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Authentication enhancements (was Re: Backport of the integer overflow in the brk system call)

On Mon, Dec 08, 2003 at 01:28:20PM +1100, Russell Coker wrote:
> But this still leaves the issue of how to deal with dial-up machines.  Even if 
> we restrict connections to a single ISP as often dial-up machines are not 
> used with multiple machines, this still isn't necessarily much good, some 
> dial-up ISPs have >50,000 IP addresses.

Your other very good points not withstanding, I was thinking along the
lines of the user's id substituting for the ip address in the
verification process.  User authentication would require a matched user
id & host id or a warning would be triggered.  

I didn't claim it was a perfect solution, I don't even claim it as a 
*good* solution.  It would be another layer of checks in the 
authentication process, with the benefit of not costing much in
terms of money.  

> Finally, if the attacker can compromise the machine and the machine is online 
> (EG permanently connected machines) there's no good options.

That is true for many of the suggested additions.  Once a trusted
machine is compromised, it's game over.  My suggestion would only send
up a flag if the attacker attempted to access project machines from
a host the user had not registered (assuming he did not know enough to
steal the host's key first).  If we could tie the host key to a unique
property of the physical host it would help.

In any event, I think there is merit in requiring a user / host
authentication pair if we can come up with a method of tying the host
key to the hardware.

I would be willing to work on such a task, if others also think it might
have merit.


Patrick Ouellette
Amateur Radio: KB8PYM 

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