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Re: Debian package manager privilege escalation attack



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On Wed, 2021-08-11 at 23:30 -0400, Timothy M Butterworth wrote:
> All,
> 
> I just ran across this article
> https://blog.ikuamike.io/posts/2021/package_managers_privesc/ I tested
> the attacks on Debian 11 and they work successfully giving me a root
> shell prompt.
> 
> Tim

Thank you for bringing this to everyone's attention. This are very real
vulnerabilities. NPM has similar issues with stopping malicious packages
from being published to the FTP server. They have made some improvements
after they were aware of the issue, but I haven't heard any new
developments at NPM about how to stop malicious packages from making it
to the server.  Malicious packages can and do make it into the
dependency sets of popular packages. This is a problem. I don't think
that any amount of human effort and attention can prevent malicious
packages from making it to the FTP server. I think that AI would be
better-equipped to handle the critical checks necessary for FTP upload
security to be top-of-the-line. The AI couldn't just be left unchecked,
though, and humans are still needed to monitor, tweak, and make sure the
AI is working and behaving in a responsible manner. As far as behaving
responsibly is concerned, the main issue I foresee is having the AI flag
false positives, and making sure the AI doesn't evolve into something
insidious. I'm not sure if that last point can exist within limited AI,
because I am not an AI expert.

Perhaps a workaround for users right now would be to have a user with
package management sudo access, and not much else. sudo access for
package managers would have to be disallowed at the root and [other]
user levels. I am not even sure that this would even work for all use
cases, and having a manual ad-hoc hotfix is far from ideal. What does
the Debian community think about this?

Also, we should notify our upstream projects, and the Linux community as
a whole, of these vulnerabilities. I believe that to be a moral
obligation.
- -- 
Best regards,

Brian T.
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