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[Freedombox-discuss] making freedombox traffic indistinguishable [was: Re: Announcing Santiago Release Candidate 1]



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On 22/05/12 23:16, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 05/22/2012 12:26 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
>> As I said before, this isn't necessarily a problem - it just
>> raises the question of whether it's a design goal for the
>> FreedomBox's traffic to be hard to distinguish from other
>> traffic.
> 
> Complete indistinguishability for both client and server against
> an active attacker who is willing to break some handshakes to
> identify at least one of the parties involved is a seriously
> difficult (possibly intractable) problem.

Yes, very difficult! However, I was thinking of a slightly less
difficult problem: indistinguishability against a passive attacker who
doesn't care about the identities of the parties involved, but just
wants to distinguish FreedomBox traffic from other TLS traffic.

It seems to me that using PGP-based certs would make the attacker's
job easier than using "normal" self-signed X.509 certs, because lots
of people already use those.

Cheers,
Michael
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