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Re: my iptables script



On Monday 01 September 2003 14:20, José Guzmán wrote:
>  I´d also set the default policy to DROP and log whatever is dropped in the
> end:

I specifically avoid doing that on the INPUT and OUTPUT chains for the single 
reason that a non-careful use of 'iptables -F' can break your access to the 
machine, generally requiring physical access to it to recover, not so good 
when you remotely manage all of your servers. I have no problem setting the 
policy to DROP for the FORWARD chain though.

> #!/bin/sh
> iptables -F
> iptables -X
>
> for tabla in nat mangle ; do
>   iptables -F -t $tabla
>   iptables -X -t $tabla
> done

You miss the default 'filter' table above. 'for tabla in filter nat mangle ; 
do'

>  Also, if I had the chance and time, I´d be more picky about accepting
> every new connection in the OUTPUT chain, call me paranoid but I prefer to
> allow only what´s needed and nothing more; although it may be less flexible
> and requires more maintenance.

The only packets that should hit the OUTPUT chain are packets that originate 
on the machine itself. I'm usually not too concerned about it because if 
someone has gained access to the box in the first place then you're already 
in trouble. That said, yes, you could lock down the OUTPUT chain to, say, 
only allow established ssh traffic to a machine on your local network, or 
whatever. It would depend on what other services this machine is 
using/offering. Simply dropping '--state NEW' from the OUTPUT chain might be 
enough if you are worried about the machine being compromised and used for 
illegitimate outbound traffic.

I tend to leave these sort of rules for the INPUT chain, and leave the OUTPUT 
chain fairly sparse to reduce complexity. I often find that increasing the 
complexity of firewalls tends to increase the chance of making errors (and 
thus allowing undesired traffic).

t
-- 
GPG: http://n12turbo.com/tarragon/public.key



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