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Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian



Your work is valuable. Many of the things have probably evolved over
time and could use some analysis based on modern cryptography and
security practices. I just wanted to point out that there are subtle
but important differences outside of the key and signature formats.

The most important distinction is probably the one of personal keys on
the one hand which purpose is to identify a developer and the Release
keys which are stored on some build servers to create Release files.

You cannot only have PGP keys signing each other (like CAs and leaf
certificates in X.509 PKI). PGP has subkeys and they could be used in
the release process to mitigate risks.

Example:
1. Debian creates a PGP key for releases.
2. The public key is installed in Debian to verify releases.
3. The release team creates subkeys for signing.
4. The main private key is stored in a restricted place.
5. The build server only uses the subkeys to sign releases.

The subkeys could be expired and rotated all the time without changing
the PGP fingerprint and therefore without changing the trusted key ring
in the Debian installations. I do not know whether Debian actually
makes use of this, or it has been discussed before.

Regards
Stephan

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