[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: OT: Smartcards and Physical Security [Was: Re: Backport of the integer overflow in the brk system call]



On Tue, 02 Dec 2003, Tom wrote:
> Yes but the attacker did not "steal" the DD's computer.  He rooted it
> remotely.

So the machine is rooted remotely, the DD logs into a debian box even
using our new fangled smart cards, and the attacker still can control
the connection.

In this particular intrusion vector, the use of a smart card merely
means that the attacker has to trojan the ssh binary on the
compromised machine and use it to run a command that opens a shell
under the DD's uid on a non-privledged port, thus circumventing the
smart card in its entirety.

If you log into a machine from a compromised machine using any means I
can forsee today, the attacker can always control the account of the
machine logged into, because the attacker effectively become the user
of the machine.


Don Armstrong

-- 
Tell me something interesting about yourself.
Lie if you have to.
 -- hugh macleod http://www.gapingvoid.com/archives/batch20.php

http://www.donarmstrong.com
http://www.anylevel.com
http://rzlab.ucr.edu

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Reply to: