Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: bookworm
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
X-Debbugs-Cc: pandoc@packages.debian.org, Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org>
Control: affects -1 + src:pandoc
[ Reason ]
pandoc 2.17.1.1-1.1 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-35936: Arbitrary file write
vulnerability via specially crafted image element in the input when generating
files using the `--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format.
The Security Team decided not to issue a DSA for that CVE, but it's now fixed in
buster-security (2.2.1-3+deb10u1) as well as sid (2.17.1.1-2), so it makes sense
to fix it via (o)s-pu too.
[ Impact ]
For users uprading from buster-security to bookworm, that would be a security
regression.
[ Tests ]
A new unit test was added upstream, and backported along with the code fixes. I
also manually verified that the PoC were fixed.
[ Risks ]
Regression risks are low: all upstream commits applied cleanly, and test coverage
is good. (Upstream changes to pandoc.cabal are a no-op as far as debian packaging
is concerned.)
[ Checklist ]
[x] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog
[x] I reviewed all changes and I approve them
[x] attach debdiff against the package in stable
[x] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable
[ Changes ]
* Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI.
* Fix CVE-2023-35936 and CVE-2023-38745: Arbitrary file write vulnerability via
specially crafted image element in the input when generating files using the
`--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format. (Closes: #1041976)
--
Guilhem.
diffstat for pandoc-2.17.1.1 pandoc-2.17.1.1
changelog | 17 +++++
copyright_hints | 6 +
patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch | 24 +++++++
patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++
patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
patches/series | 6 +
salsa-ci.yml | 9 ++
10 files changed, 492 insertions(+)
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2022-11-19 14:13:51.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+pandoc (2.17.1.1-2~deb12u1) bookworm; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Rebuild for bookworm.
+ * Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI.
+
+ -- Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 23:01:50 +0200
+
+pandoc (2.17.1.1-2) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * add patches cherry-picked upstream
+ to fix arbitrary file write vulnerability;
+ closes: bug#1041976, thanks to Guilhem Moulin;
+ CVE-2023-35936 CVE-2023-35936
+
+ -- Jonas Smedegaard <dr@jones.dk> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 18:43:57 +0200
+
pandoc (2.17.1.1-1.1) unstable; urgency=low
* Non-maintainer upload.
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -236,6 +236,12 @@
debian/pandoc.lintian-overrides
debian/patches/020220218~2a70d9c.patch
debian/patches/020220531~9aff861.patch
+ debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch
+ debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch
+ debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch
+ debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch
+ debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch
+ debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch
debian/patches/series
debian/rules
debian/source/format
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+Description: fix a security vulnerability in MediaBag and T.P.Class.IO.writeMedia
+ This vulnerability, discovered by Entroy C,
+ allows users to write arbitrary files to any location
+ by feeding pandoc a specially crafted URL in an image element.
+ The vulnerability is serious
+ for anyone using pandoc to process untrusted input.
+ The vulnerability does not affect pandoc
+ when run with the `--sandbox` flag.
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5e381e3
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
+ import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings)
+ import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType )
+ import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo)
+-import Network.URI (unEscapeString)
++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI)
+ import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing)
+ import System.Environment (getEnv)
+ import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise)
+@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@
+
+ openURL :: (PandocMonad m, MonadIO m) => Text -> m (B.ByteString, Maybe MimeType)
+ openURL u
+- | Just u'' <- T.stripPrefix "data:" u = do
+- let mime = T.takeWhile (/=',') u''
+- let contents = UTF8.fromString $
+- unEscapeString $ T.unpack $ T.drop 1 $ T.dropWhile (/=',') u''
+- return (decodeLenient contents, Just mime)
++ | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:",
++ uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do
++ let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath
++ let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest
++ return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime))
+ | otherwise = do
+ let toReqHeader (n, v) = (CI.mk (UTF8.fromText n), UTF8.fromText v)
+ customHeaders <- map toReqHeader <$> getsCommonState stRequestHeaders
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
+ -> m ()
+ writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do
+ -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform
+- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp
++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp
+ liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath)
+ logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs
+
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -28,12 +28,13 @@
+ import qualified Data.Map as M
+ import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isNothing)
+ import Data.Typeable (Typeable)
++import Network.URI (unEscapeString)
+ import System.FilePath
+ import Text.Pandoc.MIME (MimeType, getMimeTypeDef, extensionFromMimeType)
+ import Data.Text (Text)
+ import qualified Data.Text as T
+ import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest)
+-import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI)
++import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI)
+
+ data MediaItem =
+ MediaItem
+@@ -52,9 +53,12 @@
+ instance Show MediaBag where
+ show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag)
+
+--- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form.
++-- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding
++-- is resolved.
+ canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text
+-canonicalize = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise
++canonicalize fp
++ | isURI fp = T.pack fp
++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp
+
+ -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds
+ -- to the given path.
+@@ -77,22 +81,22 @@
+ , mediaContents = contents
+ , mediaMimeType = mt }
+ fp' = canonicalize fp
++ fp'' = T.unpack fp'
+ uri = parseURI fp
+- newpath = if isRelative fp
++ newpath = if isRelative fp''
+ && isNothing uri
+- && ".." `notElem` splitDirectories fp
+- then T.unpack fp'
++ && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp')
++ then fp''
+ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext
+- fallback = case takeExtension fp of
+- ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp
+- _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp
++ fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of
++ ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp''
++ _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp''
+ mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime
+- path = maybe fp uriPath uri
++ path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri
+ ext = case takeExtension path of
+ '.':e -> e
+ _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt
+
+-
+ -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents.
+ lookupMedia :: FilePath
+ -> MediaBag
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Description: fix bug in git commit 5e381e3
+ In the new code a comma mysteriously turned into a period.
+ This would have prevented proper separation
+ of the mime type and content in data uris.
+ Thanks to @hseg for catching this.
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/54561e9
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
+ openURL u
+ | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:",
+ uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do
+- let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath
++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath
+ let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest
+ return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime))
+ | otherwise = do
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Description: more fixes to git commit 5e381e3
+ These changes recognize that parseURI does not unescape the path.
+ .
+ Another change is that the canonical form
+ of the path used as the MediaBag key
+ retains percent-encoding, if present;
+ we only unescape the string when writing to a file.
+ .
+ Some tests are needed before the issue can be closed.
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/df4f13b
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/issues/8918
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
+ import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings)
+ import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType )
+ import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo)
+-import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI)
++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI, unEscapeString)
+ import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing)
+ import System.Environment (getEnv)
+ import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise)
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
+ openURL u
+ | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:",
+ uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do
+- let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath
++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') $ unEscapeString upath
+ let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest
+ return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime))
+ | otherwise = do
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
+ -> m ()
+ writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do
+ -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform
+- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp
++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp
+ liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath)
+ logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs
+
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ import qualified Data.Text as T
+ import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest)
+ import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI)
++import Data.List (isInfixOf)
+
+ data MediaItem =
+ MediaItem
+@@ -54,11 +55,11 @@
+ show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag)
+
+ -- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding
+--- is resolved.
++-- is not resolved.
+ canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text
+ canonicalize fp
+ | isURI fp = T.pack fp
+- | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp
++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise $ fp
+
+ -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds
+ -- to the given path.
+@@ -81,11 +82,11 @@
+ , mediaContents = contents
+ , mediaMimeType = mt }
+ fp' = canonicalize fp
+- fp'' = T.unpack fp'
++ fp'' = unEscapeString $ T.unpack fp'
+ uri = parseURI fp
+ newpath = if isRelative fp''
+ && isNothing uri
+- && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp')
++ && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'')
+ then fp''
+ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext
+ fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+Description: add tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/fe62da6
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/pandoc.cabal
++++ b/pandoc.cabal
+@@ -791,6 +791,7 @@
+ tasty-lua >= 1.0 && < 1.1,
+ tasty-quickcheck >= 0.8 && < 0.11,
+ text >= 1.1.1.0 && < 2.1,
++ temporary >= 1.1 && < 1.4,
+ time >= 1.5 && < 1.14,
+ xml >= 1.3.12 && < 1.4,
+ zip-archive >= 0.2.3.4 && < 0.5
+@@ -800,6 +801,7 @@
+ Tests.Lua
+ Tests.Lua.Module
+ Tests.Shared
++ Tests.MediaBag
+ Tests.Readers.LaTeX
+ Tests.Readers.HTML
+ Tests.Readers.JATS
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
++module Tests.MediaBag (tests) where
++
++import Test.Tasty
++import Test.Tasty.HUnit
++-- import Tests.Helpers
++import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode)
++import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory)
++import System.FilePath
++import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B
++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory)
++
++tests :: [TestTree]
++tests = [
++ testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $
++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do
++ olddir <- getCurrentDirectory
++ setCurrentDirectory tmpdir
++ copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg"
++ let d = B.doc $
++ B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <>
++ B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <>
++ B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
++ B.para (B.image "" "" mempty)
++ runIOorExplode $ do
++ fillMediaBag d
++ extractMedia "foo" d
++ exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg")
++ assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1
++ exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg")
++ assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2
++ exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua")
++ exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua"
++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location"
++ (exists3 && not exists4)
++ exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif")
++ assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5
++ setCurrentDirectory olddir
++ ]
+--- a/test/test-pandoc.hs
++++ b/test/test-pandoc.hs
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ import qualified Tests.Writers.AnnotatedTable
+ import qualified Tests.Writers.TEI
+ import qualified Tests.Writers.Markua
++import qualified Tests.MediaBag
+ import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory)
+
+ tests :: FilePath -> TestTree
+@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@
+ [ Tests.Command.tests
+ , testGroup "Old" (Tests.Old.tests pandocPath)
+ , testGroup "Shared" Tests.Shared.tests
++ , testGroup "MediaBag" Tests.MediaBag.tests
+ , testGroup "Writers"
+ [ testGroup "Native" Tests.Writers.Native.tests
+ , testGroup "ConTeXt" Tests.Writers.ConTeXt.tests
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Description: improve tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia
+ Ensure that the current directory is not changed up if a test fails,
+ and fix messages for the assertion failures.
