Bug#381677: initramfs-tools: Temporary files and initramfs world-readable

[maximilian attems <maks@sternwelten.at>]

On Sun, Aug 13, 2006 at 12:13:13PM +0200, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2006 11:26:02 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
<snipp>
> > please specify the info:
> > i'm not 100% familiar with yaird code, so i'd be happy to know which
> > only root readable part might get exposed?
> 
> I don't know which files the local admin chooses to hide from its local
> users.

well that is easily done by setting /boot 0700
or even tighter with selinux permissions.
 
> Backup routines ought to make sure to use equal or tighter access
> rights than the originals copied. Same goes for ramdisk builders, IMHO.

well targetting Debian default, this is handwaving until a special
file is named. in the case of loop-aes i understand that the gpg key
is a problem, but in general you didn't provide a backup for a leak
claim:

a) /lib/modules is readable by anybody
b) same goes with /boot/config that yaird uses
c) /proc/cmdline, /proc/mount gives lots of info

so please be specific about the leakage.
it is certainly against Debian standard permission setup.
i may declare it needlessly paranoid.
 
 
> > hmm indeed netboot should be supported out of the box,
> > that is an counterarg.
> 
> Copying info as root and then exposing it to the whole (local) network
> is certainly the special case, not a counter argument of maintaining
> security in general!

which security? - again handwaving, please pinpoint an actual case
in a Debian default setup.

thanks + regards.

-- 
maks