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Re: Bug#58640: wrapper does not handle fakeroot well

On Tue, Feb 22, 2000 at 09:31:22AM +0200, Fabrizio Polacco wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 21, 2000 at 02:52:27PM -0500, Clint Adams wrote:
> > Package: man-db
> > Version: 2.3.10-71
> > Severity: important
> > 
> > % fakeroot sh
> > sh-2.03# man man
> > Password: 
> > 
> Jeah, it's because of the test 
> 	[ `id -u` = 0 ] 
> Joost, is there a simple way to test if a "root" is a "fakeroot"
> instead?

I am the one who suggested this test over the flawed writablity of
/root, and I knew this would not work with fakeroot, but come on,
please tell me one valid reason for running your shell through
fakeroot? that is just plain silly and you get what you deserve for
doing it IMO.

fakeroot is for building packages as a non root user and ensuring that
the files are owned by the proper users, i cannot think of any reason
why dpkg-buildpackage would need to go read a manpage while doing

this sounds like a complete non-issue IMO.

> >From a shell script or even from a C prog (I'm convincing myself that I
> need to rewrite the wrapper in C and make it suid nobody ... or forget
> this wrapper stuff at all :-).

suid nobody will bring back the original reason for the wrapper in the
first place, the concern was if uid man was compromised it can replace
the man binaries since it owns them, if it were suid nobody if nobody
were compromised it could replace the man binary with a trojan.

Ethan Benson

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