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5246f02
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@
+ -- import Tests.Helpers
+ import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode)
+ import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory)
++import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory)
+ import System.FilePath
+ import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B
+-import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory)
++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile)
+
+ tests :: [TestTree]
+ tests = [
+ testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $
+- withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do
+- olddir <- getCurrentDirectory
+- setCurrentDirectory tmpdir
++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> inDirectory tmpdir $ do
+ copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg"
+ let d = B.doc $
+ B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <>
+@@ -26,14 +25,13 @@
+ fillMediaBag d
+ extractMedia "foo" d
+ exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg")
+- assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1
++ assertBool "file in directory is not extracted with original name" exists1
+ exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg")
+- assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2
++ assertBool "file above directory is not extracted with hashed name" exists2
+ exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua")
+ exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua"
+- assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location"
++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir"
+ (exists3 && not exists4)
+ exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif")
+- assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5
+- setCurrentDirectory olddir
++ assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5
+ ]
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+Description: ix new variant of the vulnerability in CVE-2023-35936
+ Guilhem Moulin noticed that the fix to CVE-2023-35936 was incomplete.
+ An attacker could get around it
+ by double-encoding the malicious extension
+ to create or override arbitrary files.
+ .
+ $ echo '' >b.md
+ $ .cabal/bin/pandoc b.md --extract-media=bar
+ <p><img
+ src="bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fb%2elua" /></p>
+ $ cat b.lua
+ print "hello"
+ $ find bar
+ bar/
+ bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+
+ .
+ This commit adds a test case for this more complex attack
+ and fixes the vulnerability.
+ (The fix is quite simple:
+ if the URL-unescaped filename or extension contains a '%',
+ we just use the sha1 hash of the contents as the canonical name,
+ just as we do if the filename contains '..'.)
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/eddedbf
+Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
+Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
+Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-38745
+Forwarded: yes
+Last-Update: 2023-07-25
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@
+ -> m ()
+ writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do
+ -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform
++ -- we unescape URI encoding, but given how insertMedia
++ -- is written, we shouldn't have any % in a canonical media name...
+ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp
+ liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath)
+ logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs
+--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -87,16 +87,17 @@
+ newpath = if isRelative fp''
+ && isNothing uri
+ && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'')
++ && '%' `notElem` fp''
+ then fp''
+- else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext
++ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> ext
+ fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of
+ ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp''
+ _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp''
+ mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime
+ path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri
+ ext = case takeExtension path of
+- '.':e -> e
+- _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt
++ '.':e | '%' `notElem` e -> '.':e
++ _ -> maybe "" (\x -> '.':T.unpack x) $ extensionFromMimeType mt
+
+ -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents.
+ lookupMedia :: FilePath
+--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ let d = B.doc $
+ B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <>
+ B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <>
+- B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
+ B.para (B.image "" "" mempty)
+ runIOorExplode $ do
+ fillMediaBag d
+@@ -34,4 +34,14 @@
+ (exists3 && not exists4)
+ exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif")
+ assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5
++ -- double-encoded version:
++ let e = B.doc $
++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua" "" mempty)
++ runIOorExplode $ do
++ fillMediaBag e
++ extractMedia "bar" e
++ exists6 <- doesFileExist ("bar" </> "772ceca21a2751863ec46cb23db0e7fc35b9cff8.png")
++ exists7 <- doesFileExist "b.lua"
++ assertBool "data uri with double-encoded malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir"
++ (exists6 && not exists7)
+ ]
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
020220218~2a70d9c.patch
020220531~9aff861.patch
+020230620~5e381e3.patch
+020230623.1~54561e9.patch
+020230623.2~df4f13b.patch
+020230623.3~fe62da6.patch
+020230623.4~5246f02.patch
+020230720~eddedbf.patch
2001_templates_avoid_privacy_breach.patch
2002_program_package_hint.patch
diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml
--- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+---
+include:
+ - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/recipes/debian.yml
+
+variables:
+ RELEASE: 'bookworm'
+ SALSA_CI_DISABLE_REPROTEST: 1
+ SALSA_CI_DISABLE_LINTIAN: 1
+ SALSA_CI_DISABLE_BLHC: 1
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