑ?Ñ?Ñ?Ñ? обнаÑ?Ñ?жили Ñ?Ñ?звимоÑ?Ñ?Ñ? в Ñ?меÑ?иваÑ?Ñ?иÑ? Ñ?Ñ?нкÑ?иÑ?Ñ? в коде генеÑ?аÑ?оÑ?а
+Ñ?лÑ?Ñ?айнÑ?Ñ? Ñ?иÑ?ел GnuPG. Ð?лоÑ?мÑ?Ñ?ленник, имеÑ?Ñ?ий 4640 биÑ? из RNG, легко
+можеÑ? пÑ?едÑ?казаÑ?Ñ? Ñ?ледÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ие 160 биÑ? вÑ?вода.</p>
- -<p>A first analysis on the impact of this bug for GnuPG shows that existing
- -RSA keys are not weakened. For DSA and Elgamal keys it is also unlikely
- -that the private key can be predicted from other public information.</p>
+<p>Ð?еÑ?вÑ?й Ñ?Ñ?ап анализа Ñ?Ñ?ой оÑ?ибки в GnuPG показÑ?ваеÑ?, Ñ?Ñ?о Ñ?Ñ?Ñ?еÑ?Ñ?вÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ие
+клÑ?Ñ?и RSA не бÑ?ли оÑ?лабленÑ?. Ð?Ñ?ноÑ?иÑ?елÑ?но клÑ?Ñ?ей DSA и Elgamal Ñ?оже маловеÑ?оÑ?Ñ?но,
+Ñ?Ñ?о закÑ?Ñ?Ñ?Ñ?й клÑ?Ñ? можно пÑ?едÑ?казаÑ?Ñ?, иÑ?Ñ?одÑ? из оÑ?кÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ой инÑ?оÑ?маÑ?ии.</p>
- -<p>For the stable distribution (jessie), this problem has been fixed in
- -version 1.4.18-7+deb8u2.</p>
+<p>Ð? Ñ?Ñ?абилÑ?ном вÑ?пÑ?Ñ?ке (jessie) Ñ?Ñ?а пÑ?облема бÑ?ла иÑ?пÑ?авлена в
+веÑ?Ñ?ии 1.4.18-7+deb8u2.</p>
- -<p>We recommend that you upgrade your gnupg packages.</p>
+<p>РекомендÑ?еÑ?Ñ?Ñ? обновиÑ?Ñ? пакеÑ?Ñ? gnupg.</p>
</define-tag>
# do not modify the following line
- --- english/security/2016/dsa-3650.wml 2016-08-18 02:31:42.000000000 +0500
+++ russian/security/2016/dsa-3650.wml 2016-08-18 11:52:19.605889193 +0500
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
- -<define-tag description>security update</define-tag>
+#use wml::debian::translation-check translation="1.1" maintainer="Lev Lamberov"
+<define-tag description>обновление безопаÑ?ноÑ?Ñ?и</define-tag>
<define-tag moreinfo>
- -<p>Felix Doerre and Vladimir Klebanov from the Karlsruhe Institute of
- -Technology discovered a flaw in the mixing functions of Libgcrypt's
- -random number generator. An attacker who obtains 4640 bits from the RNG
- -can trivially predict the next 160 bits of output.</p>
+<p>ФеликÑ? Ð?оеÑ?Ñ?е и Ð?ладимиÑ? Ð?лебанов из ТеÑ?нологиÑ?еÑ?кого инÑ?Ñ?иÑ?Ñ?Ñ?а
+Ð?аÑ?лÑ?Ñ?Ñ?Ñ? обнаÑ?Ñ?жили Ñ?Ñ?звимоÑ?Ñ?Ñ? в Ñ?меÑ?иваÑ?Ñ?иÑ? Ñ?Ñ?нкÑ?иÑ?Ñ? в коде генеÑ?аÑ?оÑ?а
+Ñ?лÑ?Ñ?айнÑ?Ñ? Ñ?иÑ?ел GnuPG. Ð?лоÑ?мÑ?Ñ?ленник, имеÑ?Ñ?ий 4640 биÑ? из RNG, легко
+можеÑ? пÑ?едÑ?казаÑ?Ñ? Ñ?ледÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ие 160 биÑ? вÑ?вода.</p>
- -<p>A first analysis on the impact of this bug for GnuPG shows that existing
- -RSA keys are not weakened. For DSA and Elgamal keys it is also unlikely
- -that the private key can be predicted from other public information.</p>
+<p>Ð?еÑ?вÑ?й Ñ?Ñ?ап анализа Ñ?Ñ?ой оÑ?ибки в GnuPG показÑ?ваеÑ?, Ñ?Ñ?о Ñ?Ñ?Ñ?еÑ?Ñ?вÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ие
+клÑ?Ñ?и RSA не бÑ?ли оÑ?лабленÑ?. Ð?Ñ?ноÑ?иÑ?елÑ?но клÑ?Ñ?ей DSA и Elgamal Ñ?оже маловеÑ?оÑ?Ñ?но,
+Ñ?Ñ?о закÑ?Ñ?Ñ?Ñ?й клÑ?Ñ? можно пÑ?едÑ?казаÑ?Ñ?, иÑ?Ñ?одÑ? из оÑ?кÑ?Ñ?Ñ?ой инÑ?оÑ?маÑ?ии.</p>
- -<p>For the stable distribution (jessie), this problem has been fixed in
- -version 1.6.3-2+deb8u2.</p>
+<p>Ð? Ñ?Ñ?абилÑ?ном вÑ?пÑ?Ñ?ке (jessie) Ñ?Ñ?а пÑ?облема бÑ?ла иÑ?пÑ?авлена в
+веÑ?Ñ?ии 1.6.3-2+deb8u2.</p>
- -<p>We recommend that you upgrade your libgcrypt20 packages.</p>
+<p>РекомендÑ?еÑ?Ñ?Ñ? обновиÑ?Ñ? пакеÑ?Ñ? libgcrypt20.</p>
</define-tag>
# do not modify the following line
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