Re: Bug#58640: wrapper does not handle fakeroot well
On Wed, Feb 23, 2000 at 02:57:34PM +0000, Colin Phipps wrote:
> > I was writing the wrapper when you message hit my mutt.
> > Find it attached.
> I think you've got a little too paranoid here (understandable in the
> context of this thread ;):
Yeah, but paranoia harms little. This thread has generated a couple
_real_ security fixes in man-db, and this is GOOD(TM).
(even if I've not replied to your bug, I've applied it :-)
> > I tryed to make a quite general one, with a fixed table of programs that
> > can be run trhough it (just hardlink it).
> > Maybe this wrapper can be moved to a more general package and have man
> > hardlink to it?
> Maybe there should be a symlink farm, /usr/lib/setuid-wrappered/ or
> something, with symlinks like
> man -> /usr/lib/man-db/man
> mandb -> /usr/lib/man-db/mandb
> uucp -> (maybe)
> ppp -> (maybe)
> others perhaps
> and this program could just look for the right link. There's no need to
> hard code the table then, and packages can just drop links in to extend it.
> Anyway this is only speculative, for now only man will need it.
You need three info: the name of the command issued, the pathname of the
program to exec, the name of the user or group to set in case of root.
There used to be a setuid manager program during Lameter's times ...
could it be a good candidate to manage this stuff? Adam?
> One bug I just thought of in my submission, it will break man -l for root.
> We'll have to drop the chdir.
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