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Re: Standardizing the layout of git packaging repositories



Am 16.08.2014 18:20, schrieb Russ Allbery:
> Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> writes:
>> On 08/16/2014 07:05 AM, Jeremy Stanley wrote:
> 
>>> However upstream may build tarballs through a (hopefully
>>> repeatable/automated) process at release time, publish checksums and
>>> signatures for them, et cetera and prefer packagers use those as the
>>> original tarballs for official release versions.
> 
>> And then? If I prefer to use their git repository, and create my own
>> orig.tar.xz out of a signed git tag, what is the problem, as long as I
>> use the tag they provided by upstream?
> 
> Suppose someone wants to check (possibly as part of a forensic
> investigation) that the source in Debian matches the source released and
> signed by upstream.  If you reuse the upstream tarball, the signature is
> valid, so this is as simple as verifying the Debian *.orig.tar.xz file
> against the upstream signature or a checksum of a good copy of the
> upstream source.  If you regenerate the tarball, those checksums are no
> longer valid, and now someone has to unpack both tarballs and compare all
> of the files (and, depending on what they're checking, permissions and
> other metadata) individually.

More importantly (at least in my experience): If you are working in a
team and you regenerate the tarball from git, it's very likely that the
md5sum of the generated tarball differs from what has been uploaded to
the archive by a different team maintainer in a previous upload,
resulting in a reject by dak.


-- 
Why is it that all of the instruments seeking intelligent life in the
universe are pointed away from Earth?

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