Re: SPF
* Adam Majer (adamm@galacticasoftware.com) [040724 06:40]:
> Indeed. SRS breaks SPF. SPF seems to be good only for direct mailing
> domains. It essentially breaks all lists.
>
> I guess the only way to allow forwarding is for the MTA to sign each
> outgoing message and then to publish the public key in the DNS. I don't
> see another way around it.
A combination of SPF and signing could be interessting. So, the
signature is only checked if SPF fails (and this saves time on the
receiving side if the message is not forwarded). Hm, perhaps this can
be done by just adding additional items like:
"sign:outmx1.domain.invalid", and outmx1.domain.invalid has it's
proper key in it's own dns entry.
Cheers,
Andi
--
http://home.arcor.de/andreas-barth/
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