On Fri, Mar 21, 2025 at 01:11:20AM +0100, Guillem Jover wrote:
On Thu, 2025-03-20 at 22:00:04 +0100, Christoph Biedl wrote:Being one of those on the list, I'm even more confused than I'd be about this anyway.Ok, let me try to clarify, then!So those people you listed: * Did they something wrong (although certainly with best intentions)?I don't think so, or at least if they did something explicitly, probably not wrong at the time they did it.
No fault on the part of the user. Previous versions of GnuPG had defaults whereby even if you generated a large RSA key, rather than a 1024 bit DSA key, it would use SHA-1 for UID + subkey binding signatures. It took some explicit manual configuration before a key was ever created to avoid this.
* Is this a problem if apparently everything went fine in the many past years?I think there's widespread agreement that using SHA-1 in a security context is not wise at this point in time. The problem is that when using GnuPG this is sometimes invisible unless asked for explicitly.
My understanding is that there aren't any known attacks against SHA-1 self-sigs in OpenPGP at present. Given the issues with SHA-1 migration away from it makes sense, but it's Sequoia making a decision to treat SHA-1 self-sigs as no longer valid, combined with dpkg's switch to Sequoia, that's driving the issue here.
I note that the Sequoia lint checks are not available in bookworm, you need to use the version in trixie/sid.
I'm happy to try to address anything that seems unclear, or get someone else who might be able to answer! And as Holger suggested elsewhere, we can probably also create a FAQ on the wiki with some of this to point to people.
Thanks for doing this, Guillem. J. -- ] https://www.earth.li/~noodles/ [] "f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n [ ] PGP/GPG Key @ the.earth.li [] cmptr prgrmmng." -- Simon Cozens, [ ] via keyserver, web or email. [] ox.os.linux [ ] RSA: 4096/0x94FA372B2DA8B985 [] [