* Andreas Barth (aba@not.so.argh.org) wrote: > * Stephen Frost (sfrost@snowman.net) [051026 20:13]: > > This is just patently false, as has been pointed out elsewhere. What > > security hole, exactly, is created by orphaning a file? > > Well, if some process (maybe within the package) creates a private log > file that contains sensitive information, and this log file can later on > be read by a process with much less privileges, this is usually > considered as security relevant issue. Except log files are supposed to be removed and I don't know of any actual case of this happening anyway. Additionally, this is *not* a problem with the orphaning of the file, it's a problem with the reuse of a previously-used uid. I could see adding a system to track previously-used uids and not reusing them. I don't believe using passwd for that (and keeping unused accounts in passwd/shadow/group/gshadow/etc) is appropriate. It would seem enough to me, at least, to keep an ever-increasing counter where the current value is the next available uid. This could be reset if it reaches the max, or an error presented to the user about it or some such. I'm not convinced that's necessary but I could see it being something reasonable to do. Just leaving around unused accounts isn't reasonable. Thanks, Stephen
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature